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ABSTRACT 
  This Article challenges the conventional view of contemporary 
international adjudication. It identifies a new generation of 
international tribunals, which has been largely ignored by 
commentators, and argues that these tribunals offer a highly 
successful, alternative model to traditional public-international-law 
adjudicatory bodies. 
  The proliferation of international tribunals is widely regarded as 
one of the most significant developments in international law over the 
past century. The subject has given rise to an extensive and robust 
body of academic commentary. Although commentators reach widely 
divergent conclusions about many aspects of international law and 
adjudication, they all agree that international tribunals differ 
fundamentally from national courts. In particular, according to the 
commentary, international tribunals such as the International Court 
of Justice lack the power to render enforceable decisions or to exercise 
compulsory jurisdiction. 
  This Article argues that commentators have proceeded from a 
flawed and incomplete understanding of contemporary international 
adjudication. Virtually all commentary on the subject ignores the 
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development of a second generation of international tribunals, best 
represented by international commercial and investment tribunals, 
World Trade Organization panels, and claims-settlement 
mechanisms. Contrary to the conventional wisdom about 
international adjudication, this new generation of international 
tribunals has the power to exercise what is effectively compulsory 
jurisdiction and to render enforceable decisions that can often be 
coercively executed against states and their commercial assets. 
  These second-generation tribunals have been the most frequently 
used and, in many respects, the most successful form of international 
adjudication in recent decades. The caseloads of these tribunals have 
grown rapidly over the past forty years and now substantially exceed 
those of traditional public-international-law tribunals. Moreover, an 
analysis of state treatymaking practice over recent decades shows that 
states have virtually never concluded treaties accepting the jurisdiction 
of traditional first-generation tribunals—concluding less than one 
treaty per year—whereas they have frequently accepted the 
jurisdiction of second-generation tribunals capable of rendering 
enforceable decisions—accepting some fifty treaties per year. More 
fundamentally, second-generation tribunals have played an essential 
role in facilitating international trade, finance, and investment; have 
contributed to the development of important fields of international 
law; and have provided leading contemporary examples of 
international law working in practice. 
  Although largely ignored by the commentary, the success and 
frequent use of second-generation tribunals have important 
implications for conventional analysis of international adjudication. 
The success of these tribunals flatly contradicts the claims, advanced 
by a number of academic commentators, that international 
adjudication is unimportant in contemporary international affairs and 
that states do not use international tribunals—particularly tribunals 
that would be effective. In reality, second-generation tribunals have 
been frequently and successfully used in vitally important fields, in 
part because they issue effective and enforceable decisions. At the 
same time, the success of second-generation tribunals also contradicts 
prescriptions, offered by a number of commentators, that future 
international tribunals be modeled on “independent” first-generation 
tribunals or, alternatively, on entirely “dependent” adjudicative 
mechanisms. Successful second-generation tribunals exhibit a blend 
of structural characteristics that defy blanket prescriptions for either 
“independence” or “dependence” and that counsel for more tailored, 
nuanced institutional designs. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The past half-century has seen the development of a rich, highly 
diverse field of international adjudication. The field encompasses 
proceedings before a wide range of tribunals—including international 
courts, such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ); regional 
courts, such as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(IACHR); international arbitral tribunals, such as those constituted 
by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA); and specialized 
international tribunals, such as the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). The emergence of these forms of international adjudication 
is rightly regarded as one of the most important developments in 
international law in recent decades. 
The conventional wisdom is that international tribunals differ 
from national courts in fundamental respects. As Part I of this Article 
discusses, academic commentators from every perspective agree that, 
unlike national courts, international tribunals do not possess 
mandatory jurisdiction and their decisions cannot be coercively 
enforced against states or their assets. Rather, it is said that 
contemporary international tribunals merely “provide information”1 
to states that choose to use them. 
Although they share this premise, commentators vigorously 
debate the efficacy and significance of contemporary forms of 
international adjudication, reaching widely divergent conclusions. 
Proponents of a robust view of international law argue that factors 
such as reciprocity, retaliation, and reputational concerns typically 
lead states to comply with the decisions of international tribunals, 
notwithstanding those decisions’ unenforceable character. These 
commentators regard adjudication as an effective and increasingly 
important aspect of the international legal system. Skeptics, however, 
regard international adjudication, and international law more 
generally, as a marginal aspect of international relations, contending 
that considerations of reciprocity and reputation are relatively 
insignificant in international affairs, particularly where adjudicatory 
mechanisms are concerned. 
Despite their differences, all sides of this debate proceed from an 
incomplete and inaccurate view of contemporary international 
adjudication. In particular, the debate ignores an important new form 
 
 1. Andrew T. Guzman, International Tribunals: A Rational Choice Analysis, 157 U. PA. L. 
REV. 171, 179 (2008). 
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of international adjudication that has developed progressively over 
the past forty years. As Part II discusses, this more recent generation 
of international adjudication departs from traditional models of 
public international law and involves international tribunals whose 
decisions are effectively enforceable against states and whose 
jurisdiction, although limited, is often essentially mandatory. 
Adjudicatory bodies structured on this model include arbitral 
tribunals in investment arbitrations under bilateral and multilateral 
investment treaties; arbitral tribunals established pursuant to 
international commercial-arbitration agreements between states and 
private parties; modern claims-settlement mechanisms, including the 
Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal; dispute-settlement bodies of the WTO; 
and national courts adjudicating decisions against foreign states under 
contemporary foreign-sovereign-immunity legislation. 
Unlike traditional forms of international adjudication, these 
second-generation tribunals do not merely provide information to 
states. Rather, these international tribunals render binding and 
enforceable decisions that can be, and often are, used to seize state 
assets in enforcement proceedings, much like domestic judgments. 
Moreover, in many instances, use of these types of tribunals is 
effectively compulsory for states because such use serves as a 
prerequisite for meaningful participation in contemporary 
international trade and investment relations. 
As Part III discusses, the development of second-generation 
tribunals has important implications for conventional understanding 
of international adjudication. In particular, it affects both assessments 
of the efficacy of contemporary international adjudication and 
prescriptions for the design of future international tribunals. 
First, the development of second-generation tribunals squarely 
contradicts the claims of skeptics who argue that international 
adjudicatory mechanisms, and international law more generally, are 
ineffectual and seldom used. In fact, second-generation tribunals are 
frequently and successfully used to resolve important international 
disputes and play vital roles in contemporary international affairs, 
particularly in the areas of international trade, finance, and 
investment. 
Although they are a relatively recent development, second-
generation tribunals are, by a wide measure, the most frequently used 
forms of international adjudication. The caseloads of second-
generation tribunals have substantially outpaced those of traditional 
international tribunals for more than two decades, now exceeding 
BORN IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 20/12/2011  8:11 AM 
780 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:775 
them by some one-hundred-fold in annual filings, and, while the 
usage of second-generation tribunals continues to expand, that of 
traditional first-generation tribunals stagnates. Likewise, an analysis 
of treaties entered into over the past several decades shows that states 
have provided far more frequently for enforceable adjudication by 
second-generation tribunals than for dispute resolution by traditional 
first-generation tribunals such as the ICJ, the PCA, or the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). Indeed, 
virtually no treaties concluded during the past twenty-five years 
include ICJ submission agreements—less than one per year—whereas 
substantial numbers of treaties include provisions for enforceable 
mechanisms of adjudication—nearly fifty per year. 
Second-generation tribunals also play vitally important roles in 
contemporary international affairs. They routinely issue decisions—
that are both enforceable and, if necessary, enforced—involving 
substantial economic stakes, important national regulatory policies, 
and significant issues of international law. More importantly, the 
availability of second-generation tribunals to render such decisions is 
an essential underpinning of contemporary international-trade and 
investment regimes, and the decisions of these tribunals have been 
central to the development of important bodies of international law in 
fields such as trade, investment, procedure, and remedies. Most 
broadly, the decisions of second-generation tribunals provide 
repeated, tangible examples of international law effectively placing 
significant limitations on state action—including, thus far, deterring 
or providing remedies for expropriatory or arbitrary conduct, 
enforcing multilateral trade rules, and holding states to their 
commercial and other agreements. 
Second, the frequent use and success of second-generation 
tribunals has important implications for prescriptions regarding the 
design of future international tribunals. A number of commentators 
urge that future international tribunals should be designed to 
resemble traditional first-generation tribunals, characterized by the 
attributes of “independent” national appellate courts—standing 
judicial panels, broad and compulsory jurisdiction, and standard 
procedural rules; other commentators prescribe the opposite model 
of “dependent” tribunals that are almost entirely subject to the 
parties’ control and thus lack meaningful authority. The widespread, 
successful use of second-generation tribunals challenges these 
conventional prescriptions, suggesting that these new types of 
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tribunals provide an equally viable—and, arguably, a significantly 
better—model for most forms of international adjudication. 
Importantly, the design of second-generation tribunals differs 
materially from that of either “independent” national courts or 
entirely “dependent” tribunals, instead exhibiting a blend of 
“dependent” and “independent” structural characteristics and 
procedures within more nuanced institutional designs. In particular, 
second-generation adjudication is generally modeled on international 
commercial-arbitration procedures, with a number of putatively 
“dependent” features—tribunals selected by the parties for specific 
cases, limited jurisdictional mandates, and procedural rules tailored to 
particular parties and disputes. At the same time, however, second-
generation adjudicatory mechanisms frequently incorporate limited 
forms of appellate review, typically by somewhat more 
“independent” tribunals. A detailed analysis of these procedural 
aspects of second-generation tribunals and their strengths and 
weaknesses is beyond the scope of this Article. The essential point for 
present purposes is that second-generation tribunals display 
distinctive, nuanced, and effective institutional structures that cannot 
continue to be ignored in prescriptions for future international 
adjudicatory bodies. 
Part I of this Article summarizes the proliferation of 
international tribunals over the past several decades and outlines the 
academic debate on the characteristics and efficacy of those tribunals. 
Part II describes the historical development of international 
adjudicatory mechanisms, focusing on the increasing use of second-
generation tribunals that have the power to make enforceable 
decisions. Finally, Part III addresses the implications of second-
generation tribunals for analysis of the characteristics and efficacy of 
international adjudication, addressing in particular the relative 
success of second-generation tribunals and their importance for 
prescriptions for the design of future forms of international 
adjudication. 
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I.  THE “PROLIFERATION OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND 
TRIBUNALS”2 
A wide variety of international courts and tribunals have 
developed during the past century. The emergence of these various 
methods of adjudicating international disputes is a marked change 
from earlier eras3 and has rightly been described as one of the most 
significant developments in international law during the twentieth 
century.4 This phenomenon has prompted an extensive body of 
academic commentary, variously addressing the “[p]roliferation of 
[i]nternational [c]ourts and [t]ribunals,”5 the growth of “supranational 
adjudication,”6 and the increasing resort to “international tribunals.”7 
This academic commentary has defined international 
adjudication broadly as encompassing any form of adjudicatory or 
quasi-adjudicatory process in which states participate in resolving 
 
 2. Thomas Buergenthal, Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals: Is It Good or 
Bad?, 14 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 267, 267 (2001); see also Cesare P.R. Romano, The Proliferation of 
International Judicial Bodies: The Pieces of the Puzzle, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 709, 709 
(1999) (“When future international legal scholars look back at international law and 
organizations at the end of the twentieth century, they probably will refer to the enormous 
expansion and transformation of the international judiciary as the single most important 
development of the post-Cold War age.”); Stephen M. Schwebel, The Proliferation of 
International Tribunals: Threat or Promise?, in JUDICIAL REVIEW IN INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE 3, 3 (Mads Andenas & Duncan Fairgrieve eds., 2000) (“The creation of new 
international judicial bodies is fundamentally a positive development, welcome rather than 
worrisome. It reflects the vitality and relative maturity of today’s international life.”). 
 3. See, e.g., WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 141 (1964) (“[T]he role of international courts and tribunals in the evolution of 
international law is still a modest one.”). 
 4. Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Legalized Dispute 
Resolution: Interstate and Transnational, 54 INT’L ORG. 457, 457 (2000); Romano, supra note 2, 
at 709. 
 5. Buergenthal, supra note 2, at 267. 
 6. Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective 
Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 276 (1997). 
 7. Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93 
CALIF. L. REV. 1, 3 (2005); see also JOHN COLLIER & VAUGHAN LOWE, THE SETTLEMENT OF 
DISPUTES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 (1999) (“International conflict led, for example, to the 
refinement of new rules . . . just as clearly as successive disputes have seen the confirmation of 
basic rules . . . .”); Guzman, supra note 1, at 173 (“International dispute resolution and 
international tribunals are all the rage. On the one hand, many international lawyers celebrate 
them as a powerful tool in the effort to bring order to our anarchic world. On the other hand, 
critics view these tribunals—perhaps inconsistently—as both a threat and a waste of resources.” 
(footnotes omitted)); Bruno Simma, International Adjudication and U.S. Policy—Past, Present, 
and Future, in DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW 39, 39 (Norman Dorsen & Prosser Gifford 
eds., 2001) (“International courts and tribunals are proliferating, and the caseload of some of 
these institutions appears to explode.”). 
BORN IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 20/12/2011  8:11 AM 
2012] INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 783 
international disputes—including litigation, arbitration, conciliation, 
mediation, and advisory reports. Representative of this definition is 
the Project on International Courts and Tribunals (PICT), which 
catalogues some ninety international judicial bodies and courts, 
arbitral institutions, and other quasi-adjudicatory mechanisms.8 Other 
commentators define international adjudication equally expansively, 
referring to permanent international judicial bodies, such as the ICJ 
or ITLOS; arbitral or other tribunals established to resolve specific 
disputes or categories of disputes, such as the Iran-U.S. Claims 
Tribunal or individual PCA arbitral tribunals; and national courts 
hearing international disputes.9 
 
 8. The PICT, established by New York University and the University of London, 
maintains a list of international tribunals and a database of developments in the field of 
international adjudication. See PROJECT ON INT’L COURTS & TRIBUNALS, THE 
INTERNATIONAL JUDICIARY IN CONTEXT (2004), available at http://www.pict-pcti.org/
publications/synoptic_chart/synop_c4.pdf (“The purpose of this chart is to provide international 
legal scholars and practitioners with a compendium of all international judicial bodies.”). The 
PICT list includes both “international courts”—defined as permanent bodies of independent 
judges—and other international “tribunals”—also termed “other Dispute Settlement Bodies.” 
Id. The PICT list, presented in chart form, includes the Permanent Court of International 
Justice (PCIJ), ICJ, ITLOS, WTO, International Criminal Court (ICC) and specialized criminal 
tribunals, and European Court of Justice (ECJ) and other regional judicial bodies. Id. It also 
includes arbitral tribunals constituted under the auspices of the PCA, North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID), and Court of Arbitration for Sport, along with claims-settlement tribunals such as the 
Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal and the UN Compensation Commission (UNCC). Id. 
 9. Commentators typically define international adjudication as including  
not only entities officially designated “courts,” such as the [ICJ], but also less formal 
or permanent bodies established to resolve specific disputes . . . . Examples include 
panels convened under the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 
dispute settlement procedures available under various environmental treaties, the 
underutilized [PCA], and ad hoc interstate arbitration tribunals. 
Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 6, at 285 n.35; see also Keohane et al., supra note 4, at 457 n.1 
(“By the strictest definition, there are currently seventeen permanent, independent 
international courts. If we include some bodies that are not courts, but instead quasi-judicial 
tribunals, panels, and commissions charged with similar functions, the total rises to over forty.”); 
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Constitutionalism and International Adjudication: How To 
Constitutionalize the U.N. Dispute Settlement System?, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 753, 753 n.2 
(1999) (“WTO dispute settlement panels, like the dispute settlement mechanisms of the U.N. 
Law of the Sea Tribunal . . . , are successful examples of legally binding adjudication of 
international disputes among states.”). 
 Other commentators adopt similarly broad definitions of international adjudication, 
including such bodies as the PCA, PCIJ, ICJ, ITLOS, WTO, ICC, ECJ, European Court of 
Human Rights (ECHR), UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC), and national courts hearing 
international disputes. See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER, THE PERILS OF GLOBAL LEGALISM 150 
(2009) (giving numerous examples of international judicial bodies); ROBERT E. SCOTT & PAUL 
B. STEPHAN, LIMITS OF LEVIATHAN: CONTRACT THEORY AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 33 (2006) (“A range of institutions, both national and international, 
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This definitional approach is unsurprising and correct. Different 
forms of international adjudicatory mechanisms, ranging from 
permanent courts to ad hoc arbitral tribunals to hybrid bodies, 
perform the same types of functions—dispute resolution, 
interpretation and articulation of legal rules, and review of 
government actions—involving the same sets of legal instruments and 
rules.10 Not surprisingly, the same or very similar categories of 
disputes can be submitted to and resolved by two or more very 
different types of adjudicatory bodies.11 In assessing the field of 
international adjudication and the design of future international 
tribunals, it is both appropriate and necessary to consider all of these 
different adjudicatory mechanisms, regardless of their particular 
forms or structures. 
 
can . . . apply [customary international law] to the disputes before them.”); José E. Alvarez, The 
New Dispute Settlers: (Half) Truths and Consequences, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 405, 407 (2003) 
(“International adjudication, like its domestic counterpart, is routinely seen as involving four 
basic elements: (1) independent judges applying (2) relatively precise and pre-existing legal 
norms after (3) adversary proceedings in order to achieve (4) dichotomous decisions in which 
one of the parties clearly wins.”); Guzman, supra note 1, at 185 (“[A] broader definition is 
appropriate. Thus, a tribunal is defined here as a disinterested institution to which the parties 
have delegated some authority and that produces a statement about the facts of a case and 
opines on how those facts relate to relevant legal rules.”); Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational 
Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2371 (1991) (identifying five factors that characterize 
transnational litigation); Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an International Judicial System, 56 STAN. 
L. REV. 429, 430 (2003) (“[T]here are now more than fifty international courts, tribunals, and 
quasi-judicial bodies . . . .”); W.M. Reisman, The Enforcement of International Judgments, 63 
AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 1 n.1 (1969) (“In international law, in fact, the term adjudication has been 
used generally to refer to any process of peaceful dispute settlement.”). 
 10. All of the various types of international tribunals, broadly defined, interpret and apply 
principles of international law, both public and private, to disputes involving one or more 
persons, states, or state entities. These tribunals also all perform the familiar adjudicative 
functions of dispute resolution, review of the legality of government actions against either a 
contractual treaty or other international legal rules, and enforcement. See Karen J. Alter, 
Delegating to International Courts: Self-Binding vs. Other-Binding Delegation, 71 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 37, 41 (2008) (defining the four roles of court systems as “dispute-
adjudication,” “enforcement,” “administrative review,” and “[c]onstitutional review” (emphasis 
omitted)). 
 11. For example, interstate boundary disputes can be submitted, variously, to the ICJ, to ad 
hoc interstate or commercial arbitral tribunals, to regional courts, to conciliation mechanisms, 
and to national courts. See Aman Mahray McHugh, Comment, Resolving International 
Boundary Disputes in Africa: A Case for the International Court of Justice, 49 HOW. L.J. 209, 239 
(2005) (discussing the potential alternatives to boundary-dispute resolution by the ICJ, 
including resort to other courts, arbitral tribunals, and negotiation). Similarly, expropriation 
claims by or on behalf of foreign investors can be submitted, again variously, to the ICJ, to 
international commercial arbitration, to investment arbitration, to claims-settlement tribunals, 
or to national courts. Steven R. Ratner, Regulatory Takings in Institutional Context: Beyond the 
Fear of Fragmented International Law, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 475, 479–80 (2008).  
BORN IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 20/12/2011  8:11 AM 
2012] INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 785 
Commentators on the field of international adjudication all share 
a common starting point, before proceeding to diverge widely in their 
assessments of existing mechanisms for international adjudication and 
prescriptions for future tribunals. The conventional wisdom is that, in 
stark contrast to domestic courts in developed states, existing 
international tribunals lack both mandatory jurisdiction and the 
authority to render enforceable decisions. Instead, almost all 
commentators agree that contemporary international tribunals 
merely provide information to states to enable them better to monitor 
and induce compliance with international obligations through the use 
of retaliation, reciprocity, and reputational considerations and to 
influence domestic constituencies, such as courts and advocacy 
groups.12 
On the one hand, from a perspective of deep skepticism about 
the efficacy of international adjudication, and international law more 
generally,13 commentators such as Professors Eric Posner and John 
Yoo underscore the lack of mandatory jurisdiction in international 
adjudication. These commentators start from the premise that 
“[i]nternational adjudication, however impressive in outward 
appearance, lacks an essential feature of adjudication that occurs 
within states: . . . mandatory jurisdiction.”14 They observe that 
[t]he founders of the [ICJ] sought to create a type of “mandatory” 
jurisdiction by giving states the option to submit to any claims 
brought against them, or a subset of those claims, or claims 
associated with particular treaties. But states can, and frequently 
have, withdrawn from jurisdiction when it has served their 
 
 12. Posner & Yoo, supra note 7, at 17; see also, e.g., Guzman, supra note 1, at 179 (“[A 
court’s] sole contribution to the dispute is information concerning what happened, what law 
governs, and how the law applies to the facts.”). Professors Robert Scott and Paul Stephan are a 
partial exception. They distinguish “legalized, institutionally based, privately initiated 
mechanisms from the traditional informal means of enforcement that remain subject to state 
control,” and they include investment and commercial arbitral tribunals, some claims-settlement 
tribunals, and some national courts in the “formal enforcement” category. SCOTT & STEPHAN, 
supra note 9, at 4; see also infra note 320 and accompanying text. 
 13. POSNER, supra note 9, at 34; Posner & Yoo, supra note 7, at 6–7; see also George W. 
Downs & Michael A. Jones, Reputation, Compliance, and International Law, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 
S95, S98 (2002) (“This means that even in an increasingly integrated international system, 
reputational concerns cannot by themselves begin to ensure a high level of compliance with 
every international agreement.”). 
 14. POSNER, supra note 9, at 33; see also Posner & Yoo, supra note 7, at 13 (“International 
tribunals are more like domestic arbitrators than domestic courts because nothing prevents 
disputants from ignoring them if they do not believe that submitting disputes to tribunals serves 
their interest.”).  
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interests—and, unlike the domestic case, no one has found a way to 
prevent states from doing this.15 
On the other hand, commentators with fundamentally different 
views regarding international adjudication—notably, Professors 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Laurence Helfer, and other proponents of 
international adjudication16—share the premise that “international 
dispute resolution tribunals are substantially less effective than most 
domestic courts,” largely because “[i]nternational tribunals lack a 
direct coercion mechanism to compel . . . appearance.”17 
The same unanimity of opinion prevails as to the unenforceable 
character of decisions by international tribunals. Professor Posner 
says that “when international courts issue judgments, they have no 
means to enforce them,”18 and goes on to claim that “domestic courts 
depend on enforcement by the executive branch or enforcement arm 
of the government; . . . there is no such international enforcement 
agency on which courts can depend . . . . States may voluntarily 
 
 15. POSNER, supra note 9, at 33. 
 16. See, e.g., Guzman, supra note 1, at 174 (“These institutions are important to the 
international legal system. To begin with, they are a useful tool for the peaceful settlement of 
disputes.”); Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 6, at 300–36 (using a multifactor checklist to describe 
the authors’ conception of what qualities are important in an international judicial body); 
Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why States Create International Tribunals: A 
Response to Professors Posner and Yoo, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 899, 904 (2005) (“The benefits that 
states derive from independent tribunals far exceed the provision of information to the 
disputing parties.”); Keohane et al., supra note 4, at 457 (“What transnational dispute resolution 
does is to insulate dispute resolution to some extent from the day-to-day political demands of 
states.”); see also SCOTT & STEPHAN, supra note 9, at 115 (“To say that the WTO [Dispute 
Settlement Body], the ICJ, and the ITLOS embody informal enforcement of international 
obligations is not to argue that they are ineffectual. . . . [I]nformal enforcement may provide 
robust, and in some circumstances, optimal, incentives for cooperation.”); Kenneth W. Abbott 
& Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421, 456 
(2000) (“In this light, we argue vigorously against those who discount international legalization 
because it is so often soft.”); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 
106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2659 (1997) (“Participation in transnational legal process creates a 
normative and constitutive dynamic. By interpreting global norms, and internalizing them into 
domestic law, that process leads to reconstruction of national interests, and eventually national 
identities.”); Martinez, supra note 9, at 528 (describing two possible views of the international 
judiciary—one motivated by a traditional definition and one based on complexity theory).  
 17. Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 6, at 285. The same scholars conclude that 
contemporary international tribunals lack the “power to compel a party to a dispute to defend 
against a plaintiff’s complaint.” Id. at 283. 
 18. POSNER, supra note 9, at 33; see also Posner & Yoo, supra note 7, at 13 (“By contrast, 
international tribunals do not operate as part of a coherent and unified world government. They 
exist in an interstitial legal system that lacks a hierarchy, an enforcement mechanism, and a 
legislative instrument that allows for centralized change.”). 
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comply with judgments, and they sometimes do. But they need not.”19 
Despite their very different perspective, Professors Slaughter and 
Helfer again agree: “International tribunals lack a direct coercion 
mechanism to compel . . . compliance,” and “[t]he mechanisms of 
coercion available to enforce international judgments are those 
generally available to states or groups of states to enforce 
international law against one another.”20 Professor Andrew Guzman 
concludes, even more pointedly, that 
[i]n the context of a domestic dispute, the failure of a losing party to 
comply with the ruling of a court . . . leads to sanctions—most 
typically a seizure of property or person. . . . In contrast, when a 
state loses before an international tribunal, no formal legal structure 
exists to enforce the ruling. The assets of the noncompliant state will 
not be seized, nobody will be arrested, and the state will not even 
lose its ability to file complaints.21 
Proceeding from these premises, the conventional wisdom is that 
the principal function of international adjudication is to provide 
information to the parties, a function that international tribunals are 
supposedly better able to perform than the parties themselves. Thus, 
as Professor Posner puts it, “[I]nternational tribunals [are] practical 
devices for helping states to resolve limited disputes when the states 
are otherwise inclined to settle them.”22 International courts only 
“help resolve bargaining failures between states by providing (within 
 
 19. POSNER, supra note 9, at 34; see also Posner & Yoo, supra note 7, at 13. 
 20. Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 6, at 285–86. 
 21. Guzman, supra note 1 at 178–79; see also Abbott & Snidal, supra note 16, at 426 
(“[I]nternational regimes do not even attempt to establish legal obligations centrally 
enforceable against states.”); Alvarez, supra note 9, at 416 (“As is well known, the Security 
Council has chosen to enforce only one ICJ decision in its history—against Libya and only with 
that state’s concurrence.”); Peter H. Kooijmans, The International Court of Justice: Where Does 
It Stand?, in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: ITS FUTURE ROLE AFTER FIFTY YEARS 
407, 408 (A.S. Muller, D. Rai & J.M. Thuránszky eds., 1997) (“These [states], which make up 
the system, are . . . entities which do not recognize a higher authority . . . .”); Oscar Schachter, 
The Enforcement of International Judicial and Arbitral Decisions, 54 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 6 (1960) 
(“For these reasons, a closer look at the problems of enforcement is warranted. Recent 
experience has revealed uncertainties and shortcomings that appear to call for clarification and 
remedial measures.”); Yuval Shany, No Longer a Weak Department of Power? Reflections on 
the Emergence of a New International Judiciary, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 73, 74 (2009) (“Not only did 
international courts have little influence over the sword and the purse, their jurisdictional 
powers tended to be limited in scope and marginalized in substance.”). 
 22. POSNER, supra note 9, at 129; see also Posner & Yoo, supra note 7, at 17 (“[J]ust as a 
domestic court can reduce the transaction costs of writing contracts by enforcing the 
hypothetical optimal contract, an arbitrator can reduce the transaction costs of writing treaties 
by enforcing the hypothetical optimal treaty.”).  
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limits) information in (within limits) an impartial fashion.”23 And, 
more starkly, “Adjudication itself only adds information.”24 
Professor Guzman adopts a similar view, declaring that 
“[i]nternational tribunals are simply tools to produce a particular kind 
of information.”25 He concludes that, in international adjudication, 
“the tribunal simply announces the relevant legal rules and, in the 
context of those rules, its interpretation of events,” with “[i]ts sole 
contribution to the dispute [being the provision of] information 
concerning what happened, what law governs, and how the law 
applies to the facts.”26 Put simply, “tribunals serve to provide 
information.”27 
Likewise, Professors Slaughter and Helfer emphasize “the 
informational functions that international tribunals perform and their 
effect on a state’s reputation for honoring its promises to other 
nations”28 and link international tribunals’ effectiveness to their 
“ability to provide information to, and hence empower, domestic 
political actors.”29 In particular, they argue that “[i]ndependent 
tribunals act as trustees to enhance the credibility of international 
commitments in specific multilateral contexts” by “raising the 
probability that violations of those commitments will be detected and 
accurately labeled as noncompliance.”30 
Despite this agreement on the basic characteristics of 
contemporary international tribunals, the commentary on 
international adjudication nevertheless diverges widely in its analysis 
of the consequences of these descriptions. The focus of the academic 
debate is on the efficacy of international adjudication—starting from 
the premise that the decisions of international tribunals are 
nonmandatory and unenforceable. For skeptics about international 
law, such as Professors Posner and Yoo, international adjudication 
has been relatively unimportant, playing only a minimal role in 
international affairs. Professor Posner’s statement that 
 
 23. POSNER, supra note 9, at 129; see also Posner & Yoo, supra note 7, at 17 (“The 
tribunal’s function is to provide information.”).  
 24. Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Reply to Helfer and Slaughter, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 957, 
960 (2005). 
 25. Guzman, supra note 1, at 235. 
 26. Id. at 179. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 16, at 934. 
 29. Id. at 903. 
 30. Id. at 904. 
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“[a]djudication today remains marginal to world affairs” is 
representative of this view.31 Professors Posner and Yoo describe 
states as having created a succession of tribunals, none of which they 
ultimately are willing to use or, if they do use them, to obey.32 
In contrast, for Professors Slaughter and Helfer, and for other 
proponents of international adjudication, international tribunals play 
significant roles in contemporary international affairs, 
notwithstanding their lack of mandatory jurisdiction and enforcement 
power. They claim that states are “setting up more independent 
tribunals and quasi-judicial review bodies and using them more 
frequently.”33 They postulate that this is because such tribunals 
increase the likelihood that violations of international law will be 
identified and, in turn, that the accurate labeling of violations will 
lead to higher probabilities of reputational or other costs for parties 
that have breached their obligations.34 Because adjudication thereby 
enhances the credibility of international commitments, “states all 
over the world, presumably acting in their rational self-interest, are 
proliferating . . . independent tribunals and sending more and more 
cases to the ones they already established.”35 At the same time, 
international tribunals are contributing to a “dense web of relations 
that constitutes a new, transgovernmental order,”36 creating 
constituencies within states for compliance with international law. 
Despite the absence of mandatory jurisdiction and the lack of 
enforceable decisions, proponents of international adjudication 
nonetheless see international tribunals as playing important roles in 
contemporary international affairs and as contributing materially to 
securing compliance with international law. 
These views of contemporary international adjudication inform 
prescriptions for future international tribunals. Thus, skeptics about 
 
 31. POSNER, supra note 9, at 132; see also Posner & Yoo, supra note 7, at 74 (arguing that 
new international tribunals will face “diminished chances of success”). 
 32. POSNER, supra note 9, at 173; see also id. at 167 (“[T]he most plausible reason for the 
proliferation of courts [is that] states become unhappy with an existing international court, and 
they work around it by depriving it of jurisdiction and establishing additional courts or 
adjudication mechanisms as needed.”); Posner & Yoo, supra note 7, at 74 (“Our analysis 
suggests that [the ICC, the WTO, and the ITLOS] will have diminished chances of success, and 
the steps being taken by states to avoid or weaken their jurisdiction supports our claim.”). 
 33. Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 16, at 903. 
 34. Id. at 935. 
 35. Id. at 955. 
 36. Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.–Oct. 1997, at 
183, 184. 
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international adjudication argue that states will use international 
tribunals only if those tribunals are both powerless and “dependent” 
on the parties—in the sense of being chosen by the parties for specific 
cases, subject to a high degree of control by the parties, and lacking 
meaningful enforcement power.37 In their view, “International courts 
succeed best when they are subject to strict limitations—voluntary 
jurisdiction, limited jurisdiction, weak remedies and so forth.”38 
In direct contrast, proponents of international adjudication claim 
that international tribunals will be effective only if they are 
“independent,” exercising broad jurisdiction and being composed of 
standing panels of tenured judges; if they provide private parties with 
access to adjudicatory proceedings; and if they are “embedded” in the 
domestic legal systems of participating states.39 Proponents urge that 
international adjudicatory mechanisms should be structured “more 
like . . . court[s]”40 and, in particular, more like “independent” courts 
such as the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECHR). To that end, they propose a catalogue of 
structural and other features, derived from the ECJ’s institutional 
design, as a model for both designing future international tribunals 
and restructuring existing international bodies.41 
In sum, there is broad disagreement among commentators about 
both the efficacy and significance of contemporary international 
adjudication and about prescriptions for the design of future 
international tribunals. Skeptics claim that international adjudication 
has, and can only have, a very limited role in contemporary 
international affairs; they argue that future international tribunals 
should be “dependent” and relatively powerless because states will 
 
 37. Cf. Posner & Yoo, supra note 7, at 5–8, 72 (“Tribunals are likely to be ineffective when 
they neglect the interests of state parties and, instead, make decisions based on moral ideals, the 
interests of groups or individuals within a state, or the interests of states that are not parties to 
the dispute.”). Professors Posner and Yoo define the independence of international tribunals in 
the following terms: “A tribunal is independent when its members are institutionally separated 
from state parties—when they have fixed terms and salary protection, and the tribunal itself has, 
by agreement, compulsory rather than consensual jurisdiction.” Id. at 7. 
 38. POSNER, supra note 9, at 173. 
 39. See, e.g., Keohane et al., supra note 4, at 458–59, 487–88 (“We define low 
independence, access, and embeddedness as the ideal type of interstate dispute resolution and 
high independence, access, and embeddedness as the ideal type of transnational dispute 
resolution.”); Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 16, at 908 (citing with approval the approach of 
Professors Keohane, Moravcsik, and Slaughter). 
 40. Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 6, at 365. 
 41. Id. at 298–337. 
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use only ineffectual forms of adjudication. In contrast, proponents 
claim that international adjudication has significant effects on state 
behavior and that future international tribunals should be modeled 
on “independent” and relatively powerful national courts. Regardless 
of their conclusions, however, virtually all commentators start from 
the shared premise that, in contrast to national courts, international 
tribunals lack the power to issue enforceable decisions or to exercise 
compulsory jurisdiction and then focus their debate on whether and 
how such unenforceable decisions nonetheless affect state behavior. 
With this commentary in mind, it is useful to turn to the history and 
practice of contemporary international adjudication, focusing on 
developments over the past century. 
II.  TWO GENERATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 
Commentary on contemporary international adjudication rests 
on an incomplete and therefore distorted premise. It is correct that an 
important set of international tribunals has the characteristics 
described by most commentary: traditional public-international-law 
tribunals like the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) 
and the ICJ lack both compulsory jurisdiction and the power to 
render enforceable decisions. It is therefore plausible to describe 
these traditional tribunals as simply “providing information” to 
disputants—and, more broadly, to the international community—to 
facilitate responses based on reciprocity, retaliation, or other 
actions.42 
 
 42. Nonetheless, the “providing information” metaphor is flawed in important respects. It 
ignores the distinction between formally nonbinding adjudicatory decisions, such as reports by 
commissions of inquiry or mediators, and formally binding decisions, such as those of many 
international courts and arbitral tribunals, and implies that both have the same function and 
status—namely, that of “providing information.” This implication is misleading.  
 International instruments frequently provide that commissions of inquiry, mediations, 
and conciliations are nonbinding. See, e.g., Convention for the Pacific Settlement of 
International Disputes art. 6, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2199, 2213, 1 Bevans 577, 586 (“Good 
offices and mediation . . . have exclusively the character of advice, and never have binding 
force.”); id. art. 35, 36 Stat. at 2220, 1 Bevans at 591 (“The Report of the Commission is limited 
to a statement of facts, and has in no way the character of an Award. It leaves to the parties 
entire freedom as to the effect to be given to the statement.”). These are archetypal examples of 
tribunals whose purpose is solely, and expressly, to provide information. 
 In contrast, the same international instruments provide that arbitral awards, id. art. 37, 
36 Stat. at 2220, 1 Bevans at 591; see also infra text accompanying notes 55–56, and international 
court judgments, see infra text accompanying note 88, are binding on the parties. The agreement 
by states that a tribunal’s decision will be binding gives that decision a function and character 
that is vitally different from that of nonbinding information provided by third parties; in 
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It is not correct, however, that all international tribunals conform 
to the description provided by conventional wisdom: in reality, 
international adjudication is more complex and more interesting. 
Over the past four decades, states have developed an important new 
category of international adjudication—composed of tribunals with 
characteristics that differ markedly from those of traditional 
international adjudicatory mechanisms. Although it has been largely 
ignored by the commentary on international adjudication, this new 
generation of tribunals has precisely those essential characteristics 
denied by the conventional wisdom—the power to render enforceable 
decisions and, in many cases, to exercise what is effectively, although 
not formally, compulsory jurisdiction over defined categories of 
disputes. 
As this Part explains, states have developed two basic models of 
international adjudication. In general terms, these two models have 
developed chronologically, with an earlier generation of standing 
international courts aspiring to broad jurisdiction over classic public-
international-law disputes and the later generation of much more 
specialized tribunals, usually constituted on a case-by-case basis, 
exercising relatively narrow jurisdiction over particular categories of 
international disputes.43 Importantly, while first-generation tribunals 
have never been given the power to render enforceable decisions, 
 
addition to providing information, which a commission of inquiry or mediator does, a binding 
decision imposes a specific and agreed upon obligation to comply with the decision of a neutral 
third party. A state’s refusal to comply with such a decision entails a further noncompliance with 
its international obligations, beyond its initial violation of its underlying obligations. Moreover, 
this additional violation is generally unambiguous and unconditional; it is difficult for a state to 
explain its breach, for example, by reference to changed or extenuating circumstances or to its 
counterparty’s conduct. As a consequence, noncompliance with a binding international decision 
generally entails materially increased costs beyond either breach of an underlying international 
obligation or a refusal to comply with a nonbinding recommendation. See Guzman, supra note 
1, at 181–82 (“[In] dispute resolution at the WTO . . . . [w]rongdoers . . . face both reputational 
and retaliatory consequences when they lose a case.”). Describing both binding and nonbinding 
decisions as merely providing information is unhelpful because it ignores, and impliedly rejects, 
this distinction and the special character of the information that is provided by a binding 
decision. 
 43. These forms of international adjudication involved the application of traditional rules 
of international law that formed the bulk of international-law obligations before World War II. 
See Koh, supra note 16, at 2607–13 (tracing the progression of international legal thought and 
institutions); Paul B. Stephan, The New International Law—Legitimacy, Accountability, 
Authority, and Freedom in the New Global Order, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1555, 1563–68 (1999) 
(tracing the progression from earlier international courts’ focus on sovereign relations to later 
international courts’ focus on private-party relations). 
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second-generation tribunals have almost always been granted, and 
subsequently have exercised, precisely this authority.44 
First, building on the Hague Conventions for the Pacific 
Settlement of International Disputes and the PCA, states established 
a number of standing international judicial bodies over the course of 
the twentieth century. As discussed in Section A, these tribunals were 
typically established in multilateral settings and were often inspired 
by high political and religious ideals, with aspirations for universal 
compulsory jurisdiction over broad categories of traditional public-
international-law disputes. The PCIJ, the ICJ, and the ITLOS are 
prime examples of this model for international tribunals. Notably, 
none of these first-generation tribunals have been empowered to 
render enforceable decisions; at the same time, and despite other 
important accomplishments, none of these tribunals have enjoyed 
significant usage by states or have commanded particularly impressive 
compliance with their decisions. 
Second, beginning in the 1960s, states began to establish a new 
generation of international adjudicatory mechanisms. As discussed in 
Section B, states did so by progressively concluding substantial 
numbers of bilateral treaties and contractual instruments that 
provided for international arbitration of specified categories of 
disputes and by accepting, through state practice, the jurisdiction of 
national courts over significant categories of international disputes 
involving states or state entities. This new generation of adjudication 
was largely inspired by pragmatic, commercial considerations and 
includes arbitral tribunals constituted pursuant to bilateral investment 
treaties (BITs), such as the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA)45 and the Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID 
 
 44. A chronological account of first- and second-generation tribunals is broadly accurate. 
Most first-generation tribunals, including the PCA, PCIJ, and ICJ, developed between 1900 and 
1950; in contrast, second-generation tribunals first began to develop in the 1960s and 1970s, 
following adoption of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity and widespread ratification 
of the ICSID and New York Conventions. See infra Part II.B. It is true that the model first 
reflected by traditional first-generation tribunals has continued to be used in more recent years, 
as illustrated by the formation of the ITLOS in the 1980s and the formation of various regional 
courts since 1990. See infra Part II.A.4–6. It remains the case, however, that the development of 
second-generation tribunals with the authority to render enforceable international decisions is a 
comparatively recent phenomenon that came after the development of most first-generation 
international tribunals. 
 45. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 
(1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]. 
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Convention)46; international commercial-arbitration agreements 
between states and private parties; the dispute-resolution mechanisms 
of the WTO; and claims-settlement tribunals, such as the Iran-U.S. 
Claims Tribunal. Significantly, all of these tribunals have been 
empowered to render decisions that are effectively enforceable, and 
they have frequently done so; at the same time, in contrast to 
traditional models of international adjudication, these second-
generation tribunals have enjoyed significant, and increasing, usage 
by states and other actors, as well as relatively high compliance with 
their decisions. 
A. The First Generation of International Adjudication 
The first generation of contemporary international tribunals 
emerged at the outset of the twentieth century with the creation of 
the PCA, followed by that of the PCIJ and the ICJ. These tribunals 
were established with high, often utopian, ambitions—in particular, 
that the mandatory adjudication of virtually all disputes between 
states would play a central role in ensuring a Kantian vision of world 
peace. These aspirations continued to be reflected, albeit much less 
ambitiously, in later international tribunals, including the ITLOS and 
the International Criminal Court (ICC).47 
The PCA, PCIJ, and ICJ have made substantial contributions to 
the development of international law. Despite their founders’ 
aspirations, however, these first-generation tribunals have been 
distinguished by their lack of authority—both formal and practical. In 
particular, none of these tribunals enjoy mandatory jurisdiction or are 
empowered to render enforceable decisions.48 Moreover, despite 
these tribunals’ achievements, states have resorted to them to resolve 
disputes only infrequently, and the significance of these tribunals in 
international affairs has been limited.49 
 
 46. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of 
Other States, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter 
ICSID Convention]. 
 47. I do not separately discuss the ICC, both because it is unclear whether that Court will 
enjoy significant usage or compliance and because that Court hears criminal proceedings by an 
international institution against individuals rather than disputes involving foreign states. I also 
do not discuss other international tribunals that hear criminal proceedings against individuals 
rather than disputes involving states or state entities, such as the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the 
Special Tribunal for Sierra Leone, or the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. 
 48. See infra text accompanying notes 55–63, 84–88, 95–101. 
 49. See infra text accompanying notes 65–70, 90–92, 103–06, 124–25. 
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1. Permanent Court of Arbitration.  The modern era of 
international adjudication can be traced to the 1899 and 1907 Hague 
Peace Conferences, which established the PCA.50 In both its 
aspirations and its eventual form, the PCA exhibits what came to be 
the characteristic features of traditional first-generation tribunals. 
The PCA was a child of the nineteenth-century peace movement 
and, more specifically, of the 1899 Hague Peace Conference.51 A 
central topic of the Conference’s program was the use of adjudication 
to prevent and resolve conflicts between states, a goal that was 
embodied in proposals for an ambitious multilateral convention 
requiring arbitration of most international legal disputes. Under these 
proposals, contracting states would have been obligated to arbitrate 
virtually all disputes with other contracting states under a wide range 
of treaties—disputes involving, for example, communications, 
transport, navigation, intellectual property, inheritance, health, and 
judicial cooperation—as well as all claims for monetary damages for 
wrongful state actions.52 
These proposals were unacceptable to most states. The delegates 
instead adopted the 1899 Hague Convention for the Pacific 
Settlement of International Disputes, which contained provisions for 
voluntary arbitration. In particular, the 1899 Convention 
encouraged—but did not require—contracting states to resolve their 
 
 50. There was, of course, a lengthy tradition of international adjudication prior to 1900. See 
generally J.G. MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 1–126 (4th ed. 2005) (tracing 
the use of negotiation, mediation, inquiry, conciliation, and arbitration, including their use prior 
to 1900); JACKSON H. RALSTON, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION FROM ATHENS TO LOCARNO 
(1929) (tracing international-dispute adjudications from ancient Greece through the early 
twentieth century). 
 51. See David J. Bederman, The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907, in 
INTERNATIONAL COURTS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 9, 9 (Mark W. Janis ed., 1992) 
(“[T]he 1899 and 1907 Peace Conferences are remembered both for their contributions to the 
laws of war . . . and to the rules for the peaceful settlement of disputes between nations.”); 
Geoffrey Best, Peace Conferences and the Century of Total War: The 1899 Hague Conference 
and What Came After, 75 INT’L AFF. 619, 619–21, 623–31 (1999) (describing the proceedings of 
and some of the events surrounding the 1899 Hague Peace Conference); Mark W. Janis, 
Protestants, Progress and Peace in the Influence of Religion: Enthusiasm for an International 
Court in Early Nineteenth-Century America, in THE INFLUENCE OF RELIGION ON THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 223, 223 (Mark W. Janis ed., 1991) (“[T]o a 
surprising extent, the 20th century’s international courts were inspired and fashioned by 19th 
century American religious enthusiasts.”). 
 52. 1 JAMES BROWN SCOTT, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES OF 1899 AND 1907, at 
276–77, 319–85 (1909).  
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international disputes through arbitration.53 The Convention declared 
that “[i]n questions of a legal nature, and especially in the 
interpretation or application of International Conventions, 
arbitration is recognized by the Signatory Powers as the most 
effective, and at the same time the most equitable, means of settling 
disputes.”54 But nothing in the Convention imposed any obligation to 
pursue arbitration, or any other form of adjudication, in particular 
cases. 
The 1899 Convention suggested that when states chose to 
arbitrate a dispute, the award would be binding. Article 18 of the 
Convention provided that an agreement to arbitrate “implies the 
engagement to submit loyally to the Award.”55 The Convention also 
distinguished the binding character of arbitrations from the resolution 
of disputes through “commissions of inquiry,” “good offices,” and 
“mediation”—each of which were provided for by the Convention, 
but none of which entailed a binding decision.56 At the same time, 
however, the Convention contained no means to enforce arbitral 
awards, and the Convention’s language underscored the tenuous 
nature of any obligation to comply with an award—providing only 
that states impliedly engaged to submit in good faith to awards. 
To encourage states to resort to arbitration, the 1899 Convention 
also established the grandly titled—but essentially powerless—
“Permanent Court of Arbitration.”57 In fact, the PCA is neither 
“permanent,” nor a “court,” nor is it even responsible for conducting 
“arbitrations.”58 The Convention established no standing tribunal, 
 
 53. See Best, supra note 51, at 630 (“Arbitration enthusiasts had hoped that the use of [the 
1899 Convention] would be obligatory. The Great Powers were not having that!”); David D. 
Caron, War and International Adjudication: Reflections on the 1899 Peace Conference, 94 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 4, 15 (2000) (“Organized public opinion would have been surprised to learn that it was 
quite clear from early in the conference that arbitration would not be obligatory and that any 
court that was established would not be permanently in session.”). 
 54. Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes art. 16, July 29, 1899, 
32 Stat. 1779, 1788, 1 Bevans 230, 237. 
 55. Id. art. 18. 
 56. See id. art. 6 (“Good offices and mediation . . . have exclusively the character of advice 
and never have binding force.”); id. art. 14 (“The report of the International Commission of 
Inquiry is limited to a statement of facts, and has in no way the character of an Arbitral 
Award.”); supra note 42. 
 57. Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, supra note 54, arts. 
20–29, 32 Stat. at 1789–93, 1 Bevans at 237–39.  
 58. Manley O. Hudson, The Permanent Court of International Justice—An Indispensable 
First Step, 108 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 188, 189 (1923); see also John Bassett 
Moore, The Organization of the Permanent Court of International Justice, 22 COLUM. L. REV. 
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whether denominated a court or otherwise, and it contained no grant 
of mandatory jurisdiction, whether to the PCA or otherwise. Rather, 
the Convention established the PCA, a rudimentary form of arbitral 
institution responsible for maintaining a list of arbitrators who might 
be appointed to tribunals in future cases—if states chose to agree to 
such arbitrations59—and it offered skeletal procedural rules that could 
be applied in proceedings—again, if states agreed to such 
arbitrations.60 
Less than a decade after the 1899 Hague Conference, the 
contracting states reconvened, this time making adjudication central 
to their discussions. A number of delegations again advocated a 
system of compulsory adjudication to replace the optional mechanism 
of the 1899 Convention.61 These proposals foundered because of 
disagreements about the composition of the contemplated 
international court,62 and the 1907 Conference ultimately made no 
significant changes to the treatment of international adjudication 
under the 1899 Convention.63 
PCA arbitral tribunals have issued a handful of well-reasoned 
awards that have played a material role in the development of 
customary international law.64 In general, however, the PCA has 
 
497, 511 (1922) (“As submission to the jurisdiction of the Court . . . is wholly voluntary, it 
follows that the amount of the business which may come before the Court depends upon the will 
and inclination of the world’s governments.”). 
 59. Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, supra note 54, arts. 
22–25, 32 Stat. at 1789–91, 1 Bevans at 237–38. 
 60. The Convention contained procedural rules addressing limited aspects of the arbitral 
process. Id. arts. 30–57, 32 Stat. at 1793–98, 1 Bevans at 240–43. The PCA is also responsible for 
providing limited services as a registry: the International Bureau. Id. arts. 22, 28, 32 Stat. at 
1789–90, 1792, 1 Bevans at 237–39. These services did not include many of the functions of more 
developed arbitral institutions, such as appointing arbitrators, hearing challenges to arbitrators, 
and removing arbitrators.  
 61. 1 SCOTT, supra note 52, at 330–43.  
 62. JAMES BROWN SCOTT, THE PROJECT OF A PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL 
JUSTICE AND RESOLUTIONS OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE OF JURISTS 29 (1920).  
 63. Compare Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, supra note 
42, arts. 37–90, 36 Stat. at 2220–34, 1 Bevans at 591–602, with Convention for the Pacific 
Settlement of International Disputes, supra note 54, arts. 30–57, 32 Stat. at 1793–98, 1 Bevans at 
240–43. 
 64. See, e.g., Island of Palmas (U.S. v. Neth.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 839 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928) 
(“Territorial sovereignty . . . involves the exclusive right to display the activities of a State. This 
right has as corollary a duty: the obligation to protect within the territory the rights of other 
States . . . .); N. Atl. Coast Fisheries (U.K. v. U.S.), 11 R.I.A.A. 167, 196 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1910) 
(limiting the application of customary international law’s three-mile rule regarding bays in a 
case in which a treaty was found to encapsulate any type of bay); Pious Fund (U.S. v. Mex.), 9 
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enjoyed very modest usage and has addressed few cases of 
international importance.65 All told, during the first seventy years of 
the PCA’s existence, only twenty-five arbitrations were submitted to 
PCA tribunals,66 for a filing rate of 0.3 cases per year; even fewer 
nonbinding PCA conciliations or inquiries were conducted.67 By 
comparison, nearly two hundred non-PCA interstate arbitrations 
were conducted between 1900 and 1970, often pursuant to ad hoc 
submission agreements or compromissory clauses in bilateral 
treaties.68 
In an ironic turnaround, the PCA’s caseload has increased 
materially since 1995. Between 1995 and 2009, eighty-six cases were 
conducted under PCA auspices69 for an annual filing rate of roughly 
six cases per year—a twenty-fold increase over historical figures. A 
substantial majority of these newer filings were either international 
commercial or investment arbitrations, rather than classic interstate 
proceedings; both involve second-generation tribunals with the power 
to make enforceable awards.70 This development—a disused first-
 
R.I.A.A. 1, 6 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1902) (applying res judicata principles to international 
arbitrations). 
 65. Cf. Best, supra note 51, at 630 (“The great days of the Hague’s Court of Arbitration 
were over by 1914.”). 
 66. PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, 109TH ANNUAL REPORT annex 2, at 43–45 
(2009), available at http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/09%20Annex%202%20en%2043-48%
281%29.pdf; Gilbert Guillaume, Member, Permanent Court of Arbitration, The Contribution of 
the Permanent Court of Arbitration and Its International Bureau to Arbitration Between 
States, Address at a Commemorative Meeting of the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s 
Administrative Council 2 (Oct. 18, 2007) (transcript available at http://pca-cpa.org/upload/files/
Guillaume%20EN.pdf); see also MANLEY O. HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS: PAST 
AND FUTURE 7 (1944) (stating that fifteen arbitrations had been conducted by 1920). 
 67. There have been only three recorded PCA conciliations. PERMANENT COURT OF 
ARBITRATION, supra note 66, annex 4, at 57. 
 68. See SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS: 1794–1989, at 237–450 (A.M. Stuyt 
ed., 3d ed. 1990) (surveying arbitrations between 1900 and 1970); Christine Gray & Benedict 
Kingsbury, Inter-State Arbitration Since 1945: Overview and Evaluation, in INTERNATIONAL 
COURTS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra note 51, at 55, 61 (“Another striking feature 
of post-Second World War arbitral practice . . . is the ad hoc nature of the tribunals.”). 
 69. Bette Shifman, The Permanent Court of Arbitration: An Overview, in THE HAGUE: 
LEGAL CAPITAL OF THE WORLD 128, 141–44 (Peter van Krieken & David McKay eds., 2005); 
Memorandum from the Permanent Court of Arbitration to Brooks Daly 1 (Oct. 14, 2010) (on 
file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 70. See Paul-Jean Le Cannu & Daniel Drabkin, Assessing the Role of the Permanent Court 
of Arbitration in the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes, 27 L’OBSERVATEUR DES 
NATIONS UNIES 181, 194 (2010) (listing the number of pending cases in 2009, including thirty-
five investment arbitrations, fourteen commercial arbitrations, two environmental arbitrations 
and three interstate or intrastate arbitrations); Memorandum from the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration to Brooks Daly, supra note 69, at 1–2 (classifying the eighty-six cases in which the 
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generation tribunal’s coming to enjoy significant usage only through 
the adoption of second-generation adjudicatory mechanisms—is 
representative of the development of international adjudication 
during the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. 
Also during the early twentieth century, states negotiated large 
numbers of bilateral71 and multilateral72 treaties that provided for the 
compulsory arbitration of defined, but generally broad, categories of 
disputes—along the lines of the proposals rejected at the Hague 
Conferences. Multilateral arbitration treaties from this period include 
the draft 1924 Geneva Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of 
International Disputes73 and the 1928 Geneva General Act for the 
Pacific Settlement of International Disputes,74 both of which provided 
for the compulsory arbitration of a broad range of international 
disputes. In addition, several hundred bilateral-arbitration treaties 
were entered into between 1900 and 1939; these treaties generally 
provided for compulsory arbitration of a wide range of disputes 
between the contracting states.75 As the League of Nations’ 
Committee on Arbitration and Security noted in 1928, “[T]he 
immense output of arbitration treaties ha[s] been such that to-day 
they constitute a forest, a very dense forest, in which it is difficult to 
find one’s way.”76 
 
PCA provided administrative support from 1995 to 2009 into groups, with seventy-three 
commercial or investment cases and only thirteen interstate disputes).  
 71. See HELEN MAY CORY, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES 
64–65, 136–44 (1932) (citing compulsory bilateral-arbitration treaties from 1900 to 1930); Louis 
B. Sohn, The Function of International Arbitration Today, 108 RECUEIL DES COURS 1, 26–27, 
33–34, 38–40 (1963) (citing compulsory bilateral-arbitration treaties from the 1920s and 1930s). 
 72. See CORY, supra note 71, at 145–52 (discussing compulsory multilateral-arbitration 
treaties from the 1920s); Sohn, supra note 71, at 29–33 (discussing the 1924 Geneva Protocol for 
the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, a compulsory multilateral-arbitration treaty).  
 73. Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, Oct. 2, 1924, LEAGUE OF 
NATIONS O.J., special supp. 21, at 21. 
 74. General Act of Arbitration (Pacific Settlement of International Disputes), Sept. 26, 
1928, 93 L.N.T.S. 343. 
 75. Between 1900 and 1940, an estimated sixty-eight bilateral general arbitration treaties, 
providing for arbitration of a broad range of disputes between the two contracting states, were 
concluded. Sohn, supra note 71, at 26–27, 33–34, 38–40. Between 1914 and 1939, “hundreds” of 
additional bilateral-arbitration treaties were also concluded. Hans von Mangoldt, Arbitration 
and Conciliation Treaties, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 230, 
232 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1992). 
 76. Minutes of the First Sess. of the Comm. on Arbitration and Sec., at 38, League of 
Nations Doc. C.667.M.225.1927.IX (1928). 
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Nonetheless, most states remained skeptical of such treaties and 
declined to ratify them—or, if they did ratify them, to use them.77 
Following World War II, the popularity of compulsory-arbitration 
treaties declined precipitously; in the words of one author, they “were 
abandoned almost entirely.”78 Moreover, as with the PCA itself, usage 
of those treaties that were ratified was very modest, with fewer than 
ten arbitrations being conducted pursuant to general compulsory-
arbitration treaties between 1920 and 1990.79 
As this Section shows, the ambitions and development of the 
PCA are representative of traditional first-generation forms of 
international adjudication. The Hague Conferences were 
accompanied by high aspirations for a standing, independent 
international court with broad, multilateral, compulsory jurisdiction 
over classic interstate disputes—aspirations that were reflected in the 
inapt title “Permanent Court of Arbitration.” Nevertheless, the PCA 
and the subsequent general arbitration treaties provided almost 
entirely optional and ad hoc adjudicatory mechanisms that did not 
render enforceable, or even clearly binding, awards. In practice, states 
have generally declined to use these dispute-resolution mechanisms, 
save for a limited number of non-PCA arbitrations, typically 
involving post hoc submission agreements or narrow compromissory 
clauses in individual treaties. Despite this lack of success, in 
subsequent years, other forms of international adjudication pursued a 
similar model—of standing tribunals with broad jurisdictional 
authority—and typically experienced the same results as the PCA. 
2. Permanent Court of International Justice.  Following World 
War I, proponents of an international court continued their efforts—
again with the objective of founding a standing tribunal for peacefully 
resolving a wide range of international disputes.80 The proposed 
 
 77. See von Mangoldt, supra note 75, at 233 (“In contrast to the astoundingly high number 
of general arbitration and conciliation treaties concluded since the beginning of this century, the 
frequency of their application to actual disputes is just as astoundingly low.”). 
 78. Sohn, supra note 71, at 39–40. 
 79. See PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, supra note 66, annex 2, at 44–45 (listing 
general compulsory-arbitration proceedings); cf. SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS: 
1794–1989, supra note 68, at 340–452 (providing information on all arbitration agreements 
between 1920 and 1970). 
 80. The League’s founders regarded the PCIJ as a fulfillment of the work of the Hague 
Conferences. The purpose of the Court was sweeping: to secure world peace by “induc[ing] 
governments, instead of resorting to violence, to come before the tribunal which has now been 
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League of Nations became the focal point for these aspirations, with 
the formation of an international judicial organ a central element of 
the League’s Covenant.  
The League’s Covenant contemplated the establishment of a 
Permanent Court of International Justice, which was to have 
jurisdiction over a significant range of disputes between members of 
the League.81 In turn, the PCIJ Statute established a court modeled on 
the domestic appellate courts in developed jurisdictions, with a 
tribunal of fifteen judges enjoying fixed terms and remuneration.82 
Unlike the PCA, the PCIJ was not merely a catalogue of names of 
arbitrators who might be selected to sit on future tribunals; rather, the 
PCIJ was a permanent, standing court with a predefined membership 
of tenured judges, available to hear a potentially wide range of 
disputes between members of the League of Nations.83 
Despite these differences, the PCIJ bore important similarities to 
the PCA. During negotiation of the PCIJ Statute, proposals to grant 
the Court mandatory jurisdiction over all “legal” disputes between 
members of the League were tabled.84 Just like the similar proposals 
at the Hague Conferences, these proposals were ultimately rejected 
by the League’s Council.85 Instead, the PCIJ Statute limited the 
Court’s jurisdiction to those disputes that states agreed to submit to 
it.86 The PCIJ Statute also permitted states to declare generally that 
 
established, which is continuously organized and always open to them, and [to] submit their 
controversies to its final and peaceful decision.” Moore, supra note 58, at 511. 
 81. League of Nations Covenant art. 14 (directing the Council to “formulate and submit to 
the Members of the League . . . plans for the establishment of a Permanent Court of 
International Justice”).  
 82. Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice arts. 3, 13, 32, Dec. 16, 1920, 6 
L.N.T.S. 390, 391, 395, 403. See generally Manley O. Hudson, The 1936 Rules of the Permanent 
Court of International Justice, 30 AM. J. INT’L L. 463 (1936) (discussing the procedures for 
selecting judges following rule amendments in 1936). 
 83. The PCIJ was also open to states that were eligible to join the League but that had not 
done so—in particular, the United States. Statute of the Permanent Court of International 
Justice, supra note 82, arts. 34–36, 6 L.N.T.S. at 403; League of Nations Covenant annex I. 
 84. The Advisory Committee of Jurists proposed that the PCIJ be granted mandatory 
jurisdiction over cases of a “legal nature” that fell within four broad categories, but the Council 
of the League of Nations rejected their suggestion. Christian Tomuschat, Article 36, in THE 
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: A COMMENTARY 589, 593–94 (Andreas 
Zimmermann, Christian Tomuschat & Karin Oellers-Frahm eds., 2006). 
 85. Id. at 593. 
 86. Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, supra note 82, art. 36, 6 
L.N.T.S. at 403 (“The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it 
and all matters specially provided for in treaties and conventions in force.”). 
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they accepted PCIJ jurisdiction on the basis of reciprocity, but it 
imposed no obligation on states to make such declarations.87 
The enforceability of PCIJ judgments generally mirrored that of 
arbitral awards under the Hague Conventions. As with PCA awards, 
neither the League Covenant nor the PCIJ Statute provided an 
enforcement mechanism for PCIJ judgments. Although the Court’s 
Statute did provide, more explicitly than the Hague Conventions’ 
provisions regarding awards, that PCIJ judgments were “final and 
without appeal,”88 it contained no mechanism giving effect to this 
provision. 
The PCIJ rendered a number of carefully reasoned and 
influential decisions, including several in significant disputes arising 
from the World War I peace arrangements.89 Nonetheless, despite its 
founders’ aspirations, the Court enjoyed only a modest caseload.90 
Between 1922 and 1939, when World War II led to a suspension of its 
activities, the PCIJ heard only thirty-eight contentious cases and 
twenty-eight requests for advisory opinions91—a filing rate of roughly 
 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. art. 60, 6 L.N.T.S. at 409. 
 89. See, e.g., Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 
53, at 27–30 (Apr. 5) (recognizing longstanding claims to land as a valid source of territorial 
authority); Factory at Chorzów (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 5 (Sept. 13) (“The 
Government of the German Reich . . . submitted . . . a suit concerning the reparation 
which . . . is due by the Polish Government . . . [under the treaty] concluded at Geneva on May 
15th, 1922, between Germany and Poland . . . .”); S.S. “Lotus” (Fr./Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) 
No. 10, at 22 (Sept. 7) (considering whether, as France alleged, Turkey had violated Article 15 
of the Convention of Lausanne by prosecuting a French steamboat captain); Certain German 
Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Ger. v. Pol.), 1926 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 7, at 15–16 (May 25) 
(discussing payment for German land and assets ceded to Poland following World War I); see 
also HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE 
INTERNATIONAL COURT 9–25, 43–45, 162 (1958) (noting that the use of judicial precedent by 
the Court created a source of international law and that “the Court, in resorting to the doctrine 
of abuse of rights, lent its authority to the creation of a new source of international 
responsibility”). 
 90. Roughly two-thirds of the states eligible to do so at the time recognized the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the PCIJ via the optional clause in Article 36(2) of the PCIJ Statute. Neither the 
United States nor the Soviet Union accepted the PCIJ’s compulsory jurisdiction. See Minutes of 
the Conf. of States Signatories of the Protocol of Signature of the Statute of the Permanent Court 
of Int’l Justice, League of Nations Sales No. 1926.V.26 (1926) (listing forty signatory states to the 
PCIJ, not including the United States or the Soviet Union). 
 91. ROSENNE’S THE WORLD COURT: WHAT IT IS AND HOW IT WORKS 11 (Terry D. Gill 
ed., 6th rev. ed. 2003); id. app. V, at 319; see also HUDSON, supra note 66, at 11 (“[T]he Court 
gave thirty-two judgments, twenty-seven advisory opinions, and more than two hundred 
orders.”). Fifty of the PCIJ’s cases—out of sixty-six total cases—were filed during the period 
between 1922 and 1932. ROSENNE’S THE WORLD COURT, supra, app. V at 319. After 1932, 
usage of the Court declined markedly. Id. 
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two contentious cases and 3.5 cases in total per year. In particular, the 
PCIJ’s irrelevance during the years leading up to World War II stood 
in painful contrast to its contemplated role as a guardian of world 
peace. In one observer’s words, “[T]he hope of the peace movement 
of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, that international 
adjudication was the substitute for war, was . . . ill-founded and 
unduly idealistic.”92 
3. International Court of Justice.  The aftermath of World War II 
saw the replacement of the PCIJ with the ICJ—identified by the 
United Nations (UN) Charter as the “principal judicial organ of the 
United Nations.”93 The ICJ replicated the PCIJ’s high aspirations: 
“[T]he primary purpose of the International Court . . . lies in its 
function as one of the instruments for securing peace in so far as this 
aim can be achieved through law.”94 Similarly, the ICJ largely 
replicated the PCIJ’s institutional structure and jurisdictional 
competence, as well as its patterns of usage. 
Like the PCIJ Statute, the ICJ Statute adopted the model of a 
national appellate court and provided for a standing tribunal of 
fifteen members with fixed terms and remuneration.95 Also like the 
PCIJ, the ICJ was open to all states—but not to individuals or 
corporate entities96—and was envisioned as a world court with 
universal jurisdiction over any “legal” dispute among states. 
Nonetheless, the ICJ was not granted general compulsory jurisdiction 
over interstate disputes. Instead, like the PCIJ’s, the Court’s 
jurisdiction was limited to disputes that states agreed to submit to it—
for example, in compromissory clauses in bilateral or multilateral 
treaties.97 The Court’s jurisdiction was also governed by the so-called 
 
 92. Stephen M. Schwebel, The Performance and Prospects of the World Court, 6 PACE 
INT’L L. REV. 253, 257 (1994). 
 93. U.N. Charter art. 92; Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 1, June 26, 1945, 
59 Stat. 1055, 1055, 3 Bevans 1153, 1179. 
 94. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 89, at 3–5. 
 95. Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 93, arts. 3, 13, 32, 59 Stat. at 
1055–57, 1059, 3 Bevans at 1179, 1181–82, 1185. 
 96. U.N. Charter art. 93. The Court’s jurisdiction also permits it to provide advisory 
opinions, in limited circumstances, upon request by a UN body. Id. art. 96; Statute of the 
International Court of Justice, supra note 93, art. 65, 59 Stat. at 1063, 3 Bevans at 1191–92. 
 97. Article 36(1) of the Court’s Statute provides for ad hoc submissions of particular 
disputes to the Court or for submissions pursuant to compromissory clauses that were included 
in particular treaties to cover future disputes. Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra 
note 93, art. 36(1), 59 Stat. at 1060. 
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optional clause in Article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute, which aimed at 
vesting the ICJ with broad, effectively mandatory jurisdiction by 
providing for states to make general declarations accepting the 
Court’s compulsory jurisdiction over disputes with other states that 
had similarly accepted the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction.98 
Also paralleling the PCIJ Statute, the ICJ Statute provides that 
ICJ judgments are “final and without appeal.”99 Nonetheless, neither 
the UN Charter nor the ICJ Statute provides an effective 
enforcement mechanism for ICJ decisions. If an offending party does 
not comply with an ICJ judgment, the prevailing party is authorized 
to seek recourse from the Security Council under the UN Charter.100 
As the Statute’s drafters feared, however, recourse to the Security 
Council has proved to be a highly imperfect remedy that has rarely 
been invoked and never clearly applied.101 
Despite its limitations, the ICJ has played an important role in 
the development of international law, rendering a number of opinions 
 
 98. Id. arts. 35(1), 36(2), 59 Stat. at 1159–60, 3 Bevans at 1186–87.  
 99. Id. art. 60, 59 Stat. at 1063, 3 Bevans at 1191; see also U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 1 
(“Each member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the 
International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party.”). 
 100. U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 2; see also Mary Ellen O’Connell, The Prospects for 
Enforcing Monetary Judgments of the International Court of Justice: A Study of Nicaragua’s 
Judgment Against the United States, 30 VA. J. INT’L L. 891, 905–12 (1990) (“The drafters of the 
U.N. Charter gave responsibility for enforcement to the Security Council . . . .”); cf. Reisman, 
supra note 9, at 1 (“Most frequently the real problem is not in arriving at an answer in 
[international] law, but in enforcing an answer in law.”). 
 101. Among other difficulties, the Security Council’s limited jurisdictional mandate, its 
discretion to decline enforcement, its political focus, its busy schedule, and the veto rights of the 
Council’s permanent members make enforcement of ICJ judgments via the Council both 
unlikely and unsatisfactory. See Rudolf Bernhardt, Article 59, in THE STATUTE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, supra note 84, at 1231, 1246 (noting that only one case of 
ICJ noncompliance has come before the Security Council and that Security Council 
enforcement “will be meaningless if directed against a permanent member of the Security 
Council”); Reisman, supra note 9, at 14–16 (“Security Council decisions may commission armed 
force . . . only if peace is threatened. Clearly, not every act of noncompliance constitutes an 
imminent threat to peace.” (footnote omitted)). See generally Attila Tanzi, Problems of 
Enforcement of Decisions of the International Court of Justice and the Law of the United 
Nations, 6 EUR. J. INT’L L. 539 (1995) (discussing difficulties with Security Council enforcement 
under Article 94, Paragraph 2). Article 94, Paragraph 2 was arguably invoked in the boundary 
dispute between Chad and Libya. Because both states supported Security Council 
“enforcement,” however, the example is unrepresentative. See Aloysius P. Llamzon, Jurisdiction 
and Compliance in Recent Decisions of the International Court of Justice, 18 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 
815, 830–31 (“Libya . . . , together with Chad, sought and received Security Council assistance to 
monitor the full withdrawal of Libyan troops . . . .”). 
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that have addressed significant issues of international law.102 
Nonetheless, as both proponents and critics acknowledge, usage of 
the ICJ has been disappointing, even if one takes into account the 
limited number of entities able to commence ICJ proceedings—a 
maximum of 150 states at most relevant times.103 In total, the ICJ has 
heard 124 contentious cases and has considered twenty-six requests 
for advisory opinions in its sixty-five-year history,104 resulting in an 
annual filing rate of slightly more than two cases—contentious or 
advisory—per year. Between 1945 and 1990, only eighty-two cases 
were filed with the Court—less than two cases per year.105 Following 
the breakup of the Soviet Union, the Court enjoyed a modest 
 
 102. See, e.g., North Sea Continental Shelf (W. Ger./Den.; W. Ger./Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 
¶ 101 (Feb. 20) (determining “the principles and rules of international law applicable to the 
delimitation . . . of the continental shelf in the North Sea”); Arbitral Award Made by the King 
of Spain on 23 December 1906 (Hond. v. Nicar.), 1960 I.C.J. 192, 217 (Nov. 18) (upholding a 
1906 arbitration award of land to Honduras); Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116, 128 
(Dec. 18) (“The Parties being in agreement on the figure of 4 miles for the breadth of the 
territorial sea, the problem which arises is from what base-line this breadth is to be reckoned.”); 
Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949 
I.C.J. 174, 187–88 (Apr. 11) (determining the conditions under which the United Nations may 
bring international claims for its agents’ injuries); see also Robert Y. Jennings, The United 
Nations at Fifty: The International Court of Justice After Fifty Years, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 493, 493 
(1995) (citing the Continental Shelf, Fisheries, and Reparations cases as having had a “major 
impact upon the general system of international law . . . and the law of the sea”); Manfred 
Lachs, Some Reflections on the Contribution of the International Court of Justice to the 
Development of International Law, 10 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 239, 245 (1983) (“In the 
development of international law, the [ICJ] plays a special role.”); Stephen M. Schwebel, 
Commentary, Preliminary Rulings by the International Court of Justice at the Instance of 
National Courts, 28 VA. J. INT’L L. 495, 499 (1988) (“Over the years, the International Court of 
Justice and its predecessor have not only settled a not insubstantial number of international 
legal disputes; they have contributed significantly to the progressive development of 
international law.”). 
 103. See LAUTERPACHT, supra note 89, at 4 (“[I]t would be an exaggeration to assert that 
the Court has proved to be a significant instrument for maintaining international peace.”); 
Kooijmans, supra note 21, at 418 (“In a world in which the Westphalian system is still prevalent, 
an adjudicative body can only play a limited role.”); Shigeru Oda, The Compulsory Jurisdiction 
of the International Court of Justice: A Myth?, 49 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 251, 260 (2000) (“It can be 
said that in the period prior to 1975, a meaningful result . . . was achieved in only seven 
cases . . . .”); Simma, supra note 7, at 49–51 (“[T]he constitutional role of the World Court 
remains rather limited, and its genuine judicial function, the decision of disputes submitted to it 
unilaterally, is not working too well either.”). 
 104. List of Cases Referred to the Court Since 1946 by Date of Introduction, INT’L COURT OF 
JUSTICE, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=2 (last visited Dec. 19, 2011). 
 105. Id. These figures overstate the number of true cases—both contentious judgments and 
advisory opinions—by approximately 15 percent. This overstatement principally results from 
multiple filings in single disputes and forum prorogatum filings that were not accepted. Oda, 
supra note 103, at 252–55. 
BORN IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 20/12/2011  8:11 AM 
806 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:775 
increase in popularity: sixty-seven cases were filed between 1991 and 
2010—roughly three cases per year.106 
Acceptance of the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction under Article 
36(2) has also been unsatisfactory. Only 66 of the 193 UN members 
have accepted the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction under Article 36(2).107 
Measured as a percentage of all UN members, this 30 percent 
acceptance figure is an all-time low, compared with 60 percent 
acceptance by UN members in 1950 and 65 percent acceptance of the 
PCIJ’s compulsory jurisdiction.108 Moreover, treaty-based submissions 
to ICJ jurisdiction have also been infrequent and are declining. 
Between 1946 and 1965, states entered into roughly 9.7 treaties 
providing for ICJ jurisdiction per year; that number fell to roughly 2.8 
treaties per year between 1966 and 1985 and 1.3 per year between 
1986 and 2004.109 As Part III.A.2 discusses, the one exception to this 
decline in treaty-based submissions to the ICJ involves the 
designation of the ICJ president as an appointing authority in treaty 
 
 106. List of Cases Referred to the Court Since 1946 by Date of Introduction, supra note 104. 
The increase in cases filed after 1991 reflected, in part, multiple filings in a single dispute. For 
example, claims arising from NATO’s military actions against Serbia resulted in ten cases being 
filed with the ICJ in 1999. Annual filings in contentious cases in recent years include three in 
2010, three in 2009, six in 2008, zero in 2007, three in 2006, one in 2005, one in 2004, three in 
2003, three in 2002, and three in 2001. Id. 
 107. See Declarations Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the Court as Compulsory, INT’L COURT 
OF JUSTICE, http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3 (last visited Dec. 
19, 2011) (listing the states that recognize compulsory ICJ jurisdiction). 
 108. Moreover, a substantial number of major states have either withdrawn from—the 
United States and France—or refused to accept—China and Russia—ICJ compulsory 
jurisdiction. See Tomuschat, supra note 84, at 626 (“Of the permanent members of the Security 
Council, only the United Kingdom still recognizes the jurisdiction of the ICJ . . . . France 
withdrew its acceptance, . . . and the United States followed suit . . . . Russia (formerly the 
Soviet Union) and China have never submitted to the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ . . . .”). 
 109. Eric A. Posner, The Decline of the International Court of Justice 9 (Univ. of Chi. Pub. 
Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 81, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=629341. These figures are absolute, during a period in which both the number of states 
that could accept ICJ jurisdiction and the number of treaties concluded annually increased 
substantially. Id. Even in the early years of the Court, only a small percentage of all treaties 
contained ICJ-jurisdiction clauses. See PETER H. ROHN, TREATY PROFILES passim (1976) 
(showing that 6 percent of treaties concluded between 1946 and 1965 contained ICJ-jurisdiction 
clauses). A review of the treaties concluded between 1990 and 2010 confirms these findings: 
only twenty-seven treaties concluded during this period—out of approximately 18,750 reported 
treaties—provide for ICJ jurisdiction; of these twenty-seven treaties, only ten provide for 
binding ICJ jurisdiction over disputes. See Gary Born, ICJ Jurisdiction Clauses for Settlement of 
Disputes in Recent International Treaties—Review of the Treaties and International 
Agreements Concluded Between 1990 and 2010 Registered or Filed and Recorded with the 
Secretariat of the United Nations (Nov. 1, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the 
Duke Law Journal). 
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provisions that submit future disputes to interstate arbitration—
providing for the ICJ president to select arbitrators in cases in which 
states are unable to agree upon an appointment. Treatymaking 
practice has seen frequent use of this appointment mechanism.110 
Compliance with ICJ judgments has also been mixed, 
particularly in compulsory-jurisdiction cases. The United States has 
refused to comply with a number of the Court’s judgments, and other 
states, including France, Iceland, Albania, Libya, and Iran, have done 
the same.111 Similarly, a number of states have withdrawn their 
consents to ICJ jurisdiction in connection with pending, threatened, 
or concluded cases before the Court;112 in other instances, the Court 
has simply declined jurisdiction when noncompliance appeared 
likely.113 
All told, it is impossible to conclude that the ICJ has played a 
significant role in international affairs over the course of its sixty-five-
year history. The Court’s principal achievements have been its 
contribution to the elaboration of principles of customary 
international law114 and its successful resolution of a relatively limited 
number of boundary disputes, often involving the Court’s special-
agreement jurisdiction.115 Other areas of the ICJ’s jurisdiction, 
 
 110. See infra text accompanying note 351. As discussed, the ICJ president is designated as 
an appointing authority in an average of forty-five treaties per year. See infra text accompanying 
note 351. 
 111. Colter Paulson, Compliance with Final Judgments of the International Court of Justice 
Since 1987, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 434, 436–56, 458–59 (2004) (showing that out of thirteen final 
judgments between 1987 and 2004, there was good compliance in eight cases and less-
satisfactory compliance in five cases). Although assessments are far from clear-cut, Professors 
Posner and Yoo claim a 40 percent compliance rate in compulsory-jurisdiction cases and a 72 
percent compliance rate in special-agreement or treaty cases. Posner & Yoo, supra note 7, at 53. 
 112. These states include the United States, France, Australia, and Iceland. See Mark 
Weston Janis, Somber Reflections on the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court, 81 
AM. J. INT’L L. 144, 144 (2007) (“[T]he Court’s compulsory jurisdiction cases have been beset 
with nonappearing defendants . . . .”); Gillian Triggs & Dean Bialek, Australia Withdraws 
Maritime Disputes from the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 17 INT’L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 423, 423 (2002) 
(“Australia issued declarations excluding from the jurisdiction of the [ICJ] and the [ITLOS] all 
disputes relating to the delimitation of maritime zones. . . . The risk has been that East 
Timor . . . will seek final delimitation of the sea-bed boundary between it and Australia by 
making an application to the ICJ.”); supra note 108. 
 113. See Reisman, supra note 9, at 3 & n.7 (“When the Court anticipated that a state was 
likely to impugn a judgment, it not infrequently disseised itself of jurisdiction.”). 
 114. See supra note 102. 
 115. See, e.g., Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indon./Malay.), 2002 I.C.J. 
625, ¶¶ 148–50 (Dec. 17) (recognizing a territorial claim made by Malaysia based on colonial 
landholdings); Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Bots./Namib.), 1999 I.C.J. 1045, ¶ 103 (Dec. 13) 
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especially its compulsory jurisdiction under Article 36(2), have seen 
limited use, and equally limited practical effects. 
4. International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.  The model of 
first-generation tribunals continued to be followed in structuring the 
ITLOS,116 which was established pursuant to the 1994 UN Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)117. Like the ICJ, the ITLOS is a 
permanent, standing court whose twenty-one members enjoy fixed 
terms and remuneration.118 The tribunal was conceived with broad 
jurisdictional competence that potentially extended to any questions 
arising between contracting states under the UNCLOS.119 
ITLOS judgments are “final” and, pursuant to the ITLOS 
Statute, “shall be complied with by all the parties to the dispute.”120 
Like the PCA, ICJ, and PCIJ, however, the UNCLOS and ITLOS 
Statute do not generally provide enforcement mechanisms for ITLOS 
decisions.121 
 
(resolving a territory dispute between Namibia and Botswana); Gabíkovo-Nagymaros Project 
(Hung./Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, ¶ 155 (Sept. 25) (resolving conflicts that had arisen during a joint 
waterworks project on the Hungarian-Slovak border). The only category of the ICJ’s caseload 
that has increased meaningfully since the 1970s is special-agreement cases, which involve the 
submission of existing disputes to the Court. During the ICJ’s first thirty years, only four 
special-agreement cases were filed, but ten such cases were filed in the ICJ’s next thirty-five 
years. Posner, supra note 109, at 9; see also List of Cases Referred to the Court Since 1946 by 
Date of Introduction, supra note 104. As others have noted, the ICJ’s special-agreement 
jurisdiction, particularly when used by parties to select a Chamber of the Court, bears more 
resemblance to ad hoc interstate arbitration than to the ICJ’s contemplated mandatory 
jurisdiction. Posner, supra note 109, at 9–10. 
 116. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea annex VI, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 
1833 U.N.T.S. 397, 561 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
 117. UNCLOS, supra note 116. 
 118. Id. annex VI, arts. 3, 5, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 561–62. 
 119. The ITLOS’s jurisdiction is comparatively broad, extending to any dispute concerning 
the interpretation or application of the UNCLOS, as well as to disputes concerning any 
“international agreement related to the purposes of th[e] Convention” and principles of 
customary international law. Id. art. 288(2), 1833 U.N.T.S. at 510; see also id. arts. 288(1), 293(1), 
1833 U.N.T.S. at 510, 512 (defining further ITLOS’s jurisdiction and the applicable law in its 
proceedings); id. annex VI, art. 21, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 566 (same); Jillaine Seymour, The 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea: A Great Mistake?, 13 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL 
STUD. 1, 1 (2006) (“The Convention appears to vest this Tribunal with very broad 
jurisdiction . . . .”). 
 120. UNCLOS, supra note 116, annex VI, art. 33(1), 1833 U.N.T.S. at 568. 
 121. The only exception is the specialized Seabed Disputes Chamber, whose decisions are 
subject to enforcement in national courts in the same manner as national court judgments. Id. 
annex VI, art. 39, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 570. Seabed disputes—which concern activities in the 
International Seabed Area—are subject to the mandatory jurisdiction of the Seabed Disputes 
Chamber of the ITLOS. Id. art. 187, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 475–76; ROBIN ROLF CHURCHILL & 
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In practice, the vast majority of states have declined to accept the 
ITLOS’s jurisdiction, instead opting for alternative means of dispute 
resolution. Article 287 of the Convention allows states to file a 
declaration selecting among three options for the resolution of 
disputes under the UNCLOS: (i) the ITLOS, (ii) the ICJ, and 
(iii) arbitration.122 Very few of the UNCLOS contracting states have 
accepted the ITLOS’s jurisdiction pursuant to Article 287. As of 
September 2010, only 27 of the 161 contracting states had chosen the 
ITLOS as their preferred dispute-resolution mechanism, and, of 
these, 12 selected the ITLOS along with another form of dispute 
resolution.123 
Since the tribunal began functioning in 1998, only nineteen cases 
have been filed with it—ten of which were claims for provisional 
relief.124 During these years, the ITLOS has issued only one decision 
 
ALAN VAUGHAN LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 458–59 (3d ed. 1999). The Seabed Disputes 
Chamber consists of eleven members of the ITLOS; the judges sit in “ad hoc chambers” in 
particular disputes, which consist of three judges selected by the parties from the Seabed 
Disputes Chamber or, failing agreement, by the Chamber’s presiding judge. UNCLOS, supra 
note 116, annex VI, arts. 35(1), 36, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 569–70. 
 Judgments of the Chamber are, like other ITLOS judgments, “final” and “shall be 
complied with by all the parties to the dispute.” Id. annex VI, arts. 33(1), 40(1), 1833 U.N.T.S. at 
568, 570. Additionally, however, Article 39 of the ITLOS Statute provides that decisions of the 
Chamber, unlike other ITLOS judgments, are directly enforceable in contracting states: “The 
decisions of the Chamber shall be enforceable in the territories of the States Parties in the same 
manner as judgments or orders of the highest court of the State Party in whose territory the 
enforcement is sought.” Id. annex VI, art. 39, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 570. 
 122. Id. art. 287, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 509–10. Arbitration under the UNCLOS may include both 
arbitration under Annex VII and “special” arbitration under Annex VIII—for expert 
factfinding on issues of fisheries, marine environment, marine-scientific research, or navigation. 
Id. art. 287(1)(c)–(d), 1833 U.N.T.S. at 510; see also id. annex VIII, art. 1, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 575 
(listing the subjects for special arbitration). Exceptionally, Articles 187 and 292 of the UNCLOS 
provide for mandatory ITLOS jurisdiction for cases in which vessels are detained in violation of 
the UNCLOS and for “seabed disputes”—disputes arising under the UNCLOS regime for rights 
to the international seabed. Id. arts. 187, 292, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 475–76, 512. 
 123. See Settlement of Disputes Mechanism, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/
settlement_of_disputes/choice_procedure.htm (last updated Nov. 11, 2010) (displaying a table 
with member parties’ choices of dispute-settlement methods). 
 124. See List of Cases, INT’L TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA, http://www.itlos.org/
index.php?id=35&L=0 (last visited Dec. 19, 2011).  
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on the merits.125 Not surprisingly, there are substantial doubts about 
the usefulness of the ITLOS and about its future viability.126 
Like the ICJ and PCIJ, the ITLOS was established as a 
permanent judicial body, with aspirations to broad jurisdiction over a 
wide range of international-law disputes; yet it lacks any means to 
issue enforceable decisions. Also like the ICJ and PCIJ, the ITLOS 
ultimately was not granted compulsory jurisdiction; instead, the 
contracting states insisted upon retaining the ability to accept or 
decline the ITLOS’s jurisdiction, and they have generally declined. 
Finally, like the PCA, ICJ, and PCIJ, states have decided not to use 
the ITLOS—filing, at best, one case per year—and consequently the 
tribunal has played no material role in international affairs. 
5. Regional Courts and Tribunals.  A number of the regional 
tribunals established since World War II share various characteristics 
of the PCA, PCIJ, ICJ, and ITLOS—they are modeled on the 
institutional structure of independent national appellate courts but 
lack the power to render enforceable decisions. None of these 
regional tribunals precisely parallel the institutional structures of the 
original first-generation tribunals, and most differ in significant 
respects—particularly because many of these tribunals are part of 
broader regional integration efforts.127 Nevertheless, because these 
tribunals have been featured in some of the commentary on 
international adjudication, they warrant a brief discussion. Notably, 
like classic first-generation tribunals, very few of these tribunals have 
enjoyed more than modest usage or compliance, and many of them 
have been entirely unsuccessful.128 
The African Court of Justice and Human Rights (ACJHR) is 
representative of many regional judicial institutions. Founded by the 
 
 125. The one case that has been decided on the merits is M/V Saiga (No. 2) (St. Vincent v. 
Guinea), Case No. 2, Judgment of July 1, 1999, 3 ITLOS Rep. 10. See Seymour, supra note 119, 
at 2 (noting that only M/V Saiga (No. 2) has reached judgment on the merits); List of Cases, 
supra note 124 (listing ITLOS cases, only one of which was brought for provisional measures 
under Article 290 and received a judgment). 
 126. See, e.g., Shigeru Oda, Dispute Settlement Prospects in the Law of the Sea, 44 INT’L & 
COMP. L.Q. 863, 864 (1995) (“The creation of [the ITLOS] . . . will prove to have been a great 
mistake.”); Seymour, supra note 119, at 35 (“Whatever the impetus behind creation of the 
Tribunal, its present challenge is to justify its existence.” (footnote omitted)). 
 127. In the context of the European Union, regional political and economic unions involve 
largely sui generis considerations that make it difficult to use regional tribunals as evidence of or 
models for international adjudication. See infra Part II.A.6. 
 128. The most important exceptions are the ECJ and the ECHR. See infra Part II.A.6. 
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African Union in 2008, the ACJHR was intended to merge the 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) and the 
African Court of Justice (ACJ) and to serve as the judicial organ of 
the African Union.129 Like the ACHPR and ACJ before it, the 
ACJHR formally possesses broad jurisdictional competence over 
disputes between African Union member states.130 The ACJHR is a 
standing court of sixteen judges who serve six-year terms.131 Under the 
ACJHR Statute, judgments of the ACJHR are final and binding on 
the parties, but the Statute includes no meaningful enforcement 
mechanism.132 
Although they are routinely included in lists of contemporary 
international tribunals,133 neither the ACJ, the ACHPR, nor the 
ACJHR has attracted anything more than nominal support from 
member states or played any role in the adjudication of international 
disputes. Before being merged out of existence in 2008, neither the 
ACHPR nor the ACJ had ever commenced judicial activities or heard 
a single case.134 Similarly, although it was established to replace the 
ACJ and ACPHR, the ACJHR has not commenced judicial 
activities.135 
 
 129. Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights arts. 2–3, 
July 1, 2008, 48 I.L.M. 337, 340. 
 130. Id. annex, art. 28, 48 I.L.M. at 347. 
 131. Id. annex, arts. 3, 8(1), 48 I.L.M. at 343. 
 132. Id. annex, art. 46, 48 I.L.M. at 351. Articles 46(3) and (4) authorize the referral of cases 
to the African Union Assembly of cases when parties fail to comply with a judgment. Id. 
 133. See, e.g., Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 16, at 912 tbl.1 (identifying the ACJ and the 
ACHPR as courts that must be considered in addressing international adjudication); African 
Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights, PROJECT ON INT’L COURTS & TRIBUNALS, http://www.
pict-pcti.org/courts/ACHPR.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2011) (listing the ACHPR in the drop-
down menu for “Courts and Tribunals”). 
 134. In both instances, member states of the African Union were slow to ratify the Courts’ 
respective constitutive instruments. See Gino J. Naldi, Aspects of the African Court of Justice 
and Human Rights, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENTS: NEW PROBLEMS 
AND TECHNIQUES 321, 322–23 (Duncan French, Matthew Saul & Nigel D. White eds., 2010) 
(giving the date of adoption and the date entered into force for both Courts’ protocols). 
Ironically, only when the ACPHR’s Protocol was eventually ratified, at least theoretically 
permitting the ACPHR to begin judicial functions, did the African Union agree to merge the 
nascent Court into the ACJ to produce the new ACJHR—which had not begun functioning as 
of January 2012. See id. at 323–25 (describing the timeline for the ACPHR’s entering into force 
and for the decision to merge the Courts); Bernard James, African Rights Court a White 
Elephant?, ALLAFRICA.COM (Dec. 25, 2010), http://allafrica.com/stories/201012260008.html 
(“[T]he [ACHPR] . . . has received only one case so far . . . .”). 
 135. The ACJHR Protocol and Statute had not yet received the number of ratifications 
required to come into force. See Simon M. Weldehaimanot, Unlocking the African Court of 
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The Central American Court of Justice (CACJ) provides a 
substantially similar example. Established by the Organization of 
Central American States in 1991,136 the Court’s jurisdiction extends 
broadly to disputes among Central American contracting states and 
to disputes between contracting states and any national of a 
contracting state.137 Pursuant to its Statute, the CACJ consists of a 
standing body of judges serving ten-year terms.138 Decisions of the 
CACJ are, under the terms of its Statute, final and not subject to 
appeal, but they lack any enforcement mechanism.139 
The CACJ has been used infrequently. To date, only El 
Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua have ratified the CACJ’s 
Protocol, and Guatemala, Costa Rica, and Panama have refused.140 
During the Court’s first ten years, forty-seven cases were filed, and 
twenty-one judgments were delivered.141 At the same time, the 
 
Justice and Human Rights, 2 J. AFR. & INT’L L., no. 2, 2009, at 167, 176 n.45 (stating that only 
Libya had ratified at that time).  
 136. A predecessor of the CACJ was founded in 1907 but was dissolved in 1918 after 
hearing ten cases. Sasha Maldonado Jordison, The Central American Court of Justice: Yesterday, 
Today, and Tomorrow?, 25 CONN. J. INT’L L. 183, 195–96, 199 (2009). The Carta de la 
Organización de Estados Centroamericanos (ODECA) [Charter of the Organization of Central 
American States (OCAS)], Dec. 12, 1962, 552 U.N.T.S. 15, reestablished the CACJ in 1962, id. 
arts. 2, 14–16, 552 U.N.T.S. at 24–26, 30, but no steps were taken to create a functioning court 
until 1991. See id. at 207–09 (describing the emergence over time of the CACJ and stating “that 
the Court was established through the ODECA Charter, even though the Charter did not 
contain certain information important to the establishment of the Court”).  
 137. Convenio de los Estatutos de la Corte Centroamericana de la Justicia [Convention on 
the Statute of the Central American Court of Justice] art. 22, Dec. 10, 1992, 1821 U.N.T.S. 279, 
298–99; Jordison, supra note 136, at 220–21; Thomas Andrew O’Keefe, The Central American 
Integration System (SICA) at the Dawn of a New Century: Will the Central American Isthmus 
Finally Be Able To Achieve Economic and Political Unity?, 13 FLA. J. INT’L L. 243, 252–53 
(2001).  
 138. Convention on the Statute of the Central American Court of Justice, supra note 137, 
art. 11, 1821 U.N.T.S. at 297; Jordison, supra note 136, at 222–23; see also Convention on the 
Statute of the Central American Court of Justice, supra note 137, arts. 14–15, 44, 1821 U.N.T.S. 
at 298, 301–02 (implying the permanent nature of the Court by requiring that judges be 
independent of their home countries, abstain from working as anything but a judge on that 
Court, and receive a full salary). 
 139. Convention on the Statute of the Central American Court of Justice, supra note 137, 
art. 38, 1821 U.N.T.S. at 301; see also id. art. 39, 1821 U.N.T.S. at 301 (declaring that the only 
available enforcement mechanism is to inform the other member states of noncompliance so 
that they can take appropriate action to enforce the judgment); Jordison, supra note 136, at 221 
(“Decisions of the Court are final and cannot be appealed.”). 
 140. Jordison, supra note 136, at 224–25; O’Keefe, supra note 137, at 251.  
 141. Jordison, supra note 136, at 223; see also O’Keefe, supra note 137, at 253 (“Although 
the [CACJ] has been operating since 1994, its caseload has been light because only three 
countries . . . actively participate in the Court.”). 
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CACJ’s compliance record has been poor; several highly publicized 
cases have resulted in noncompliance or the suspension of a country’s 
participation in the Court.142 Again, given this record, it is impossible 
to regard the CACJ as a successful example of international 
adjudication. 
Other regional judicial bodies have track records that are 
substantially similar to the ACJHR and CACJ. Examples include the 
Benelux Court of Justice, the Economic Court of the Commonwealth 
of Independent States, the Court of Justice for the Common Market 
of Eastern and Southern Africa, the Court of Justice for the Arab 
Magreb Union, and the Judicial Tribunal for the Organization of 
Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries. In most instances, these Courts 
have heard either zero or a de minimis number of disputes and have 
played no role in international or regional affairs. 
In a few cases, regional courts such as the Court of Justice for the 
Andean Community (CJAC) have attracted a respectable degree of 
usage in connection with largely unsuccessful regional integration 
efforts.143 Notably, however, this usage has virtually always occurred 
in very limited and unusual circumstances, typically involving only 
one or a few states and “islands” of disputes over very limited subject 
areas, such as specialized intellectual-property issues.144 The only 
 
 142. See, e.g., Jordison, supra note 136, at 228–31 (describing a case in which the Nicaraguan 
president brought suit against the Nicaraguan National Assembly and in which the assembly 
refused to comply with the CACJ’s orders); O’Keefe, supra note 137, at 243, 254–55 (describing 
both parties’ noncompliance with court orders concerning a case brought by Nicaragua against 
Honduras after Honduras signed a treaty with Colombia that, in part, recognized Colombia’s 
territorial claim to land that Nicaragua had long claimed). 
 143. The CJAC is sometimes cited as an example of a successful regional court, with a 
reasonably sizable docket. See, e.g., Laurence R. Helfer, Karen J. Alter & M. Florencia 
Guerzovich, Islands of Effective International Adjudication: Constructing an Intellectual 
Property Rule of Law in the Andean Community, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (2009) (“[The CJAC] 
is the world’s third most active international court . . . .”). 
 144. Importantly, the CJAC’s caseload consists almost entirely—97 percent—of a limited 
range of intellectual-property issues—principally trademark regulation—originating largely—
approximately 66 percent—in one state: Colombia. Id. at 14–15. The CJAC’s specific 
characteristics make it difficult to cite as a model of successful international adjudication. 
Rather, it is an example of how an otherwise-disused tribunal can be adapted to fill a very 
specific and limited purpose in a limited number of states. The same observations apply to the 
Common Court of Justice and Arbitration for the Organization for the Harmonization of 
Corporate Law in Africa (OHADA), as the substantial majority of that Court’s cases originate 
from the Ivory Coast. See Claire M. Dickerson, Harmonizing Business Laws in Africa: OHADA 
Calls the Tune, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 17, 57–58 & n.164 (2005) (“[T]he national supreme 
courts are in fact not sending all their business-related cases to the [CJAC], and the parties 
apparently often do not insist that their case be removed. The supreme courts’ motivation is 
clear enough; legal professionals within the region confirm that parties are equally reticent due 
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exception to this pattern in the performance of regional tribunals 
involves European institutions—specifically, the European Court of 
Human Rights and the European Court of Justice, which is discussed 
in the next Section. 
Finally, the IACHR, established pursuant to the 1969 American 
Convention on Human Rights, has been more successful than most 
other regional courts. The Court has jurisdiction to hear cases filed by 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Commission), 
which, in turn, has jurisdiction to hear petitions filed by individuals or 
groups;145 the IACHR itself does not have jurisdiction to hear cases 
filed directly by individuals.146 Decisions of the IACHR are formally 
binding, but the Convention provides no enforcement mechanisms 
for cases of noncompliance.147 
Usage of the IACHR was initially modest but has been growing. 
In 2009, the Commission received 1431 complaints, compared to 435 
 
to the perceived cost of removing the final appeal to the [CJAC] in Abidjan. The fact that the 
vast majority of appeals to the [CJAC] come from Côte d’Ivoire supports that conclusion.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 145. Convención Americana Sobre Derechos Humanos [American Convention on Human 
Rights] arts. 44, 61, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 155, 159; see also JO M. PASQUALUCCI, 
THE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 6 
(2003) (“[A]n individual . . . must first file a complaint directly with the Inter-American 
Commission . . . . If the Commission attributes the human rights violation to the State, the 
Commission may make recommendations to the State. A State that decides to challenge the 
Commission’s attribution of responsibility may submit the case to the Inter-American Court. 
The Commission may submit a case to the Court only if the State has accepted the Court’s 
jurisdiction.” (footnotes omitted)); James Cavallaro & Stephanie Brewer, Reevaluating Regional 
Human Rights Litigation in the Twenty-First Century: The Case of the Inter-American Court, 102 
AM. J. INT’L L. 768, 778 (2008) (“The quasi-judicial Commission acts as the first instance for 
victims of human rights violations who wish to bring cases before the system. . . . The Court, on 
the other hand, is an exclusively judicial body that issues binding decisions in cases of human 
rights violations submitted to it by the Commission.”). The Convention authorizes contracting 
states to make a declaration upon ratification, consenting to the IACHR’s jurisdiction. 
American Convention on Human Rights, supra, art. 62, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 159. Twenty-four 
states accept some measure of IACHR jurisdiction, although the United States, Canada, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Dominica, Grenada, and Jamaica do not. See American Convention of 
Human Rights “Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica,” ORG. OF AM. STATES, http://www.oas.org/
juridico/english/sigs/b-32.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2011). The IACHR comprises seven 
members, each serving six-year terms. PASQUALUCCI, supra, at 9–10. 
 146. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 145, art. 61(1), 1144 U.N.T.S. at 
159 (providing that the state members and the Commission are the only parties that can bring 
suit before the IACHR). In contrast, the Commission may entertain petitions filed by 
individuals. Id. art. 44, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 155. 
 147. Id. arts. 67–68, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 160 (declaring that judgments are final and that the 
parties to the Convention agree to comply with the judgments); see also PASQUALUCCI, supra 
note 145, at 8 (“[T]he Court has no effective mechanism to enforce its judgments . . . .”). 
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in 1997.148 Of these complaints, the Commission initiated eleven cases 
before the IACHR, up from two in 1997.149 The IACHR can order 
two general types of remedies: (a) monetary compensation for 
individuals who have been deprived of their human rights and 
(b) orders for the trial and punishment of perpetrators of human-
rights violations and for changes in domestic law.150 In light of the 
absence of enforcement mechanisms, states have seldom complied 
with orders to punish perpetrators, to change domestic laws, or to 
take similar steps, but they generally have paid monetary 
compensation to victims, albeit often after delays.151 Although precise 
figures vary, it is generally accepted that a substantial number of the 
Court’s judgments do not enjoy full compliance.152 
 
 148. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights [Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R.], Annual 
Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 2009, at 33 tbl.b, OEA/Ser.L/V/II, 
doc. 51, corr. 1 (2009), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/pdf%20files/ANNUAL2009.pdf. 
 149. Id. at 39 tbl.a. Since 2001, the Commission has filed roughly one dozen cases per year 
with the IACHR. Cavallaro & Brewer, supra note 145, at 780. Before 2001, the Court heard 
between one and four cases annually. Id. at 780–81. It remains the case that the Court is “an 
organ of extremely limited access for the vast majority of victims of human rights violations.” Id. 
at 781.  
 150. PASQUALUCCI, supra note 145, at 8–9; see also id. at 17–18 (describing the reparations 
in a particular case). See generally id. at 230–79, 281–85 (detailing the victim reparations 
process).  
 151. Id. at 8–9. There have been a number of instances of outright defiance of IACHR 
judgments. See, e.g., Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Democracy and Human Rights in Venezuela, at 
77–80, OEA/Ser.L/V/II, doc. 54 (2009), available at http://www.cidh.org/pdf%20files/
VENEZUELA%202009%20ENG.pdf (criticizing Venezuela’s Supreme Court for rejecting the 
IACHR’s judgment regarding biased judges); PASQUALUCCI, supra note 145, at 288–89 
(describing how Honduras initially refused to comply with an order to pay compensation and 
successfully blocked an OAS General Assembly consideration of the issue). 
 152. See Inter-American Court of Human Rights [Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.], Annual Report of the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 2009, at 10–12, OEA/Ser.L/V/III.86, doc. I (2010), 
available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/informes/eng_2009.pdf (giving various graphs and 
charts showing levels of compliance); Cavallaro & Brewer, supra note 145, at 784–88 (“A review 
of the [IACHR’s] past cases demonstrates that the Court does face frequent nonimplementation 
of its judgments. Governments may openly reject certain orders, but even more commonly they 
assert that they will comply or are in the process of complying, yet fail to take the steps 
necessary to bring their practices into line with the requirements of the Court’s judgment.”); 
Darren Hawkins & Wade Jacoby, Partial Compliance: A Comparison of the European and 
Inter-American Courts of Human Rights, 6 J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 35, 56 (2010) (“[F]ull 
compliance [with IACHR orders] has occurred . . . 6% of the time. . . . [T]he state has not 
complied with any compliance orders . . . 11% [of the time]. Thus, 83% of the cases . . . hav[e] 
partial compliance . . . .”). 
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6. Regional Exceptionalism: The European Court of Justice.  The 
“Story of Europe”153 has figured prominently in commentary on 
international adjudication. In particular, proponents of international 
adjudication regard the evolution of the ECJ as a model for other 
international tribunals.154 Considered in historical context, however, it 
is difficult to see these regional European institutions as 
representative of more general trends in international adjudication. 
The ECJ was established by the Treaty of Rome, with its 
jurisdiction directed toward interpretation of the treaty in disputes 
between member states of the European Community—now the 
European Union (EU)—or between member states and EU organs.155 
The ECJ is a permanent judicial body whose judges enjoy fixed terms 
of six years and fixed remuneration.156 
As initially adopted, the Treaty of Rome granted the ECJ 
comparatively limited authority; the Court was envisaged as being 
principally limited to actions brought by the EU Commission or by 
member states. Despite these initial restrictions, the ECJ 
progressively extended the scope of its jurisdiction, developing a body 
of decisions holding that the treaty and other EU agreements could 
be invoked in national court proceedings by private parties.157 Over 
time, as the EU progressed rapidly toward integration, the ECJ 
effectively claimed broad competence over an extensive range of EU 
legal instruments.158 The formal enforceability of ECJ judgments 
 
 153. See generally Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 6, at 290–98 (tracing and comparing the 
histories of the ECJ and the ECHR). 
 154. See generally id. at 298–337 (developing a checklist of important factors for a successful 
international tribunal by, in large part, analyzing the ECJ and the ECHR). 
 155. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community arts. 164, 169–70, Mar. 25, 
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 73, 75; see also J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE 
L.J. 2403, 2419 (1991) (“Two sets of legislative acts and administrative measures are subject to 
judicial review: (1) the measures of the Community itself (principally acts of the Council of 
Ministers, Commission, and European Parliament) . . . and (2) the acts of the Member 
States . . . .”). But cf. Eric Stein, Lawyers, Judges and the Making of a Transnational 
Constitution, 75 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 6 & n.15 (1981) (“To date, only a single case has been decided 
by the Court upon the complaint of a member state under Article 170, and a relatively limited 
number were instituted by the Commission under Article 169. . . . [M]ost of the ‘constitutional’ 
cases . . . were referred to the Court under Article 177 as a result of litigation instituted by 
individuals or companies against their governments . . . .”). 
 156. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 253, 
Sept. 5, 2008, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 47, 158. 
 157. The classic account of the evolution of ECJ authority is Stein, supra note 155. 
 158. See ANTHONY ARNULL, ALAN DASHWOOD, MICHAEL DOUGAN, MALCOLM ROSS, 
ELEANOR SPAVENTA & DERRICK WYATT, WYATT AND DASHWOOD’S EUROPEAN UNION 
LAW 125–202 (5th ed. 2006) (giving an account of the development of various European 
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remains unsettled,159 but the Court’s judgments have been met with 
relatively high compliance.160 
It is very doubtful that the ECJ’s evolution provides real 
guidance for most other forms of international adjudication. The 
Court was one element of a broad institutional effort that fulfilled 
powerful political commitments to European integration among 
states with comparatively homogeneous cultures and political 
systems.161 Because these circumstances and commitments lack 
parallels in most other international contexts, drawing analogies 
between the experience of the ECJ and that of other types of 
tribunals is difficult. Moreover, because of the success of European 
integration efforts, the ECJ is, in most respects, unlike an 
international tribunal that decides disputes between parties of 
different nationalities and is instead more akin to a national tribunal 
 
Community law doctrines that have increased the effect of European Community law within a 
member state’s legal system). See generally Hjalte Rasmussen, Between Self-Restraint and 
Activism: A Judicial Policy for the European Court, 13 EUR. L. REV. 28 (1988) (providing a 
proto-theory to evaluate whether the ECJ has been too activist in expanding its reach). 
 159. See TC HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN 
UNION 345 (7th ed. 2010) (“Enforcing Union law has always been problematic. Since the Union 
institutions have no means of direct enforcement—there are no Union bailiffs, policemen, or 
soldiers to arrest members of the national Government—they must rely in the last resort on 
political pressure from other Member States.”). 
 160. See Alan Dashwood & Robin White, Enforcement Actions Under Articles 169 and 170 
EEC, 14 EUR. L. REV. 388, 411 (1989) (“In the small minority of cases that have run their full 
course the Member State concerned has almost always taken the steps necessary to comply with 
the judgment . . . .”); Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 6, at 292 (“Acceptance of these doctrines 
[developed by the ECJ] by national courts has given the judgments of the ECJ in cases referred 
to it under Article 177 roughly the same effect as judgments issued by domestic courts in the 
member states of the European Union.”). 
 161. See HARTLEY, supra note 159, at 1–10 (“It is not easy to compare [the EU] with other 
political entities: it contains some of the features of a traditional international organization and, 
less prominently, some features of a federation.”); FRANCIS G. JACOBS, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF 
LAW: THE EUROPEAN WAY 35–56 (2007) (“When the European Community was 
founded . . . , the ECJ was set up to protect against misuse of the powers of institutions and to 
ensure respect by member states for their treaty obligations.”). At the same time, EU 
integration involved a limited number of relatively homogeneous states, sharing common 
traditions of legalization. See, e.g., Jost Delbrueck, International Protection of Human Rights 
and State Sovereignty, 57 IND. L.J. 567, 576 (1982) (“[T]he regional experience . . . , made in 
more or less culturally and politically homogeneous regions, . . . hardly could be taken as a 
model that could be easily transferred elsewhere . . . .”). 
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that decides disputes between parties of the same—European—
nationality.162 
Also significant is the fact that the ECJ was not granted its broad 
authority by any deliberate decision of the EU member states but 
instead incrementally acquired its power through its own decisions 
during the ongoing process of European integration.163 The ECJ’s 
most significant powers did not derive from decisions made by states 
about international adjudication, but rather from the ECJ’s ability to 
use broader political progress toward European integration as a basis 
for extending its own essentially domestic authority, even beyond 
what member states had initially intended.164 These sui generis 
attributes of the ECJ make it an unrepresentative model for 
hypotheses about international adjudication or for the design of most 
other international tribunals.165 
 
 162. Thus, the ECJ’s jurisdiction encompasses principally disputes between EU nationals 
and EU member states—not between non-EU nationals and EU member states or EU 
nationals. See supra note 155.  
 163. See Karen J. Alter, The European Union’s Legal System and Domestic Policy, 54 INT’L 
ORG. 489, 491 (2000) (“[T]hese powers the ECJ created for itself, despite the intention of 
members states.”); Stein, supra note 155, at 24–26 (“[T]he authority of the Community and of 
the Court itself has grown substantially at the expense of national governments and courts.”).  
 164. Even the ECJ’s explanation for its jurisdictional claims rejected traditional 
international-law doctrine, instead relying on the European treaties’ asserted status as 
“constitutional” instruments within a new European political structure. See Stein, supra note 
155, at 1, 5–6, 11–12 (noting that the Court has “construed the European Community Treaties in 
a constitutional mode rather than employing the traditional international law methodology”); 
J.H.H. Weiler & Joel P. Trachtman, European Constitutionalism and Its Discontents, 17 NW. J. 
INT’L L. & BUS. 354, 373–74 (1997) (“[T]he Court . . . referred to the treaties as the 
constitutional charter of the Community.”).  
 165. A broadly similar analysis applies to the ECHR. The ECHR is not an EU institution; it 
was created by the European Convention on Human Rights under the auspices of the Council 
of Europe, and it includes a number of non-EU members, such as Turkey and Russia. ED 
BATES, THE EVOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM ITS 
INCEPTION TO THE CREATION OF A PERMANENT COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 17–38, 49 & n.17 
(2010). Nonetheless, the ECHR has played a significant role in Europe’s integration, both for 
existing EU member states and for future candidates for membership. That role distinguishes 
the Court from adjudicatory tribunals in most other international settings. It is also significant 
that the ECHR has encountered most of its difficulties with compliance with states outside the 
EU—notably, Turkey, Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Bulgaria, and Romania. See COMM. OF 
MINISTERS, COUNCIL OF EUR., SUPERVISION OF THE EXECUTION OF JUDGMENTS OF THE 
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: ANNUAL REPORT, 2009, app. 2, at 50–54 (2010), 
available at https://wcd.coe.int/wcd/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.
CmdBlobGet&InstranetImage=1824760&SecMode=1&DocId=1565496&Usage=2 (presenting 
statistics on the respect of payment deadlines by ECHR member states); Cavallaro & Brewer, 
supra note 145, at 772–75 (“[T]he majority of ECHR judgments awaiting compliance 
supervision by the committee . . . now involve Eastern European member states and Turkey.”). 
This observation suggests that EU integration and regional homogeneity are the principal 
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B. The Second Generation of International Adjudication 
The debate among commentators about international 
adjudication—which focuses on first-generation tribunals—ignores a 
critically important category of substantially more active, more 
effective, and more interesting international adjudicatory mechanisms 
that have developed over the past four decades. In particular, the 
commentary has devoted little or no attention to a newer generation 
of tribunals—a generation that includes arbitral tribunals constituted 
pursuant to investment treaties, such as NAFTA and the ICSID 
Convention; international commercial-arbitration tribunals, such as 
the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal and the UN Claims Commission; the 
WTO; and national courts adjudicating claims against foreign states. 
The origins of this newer generation of tribunals differ markedly 
from those of traditional forms of international adjudication. Second-
generation tribunals were not the creations of multilateral 
conferences with high aspirations of securing world peace—like the 
Hague Conferences or the UN Conference—but instead evolved 
progressively from a multitude of practical, ad hoc arrangements, 
often involving bilateral relationships between states or between 
private parties and state entities, and typically concerning trade or 
investment. These arrangements were part of an incremental and 
pragmatic evolution of adjudicatory mechanisms aimed at providing 
improved means of impartially, efficiently, and effectively resolving 
disputes, particularly those disputes that impeded the development of 
international trade and investment. As discussed in the following 
Sections, these kinds of mechanisms have been used much more 
frequently and, for the most part, have worked much more effectively 
than traditional first-generation tribunals. 
1. Litigation Involving Foreign States in National Courts.  
Somewhat surprisingly, the origins of the new generation of 
international adjudication can be traced to developments in the mid-
twentieth century regarding foreign-state immunity. Although their 
existence is noncontroversial, these developments have been largely 
 
explanations for the ECHR’s adjudicatory mechanism. Finally, the ECHR’s caseload 
overwhelmingly involves disputes between European states and their own nationals, not 
nationals of other states. The best analogy for that category of disputes is a national court, such 
as the U.S. Supreme Court or the German federal constitutional court 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht), which applies domestic constitutional protections to claims by local 
nationals or residents—not an international tribunal that hears claims by nationals of one state 
asserting claims against a foreign state. 
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ignored in commentary about international adjudication.166 Despite 
this omission, these developments have played a central role in the 
evolution of contemporary modes of international adjudication. 
Before World War II, most states adopted a policy of “absolute 
immunity,” affording foreign states and their property complete 
immunity from the jurisdiction of national courts.167 Thus, although 
commercial interactions between states and private parties were 
common, disputes arising from these activities were not subject to the 
jurisdiction of national courts. If a private party wished to pursue a 
claim against a foreign state with which it had done business, it would 
have had to persuade its home state to espouse its claim against the 
foreign state—virtually always by means of diplomatic negotiations 
between the two states.168 These negotiations were heavily influenced 
by political, security, and other considerations and, consequently, 
often produced anomalous and arbitrary results.169 
Equally familiar is the gradual development during the first half 
of the twentieth century of a “restrictive theory” of sovereign 
immunity.170 This theory provided, in general terms, that a foreign 
 
 166. Commentary on contemporary international adjudication sometimes considers 
litigation in national courts under human-rights legislation such as the U.S. Alien Tort Statute, 
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006), but it does not address the larger corpus of litigation involving foreign 
states and state entities. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 9, at 207 (limiting its discussion to the use 
of the Alien Tort Statute against multinational corporations); Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 6, 
at 293–97 (discussing human-rights claims brought before the ECHR and the role of ECHR 
judgments and treaty obligations in national judicial proceedings). 
 167. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 9 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6607 
(“Since World War II, the United States has increasingly become involved in litigation in 
foreign courts.”); S. REP. NO. 94-1310, at 10 (1976) (same); GARY BORN & PETER RUTLEDGE, 
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 219–24 (4th ed. 2007) 
(“[I]nternational practice . . . saw widespread acceptance of absolute immunity.”); Peter D. 
Trooboff, Foreign State Immunity: Emerging Consensus on Principles, 200 RECUEIL DES COURS 
235, 252–63 (1986) (“On the Continent, . . . the possible emergence of a restrictive immunity 
approach . . . was then eclipsed by the absolute immunity principle . . . .”). See generally GAMAL 
MOURSI BADR, STATE IMMUNITY: AN ANALYTIC AND PROGNOSTIC VIEW 9–70 (1984) 
(discussing the historical development of the sovereign immunity doctrine). 
 168. See EDWIN M. BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD 
§ 144 (1919) (observing during the early twentieth century that “[t]he government’s power to 
settle the claim of its citizen against a foreign country is practically unrestricted”); Guy I.F. 
Leigh, Nationality and Diplomatic Protection, 20 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 453, 455 (1971) (“[W]hile 
a state has the right to exercise diplomatic protection, it has no obligation to do so. Whether or 
not . . . it chooses to act on behalf of a national is entirely within its own discretion.”).  
 169. See infra notes 174–75. 
 170. See JOSEPH W. DELLAPENNA, SUING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR 
CORPORATIONS 4–14, 26–31 (2d ed. 2003) (“By 1950 most countries that were neither 
‘socialist’ . . . nor within the common law tradition had adopted the restrictive theory.”); 
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state would enjoy immunity from the jurisdiction of national courts 
for its “sovereign” actions but not for its “private” acts.171 
Importantly, application of this theory had the effect of transferring 
disputes involving foreign states from the diplomatic arena to 
adjudicatory forums—in particular, to litigation in national courts. In 
the words of one commentator, “The embrace of the restrictive 
theory of the immunity of foreign states around the globe is 
representative of the ongoing legalization of international 
relations.”172 
The gradual replacement of the absolute theory of sovereign 
immunity by the restrictive theory was reflected in the enactment of 
foreign-sovereign-immunity legislation in most developed 
jurisdictions, including the United States, Europe, and elsewhere.173 
These enactments aimed to resolve disputes between foreign states in 
accordance with generally applicable legal rules in adjudicatory 
settings, rather than in politicized diplomatic forums,174 and to provide 
 
Sompong Sucharitkul, Immunities of Foreign States Before National Authorities, 149 RECUEIL 
DES COURS 87, 126–82, 185–86 (1976) (“[By the end of the Second World War,] an ever-
growing majority of recent and contemporary writers—assuming the complexion of the general 
consensus of opinion—[had] subscribed to a restrictive doctrine of immunity.”). See generally 
BADR, supra note 167, at 9–70, 79–139 (discussing the transition to a restrictive approach). 
 171. See BADR, supra note 167, at 91 (noting that sovereign immunity generally turns on 
whether the sovereign is acting in its official state capacity or in some private capacity—losing 
its immunity in the latter scenario). See generally Trooboff, supra note 167, at 275–96 
(describing case law in the United States under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) 
of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 
U.S.C.), that has interpreted the distinction between sovereign and private action). 
 172. DELLAPENNA, supra note 170, at 5. 
 173. E.g., FSIA; Foreign States Immunities Act 1985 (Cth) (Austl.), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 
715 (1986); State Immunity Act, S.C. 1980-81-82-83, c. 95 (Can.); [Act on the Civil Jurisdiction 
of Japan with Respect to a Foreign State], Act No. 24 of 2009 (Japan); State Immunity Act, 
1985, c. 313 (Sing.); State Immunity Act, 1978, c. 33 (U.K.), reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1123 (1978); 
European Convention on State Immunity, opened for signature May 16, 1972, 1495 U.N.T.S. 
181. 
 174. The FSIA’s legislative history explained: 
A principal purpose of this bill is to transfer the determination of sovereign immunity 
from the executive branch to the judicial branch, thereby reducing the foreign policy 
implications of immunity determinations and assuring litigants that these often crucial 
decisions are made on purely legal grounds and under procedures that insure due 
process. The Department of State would be freed from pressures from foreign 
governments to recognize their immunity from suit and from any adverse 
consequences resulting from an unwillingness of the Department to support that 
immunity. 
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 7 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6606; S. REP. NO. 94-
1310, at 9 (1976); see also Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Against Foreign States: Hearings on 
H.R. 11,315 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law & Governmental Relations of the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 31 (1976) (statement of Bruno A. Ristau, Chief, Foreign Litig. 
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a means for the effective enforcement of national court judgments 
against states and their property.175 
By the 1980s, legislation adopting the restrictive theory of 
sovereign immunity had been enacted not only in most developed 
states but in many other states as well. In broad terms, this legislation 
granted national courts jurisdiction over disputes involving 
commercial activities, real property, expropriatory actions, and a 
limited number of other specified actions, as well as over disputes in 
which states had waived their immunity, particularly through 
arbitration agreements.176 The same statutes also provided for the 
enforcement of national court judgments against the commercial 
assets of foreign states.177 The gradual acceptance of the restrictive 
theory of sovereign immunity culminated in the 2004 UN Convention 
on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property,178 which 
gave broad effect to the theory.  
The shift from absolute to restrictive immunity had significant 
consequences for the adjudication of disputes involving foreign states. 
As already outlined, prior to the 1960s, claims by nationals of one 
state against foreign states were almost exclusively the subject of 
 
Section, Civil Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice) (“[T]he bill is designed to depoliticize the area of 
sovereign immunity by placing the responsibility for determining questions of immunity in the 
courts.”). 
 175. The FSIA, for example, was intended to 
remedy, in part, the present predicament of a plaintiff who has obtained a judgment 
against a foreign state. Under existing law, a foreign state in our courts enjoys 
absolute immunity from execution, even in ordinary commercial litigation where 
commercial assets are available for the satisfaction of a judgment. [This bill] seeks to 
restrict this broad immunity from execution. It would conform the execution 
immunity rules more closely to the jurisdiction immunity rules. It would provide the 
judgment creditor some remedy if, after a reasonable period, a foreign state or its 
enterprise failed to satisfy a final judgment.  
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 8; S. REP. NO. 94-1310, at 9. 
 176. E.g., Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2006); 
Foreign States Immunities Act 1985 ss 10–22; State Immunity Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-18, arts. 4–8 
(Can.); Foreign States Immunities Act 87 of 1981 §§ 3–12 (S. Afr.); State Immunity Act, 1978, 
§§ 2–11 (U.K.); European Convention on State Immunity, supra note 173, arts. 4–12, 1495 
U.N.T.S. at 183–85. See generally DELLAPENNA, supra note 170, at 323–468 (discussing the 
extent to which sovereign immunity is restricted over various categories of state action). 
 177. E.g., FSIA, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1609–1611; Foreign States Immunities Act 1985 s 32 (Austl.); 
State Immunity Act, 1978, § 13 (U.K.); European Convention on State Immunity, supra note 
173, art. 26, 1495 U.N.T.S. at 189–90. See generally DELLAPENNA, supra note 170, at 743–89 
(describing the extent to which states are immune from executions against different types of 
state assets). 
 178. U.N. Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, G.A. Res. 
59/38, annex, U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/59/49 (Dec. 2, 2004).  
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diplomatic negotiations or claims-settlement mechanisms.179 Adoption 
of the restrictive theory of immunity moved the overwhelming bulk of 
these claims into adjudication in national courts in which private 
parties could directly participate—a shift that produced a new and 
significant caseload.180 
Importantly, the emergence of this newer category of 
international adjudication has subjected states to the mandatory 
jurisdiction of national courts. Foreign states are no longer given the 
option of consenting, or of withholding consent, to litigation under 
the European Convention on State Immunity,181 the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA),182 or similar instruments. 
Rather, if a state fails to appear in a proceeding, it is subject to default 
proceedings and a default judgment—much like a private litigant.183 
Similarly, judgments issued against a foreign state or state entity are 
enforceable against the state’s commercial property, subject to 
specified procedures and exceptions.184 If a foreign state or state-
related entity fails to pay a judgment, its commercial assets may be 
forcibly seized in substantially the same manner as a private party’s.185 
On any view, litigation against foreign states under foreign-
sovereign-immunity legislation has become a significant category of 
contemporary international adjudication. In terms of usage, it is likely 
 
 179. See supra notes 167–68. In some instances, interstate judicial proceedings or 
arbitrations addressed claims by nationals of one state against a foreign state. See, e.g., Factory 
at Chorzów (Ger. v. Pol.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9 (July 26) (evaluating the claims of 
German factory owners against the Polish government); Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions 
(Greece v. U.K.), 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 5 (Mar. 26) (evaluating the claims of a Greek 
national against the British government). 
 180. See infra notes 186–87187 and accompanying text. At the same time, states also began 
to use foreign courts to pursue claims against private parties. See Koh, supra note 9, at 2369–71 
(“The most novel development in transnational public law litigation has been its expansion 
beyond individual to state plaintiffs.”). 
 181. European Convention on State Immunity, supra note 173. 
 182. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
 183. E.g., State Immunity Act art. 10 (Can.); State Immunity Act, 1985, c. 313, § 14 (Sing.); 
European Convention on State Immunity, supra note 173, art. 16, 1495 U.N.T.S. at 185–86. But 
cf. DELLAPENNA, supra note 170, at 725–35 (noting that foreign states are subject to default 
proceedings, albeit with some procedural safeguards not extended to private litigants). 
 184. E.g., FSIA, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1610–1611; State Immunity Act art. 12 (Can.). 
 185. Recent examples of such execution include Ram Media, Ltd. (In Administration) v. 
Ministry of Culture of the Hellenic Republic (Secretariat General of Sport), [2008] EWHC (QB) 
1835 (Eng.), and Sedelmayer v. Russian Federation, [District Court] 2010-10-11, T 15420-10 
(Swed.). In practice, foreign states ordinarily resolve disputes or pay judgments against them, 
rather than allowing execution against state assets to proceed.  
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that some one thousand cases involving claims against foreign states 
are pending in national courts at any given time and that some 250 
new cases are filed each year. Electronic archives and other materials 
indicate that annual filings of new cases number in the hundreds in 
some jurisdictions and in the dozens in others.186 They also indicate 
that these figures have been increasing over the past decade.187 In 
quantitative terms, the volume of international litigation involving 
foreign states in national courts exceeds, by a fairly wide margin, the 
total caseload of all of the first-generation tribunals discussed in Part 
II.A. 
Litigation involving foreign sovereigns is not only frequent but 
also deals with significant legal issues. National courts adjudicate a 
wide range of important international matters, including commercial 
disputes, often involving very substantial contracts or projects;188 
expropriations;189 and human-rights violations.190 More fundamentally, 
 
 186. DELLAPENNA, supra note 170, at xiv (observing that over three thousand FSIA cases 
were filed between 1977 and 2000, for a filing rate of roughly 130 cases per year). A Westlaw 
search in the Federal Cases (ALLFEDS) database using the following terms-and-connectors 
search—CI([insert year]) & SY(FSIA)—yields roughly fifty reported FSIA cases per year, 
suggesting substantially more unreported decisions and filings. 
 187. Id. 
 188. See, e.g., EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 389 F. App’x 38 (2d Cir. 2010) (reviewing a 
suit brought by bondholders against Argentina for payment on defaulted bonds); Reed Int’l 
Trading Corp. v. Donau Bank AG, 866 F. Supp. 750 (S.D.N.Y 1994) (considering a contract 
dispute between international-trading companies and Russian banks); J.H. Rayner (Mincing 
Lane) Ltd. v. Dep’t of Trade & Indus., [1990] 2 A.C. 418 (Eng.) (examining the insolvency of 
the International Tin Council); Owners of Cargo Lately Laden on Bd. the Playa Larga v. 
Owners of the I Congreso del Partido, [1983] 1 A.C. 244 (Eng.) (considering a shipping dispute 
involving a state-owned ship); Donegal Int’l Ltd. v Republic of Zambia, [2007] EWHC (Comm) 
197, [2007] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 397 (Eng.) (adjudicating Zambia’s obligation to repay a debt held by 
Donegal International).  
 189. E.g., Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954 (2d Cir. 2002) (involving the 
expropriation of paintings that had been confiscated by the Nazis); Zappia Middle E. Constr. 
Co. v. Emirate of Abu Dhabi, 215 F.3d 247 (2d Cir. 2000) (considering whether the loss of a 
government contractor’s intangible contract rights amounted to an expropriation); West v. 
Multibanco Comermex, S.A., 807 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1987) (considering whether an 
expropriation occurred when the Mexican government instituted currency-exchange controls 
that undermined the value of U.S. certificates of deposits from Mexican banks). 
 190. See, e.g., Liu v. Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir. 1989) (examining the 
assassination of a California resident that was allegedly authorized by a high-ranking Chinese 
official); Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 748 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1984) (adjudicating a wrongful-
death claim against the Republic of Chile for its supposed involvement in the assassination of 
the Chilean ambassador to the United States); see also Koh, supra note 9, at 2371, 2391 
(“Transnational litigation, which originated in the context of private commercial suits against 
foreign governments, has now migrated into the realm of public human rights suits against the 
United States and foreign governments and officials.”). 
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the availability of fora for the adjudication of claims against foreign 
states, pursuant to generally applicable substantive rules, plays an 
essential role in contemporary international trade and finance. 
Without the assurance of such fora, which are often specified in 
contractual forum-selection clauses, private contractors, lenders, and 
others would not enter into commercial relationships with foreign 
states or would demand unacceptable terms.191 
In terms of compliance, foreign states almost always participate 
in national court proceedings brought against them,192 and they 
frequently satisfy adverse judgments. In cases in which judgments are 
not voluntarily complied with, enforcement proceedings have been 
instituted and have frequently succeeded, albeit often after the kinds 
of delays that attend any litigation process.193 Of course, a state’s 
refusal to comply with a judgment against it, a response that 
necessitates recourse to enforcement processes, is no different from a 
refusal by a private litigant to comply with a judgment, a response 
that also triggers the need for coercive enforcement.194 
 
 191. As one commentator more broadly concludes, litigation involving foreign states in U.S. 
courts “weav[es] the doctrinal tapestry that . . . help[s] shape geopolitical and economic 
relationships among America and its global partners.” Koh, supra note 9, at 2395; see also 
Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Against Foreign States: Hearings on H.R. 11,325 Before the 
Subcomm. on Admin. Law & Governmental Relations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th 
Cong. 27 (1976) (statement of Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State) (“[W]hen the 
foreign state enters the marketplace or when it acts as a private party, there is no justification in 
modern international law for allowing the foreign state to avoid the economic costs of the 
agreements which it may breach or the accidents which it may cause. The law should not permit 
the foreign state to shift these everyday burdens of the marketplace onto the shoulders of 
private parties.”). 
 192. Cf. DELLAPENNA, supra note 170, at 728–29 (noting all of the reported instances of 
default by foreign states). 
 193. See, e.g., Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital Ltd., [2010] EWCA (Civ) 41 (Eng.); 
Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., Jan. 25, 2005, Bull. civ. I, 
No. 39 (Fr.); see also DELLAPENNA, supra note 170, at 728, 729 n.111 (citing successful 
executions of default judgments against foreign states while cautioning that “one should not 
overestimate the ease of obtaining a default judgment” against a foreign state). Judgments 
against a foreign state in one jurisdiction are, subject to generally applicable rules regarding 
recognition of foreign judgments, enforceable in other jurisdictions. BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra 
note 167, at 1009–82 (offering cases and materials analyzing when courts are willing to give 
foreign judgments effect, while noting that this practice is generally discretionary); 
DELLAPENNA, supra note 170, at 790–811 (describing the circumstances under which courts are 
likely to recognize and enforce foreign judgments); 1 DICEY, MORRIS AND COLLINS ON THE 
CONFLICT OF LAWS 567, 574–79 (Lawrence Collins et al. eds., 14th ed. 2006) (discussing the 
enforcement and recognition of foreign judgments under English common law). 
 194. See infra note 331 and accompanying text. 
BORN IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 20/12/2011  8:11 AM 
826 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:775 
2. International Commercial Arbitration Involving State Parties.  
In parallel with the development of the restrictive theory of sovereign 
immunity, states began to agree in significant numbers of cases to the 
resolution of commercial, financial, and other disputes with private 
parties by international commercial arbitration. Historically, states 
and state-related entities had sometimes included arbitration clauses 
in commercial or investment contracts with foreign parties.195 During 
the 1960s and 1970s, however, the frequency with which states agreed 
to arbitrate disputes with private parties as part of their commercial 
arrangements with those parties significantly increased196—again 
moving a substantial category of disputes out of diplomatic 
negotiations, where they had historically been resolved, and into 
adjudicatory proceedings involving private parties. 
The increased use of arbitration in states’ commercial 
agreements coincided with a more general use of international 
arbitration by private parties following World War II and with the 
development of robust legal regimes that aimed to give effect to the 
international arbitral process.197 In particular, the New York 
 
 195. See ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUÍS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT 
TREATIES: STANDARDS OF TREATMENT § 1.18 (2009) (“There were a number of arbitrations 
arising out of concession agreements made in the 1920s between Western companies and the 
Soviet Union.”). See generally V.V. Veeder, The Lena Goldfields Arbitration: The Historical 
Roots of Three Ideas, 47 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 747 (1998) (describing the arbitration proceedings 
initiated against the Soviet Union by an English mining company under an arbitration clause 
contained in a concession agreement). 
 196. See STEPHEN J. TOOPE, MIXED INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 204, 213 (1990) 
(“[T]he number of ICC cases involving ‘public authorities’ increased sharply in the 1960s. It 
would appear that the involvement of states in ICC arbitration has remained substantial 
throughout the 1970s and early 1980s.” (footnote omitted)); Georges R. Delaume, State 
Contracts and International Arbitration, 75 AM. J. INT’L L. 784, 784 (1981) (noting that “a 
network of treaty, statutory, and judicial developments . . . greatly improve[d] the effectiveness 
of the arbitration process” and created “new incentives to have recourse to arbitration” during 
the 1960s and 1970s); cf. KARL-HEINZ BÖCKSTIEGEL, ARBITRATION AND STATE 
ENTERPRISES: SURVEYS ON THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL STATE OF LAW AND 
PRACTICE 11 (1984) (“When state enterprises thus participate in international commerce, they 
are obviously confronted with a desire of their foreign business partners commonly to agree to 
arbitration as the prevailing technique to be used for settling disputes in international business 
relations.”). See generally Martin Domke, Arbitration Between Government Bodies and Foreign 
Private Firms, 17 ARB. J. 129 (1962) (observing in the early 1960s that many international legal 
institutions were advocating greater reliance on private arbitration to settle disputes between 
government entities and business enterprises). 
 197. See 1 GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 90–106, 111–43 
(2009); Martin Domke & Ottoarndt Glossner, The Present State of the Law Regarding 
International Commercial Arbitration, in THE PRESENT STATE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
OTHER ESSAYS 307, 307 (Maarten Bos ed., 1973) (“There has been a trend, since the Sixties, 
towards multilateral and bilateral commercial arbitration conventions and to drafts of uniform 
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Convention198—signed in 1958 and progressively ratified thereafter—
established an effective enforcement mechanism for international 
arbitration agreements and awards.199 By 1990, the Convention had 80 
contracting states; by 2012, it had 146 parties.200 During the same 
period, states around the world enacted progressively more effective 
legislation for giving effect to the Convention and enforcing 
arbitration agreements and awards.201 
By the beginning of the twenty-first century, it was fair to say 
that international arbitration was the preferred means of dispute 
resolution for commercial and investment agreements between 
private parties and foreign states or state-related entities.202 Except in 
 
commercial arbitration laws. This trend has also become a concern of the United Nations 
Commission on International Law with the goal of harmonization and unification of arbitration 
laws of various countries.”). 
 198. U.N. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 
June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Convention]. 
 199. See 1 BORN, supra note 197, at 92–101 (providing background information on the New 
York Convention, “the most significant contemporary legislative instrument relating to 
international commercial arbitration”); ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK 
ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 1958: TOWARDS A UNIFORM JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION 10 
(1981) (“[T]he New York Convention is in essence limited to two aspects of international 
commercial arbitration: the enforcement of those arbitration agreements which come within its 
purview (Art. II(3)) and the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (Arts. I and III-VI).”); 
Herbert Kronke, Introduction to RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL 
AWARDS: A GLOBAL COMMENTARY ON THE NEW YORK CONVENTION 1, 3 (Herbert Kronke 
et al. eds., 2010) (referring to the New York Convention and later international-arbitration 
provisions as a “success story”). 
 200. 1 BORN, supra note 197, at 98–99; Status: 1958—Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, http://www.
uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html (last visited Dec. 
19, 2011). 
 201. See 1 BORN, supra note 197, at 111–43 (“[V]irtually every major developed country has 
substantially revised or entirely replaced its international arbitration legislation, in every case, to 
facilitate the arbitral process and promote the use of international arbitration.”).  
 202. See NIGEL BLACKABY & CONSTANTINE PARTASIDES WITH ALAN REDFERN & 
MARTIN HUNTER, REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION ¶ 810, at 469 
(5th ed. 2009) (“Whilst in 1998 ICSID registered eight cases with 19 cases pending, in 2008 it 
registered 31 new cases with 128 cases pending.”); CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN, LAURENCE 
SHORE & MATTHEW WEINIGER, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: SUBSTANTIVE 
PRINCIPLES ¶ 1.07 (2007) (“Since the potential of [international commercial arbitration] was 
realized, the results have been dramatic.”). 
There has been some criticism of the rise of international commercial arbitration as a 
form of international dispute resolution, typically on the basis that it favors international 
businesses from developed states and disfavors state interests. See, e.g., Amr Shalakany, 
Arbitration and the Third World: A Plea for Reassessing Bias Under the Specter of Neoliberalism, 
41 HARV. INT’L L.J. 419, 419 (2000) (“The question of bias in North-South arbitration and the 
skewed distributive consequences of awards were heated topics of debate throughout the 1970s 
and early 1980s . . . .”); Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, The Climate of International 
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unusual circumstances, parties to significant commercial contracts 
involving foreign states insisted on the resolution of disputes related 
to the contract by arbitration, ordinarily in a neutral forum and 
pursuant to institutional arbitration rules.203 The rationale behind 
these agreements was to ensure the impartial adjudication of disputes 
through the application of the terms of the parties’ agreement, 
objective legal principles, and neutral procedural rules, rather than 
through contests of political, diplomatic, or similar pressure. 
Importantly, this new category of international adjudication 
produces enforceable decisions, which can be the basis for coercive 
execution against a state’s assets. Under the New York Convention 
and implementing legislation in most states, arbitral proceedings may 
go forward, and thus may produce a binding award, in the absence of 
a defaulting party;204 once a foreign state commits to international 
arbitration, it is bound to that commitment, and the arbitral tribunal’s 
jurisdiction is effectively compulsory. Similarly, arbitral awards are 
presumptively subject to recognition and enforcement in the 146 
states that are parties to the Convention.205 Finally, foreign-sovereign-
immunity legislation in most states provides for the enforcement of 
awards against a foreign state’s commercial property,206 an outcome 
 
Arbitration, 8 J. INT’L ARB., no. 2, 1991, at 47, 47 (“[Developing] States have seen international 
arbitration as a system that is weighted in favour of the capital exporting States.”). 
 203. See, e.g., BLACKABY ET AL., supra note 202, ¶ 1.190, at 63 (“The private party to such a 
contract will almost always prefer to submit to arbitration as a ‘neutral’ process . . . .”); PAUL D. 
FRIEDLAND, ARBITRATION CLAUSES FOR INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 7 (2d ed. 2007) 
(“[P]arties regularly choose arbitration over litigation for international contracts . . . .”).  
 204. 2 BORN, supra note 197, at 1865–68, 2439–40, 2753–54.  
 205. See 1 BORN, supra note 197, at 96 (“[T]he Convention’s provisions prescribe uniform 
rules that . . . require national courts to recognize and enforce foreign arbitral awards . . . .”); 
Kronke, supra note 199, at 3 (“[T]he single most important advantage of arbitration . . . is the 
degree of certainty a party can have that an award will be recognized and enforced almost 
anywhere in the world.”). 
 The New York Convention provides a limited number of grounds for denial of 
recognition, including lack of jurisdiction, procedural unfairness, and public policy. See New 
York Convention, supra note 198, art. V, 21 U.S.T. at 2520, 330 U.N.T.S. at 41–42 (giving 
reasons for which a signatory may refuse recognition of an arbitration award); Andrés Jana, 
Angie Armer & Johanna Klein Kranenberg, Article V(1)(b), in RECOGNITION AND 
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS, supra note 199, at 231, 235 (comparing the 
due-process exception under Article V(1)(b) of the New York Convention with the public-
policy exception under Article V(2)(b)). See generally 2 BORN, supra note 197, at 2730–33, 
2736–2872 (discussing potential grounds for refusing to recognize international arbitral awards). 
 206. See, e.g., Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(6) 
(2006) (“The property in the United States of a foreign state . . . used for a commercial activity 
in the United States, shall not be immune . . . if . . . the judgment is based on an order 
confirming an arbitral award rendered against the foreign state . . . .”); Foreign States Immunities 
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that occurs in practice when awards are not complied with 
voluntarily.207 
Although arbitration agreements are a classic example of 
consensual jurisdiction, in practice, foreign states are often effectively 
subject to a form of mandatory jurisdiction. For most states and state-
related entities, accepting an international-arbitration clause that 
provides for the resolution of future contractual disputes by binding 
arbitration is a necessary condition to concluding significant 
international commercial and investment contracts: unless the state 
accepts international arbitration, it will not be able to conclude 
commercial arrangements, at least not with serious counterparties.208 
As a consequence, although consensual as a formal matter, accepting 
arbitration is, in many circumstances, effectively mandatory for states 
that wish to do business with foreign private parties. 
Although international commercial arbitration is seldom 
mentioned in commentary assessing international adjudication,209 
arbitrations involving foreign states and state-related entities are a 
significant category of contemporary international dispute resolution. 
Precise statistics do not exist because many arbitrations are 
confidential, but at least three hundred international commercial 
 
Act 1985 (Cth) s 17(2) (Austl.), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 715, 719 (1986) (waiving the immunity of 
foreign states that agree to submit to arbitration agreements); State Immunity Act, 1978, c. 33, 
§§ 9, 13(2) (U.K.), reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1123, 1125–26 (1978) (“Where a State has agreed . . . to 
submit . . . to arbitration, the State is not immune as respects proceedings in the courts of the 
United Kingdom which relate to the arbitration.”); Cass. 1e civ., July 6, 2000, Bull. civ. I, No. 
207 (Fr.) (finding that when a state had agreed to arbitration, it had thereby waived its immunity 
from execution of the order); see also DELLAPENNA, supra note 170, at 775 (“Thus section 
1610(a)(6) authorizes execution against any commercial property of the foreign state 
proper . . . .”); Claudia Annacker & Robert T. Greig, State Immunity and Arbitration, 15 ICC 
INT’L CT. ARB. BULL., no. 2, 2004, at 70, 70 (“We are now at the threshold of a universal 
convention on State immunity.”). 
 207. E.g., Orascom Telecom Holding SAE v. Republic of Chad, [2008] EWHC (Comm) 
1841 (Eng.) (finding that Chad had waived its immunity by agreeing to international 
arbitration); Cass., July 6, 2000, Bull. civ. I, No. 207 (finding that submission to ICC arbitration 
had resulted in a waiver of state immunity from execution); Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt am 
Main [OLG Frankfurt] [Frankfurt Higher Regional Court] Sept. 26, 2002, 30 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 
505 (508), 2005 (Ger.). 
 208. See infra note 247 and accompanying text. 
 209. Professors Slaughter and Helfer do not separately include either commercial or 
investment arbitration on their lists of international courts and tribunals, see Helfer & 
Slaughter, supra note 16, at 926 tbl.2(a), 927 tbl.2(b), or in their discussions of international and 
supranational adjudication, see Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 6, at 282–89. Similarly, 
Professors Posner and Yoo do not list forms of investment or commercial arbitration, instead 
referring only to the PCA. See Posner & Yoo, supra note 7, at 52 tbl.6, 53 tbl.7; cf. Alter, supra 
note 10, at 57–60 tbl.2 (listing international-arbitration courts by their years of establishment). 
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arbitrations involving foreign states or state-related entities are filed 
each year,210 and this figure appears to have been growing solidly since 
the early 2000s.211 If international commercial arbitrations more 
generally—not necessarily involving state entities—are considered, 
annual filing rates run well in excess of five thousand cases per year.212 
International commercial arbitral tribunals decide a wide range 
of significant disputes, both in terms of monetary amounts and the 
nature of disputed issues. Dozens of international arbitrations 
involving states are filed annually, with very large financial and 
commercial stakes.213 Moreover, awards routinely resolve claims 
involving important legal issues, including corruption,214 public 
international law,215 and regulatory legislation, such as competition 
 
 210. See BÖCKSTIEGEL, supra note 196, at 59 (reporting that 29.7 percent of ICC 
arbitrations at the time involved state entities); 2009 Statistical Report, 21 ICC INT’L CT. ARB. 
BULL., no. 1, 2010, at 5, 8 (“The number of cases involving one or more States or parastatal 
entities rose to 78 in 2009, representing 9.5% of all cases filed during the year.”). Conservatively 
assuming that some three thousand international arbitrations are filed per year, with 10 percent 
involving state entities, roughly three hundred international arbitrations involving state entities 
are filed each year. If the more realistic figure of five thousand cases per year is used, then there 
are approximately five hundred arbitrations filed per year involving states or state entities. 
 211. The number of international commercial arbitrations filed annually has substantially 
increased each year over the past several decades. See 1 BORN, supra note 197, at 69 (charting 
annual numbers of international commercial arbitrations filed with various arbitral institutions 
from 1993 to 2007). 
 212. See id.  
 213. See Michael D. Goldhaber, Arbitration Scorecard, FOCUS EUR., Summer 2009, at 28, 
28–39 [hereinafter Goldhaber, Arbitration Scorecard 2009] (listing 59 contract and 33 
investment arbitrations in which at least $1 billion was at stake and roughly 250 pending 
commercial arbitrations that have amounts in dispute in excess of $500 million); Michael D. 
Goldhaber, Arbitration Scorecard, FOCUS EUR., Summer 2007, at 22, 28–37 [hereinafter 
Goldhaber, Arbitration Scorecard 2007] (listing fifty pending international commercial 
arbitrations with amounts in dispute in excess of $650 million, including thirty-eight arbitrations 
in excess of $1 billion). 
 214. E.g., Navy of the Republic of China v. Thales S.A., Focus Eur., Summer 2011, at 43 
(ICC Int’l Ct. Arb. 2010) (resolving a claim of bribery); EDF (Servs.) Ltd. v. Romania, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/05/13, Award (Oct. 8, 2009) (rejecting the claim that Romania had illegally 
expropriated EDF funds after EDF refused to bribe Romanian officials); Westinghouse v. 
Republic of the Philippines, Mealey’s Int’l Arb. Rep., Jan. 1992, at B-1 (ICC Int’l Ct. Arb. 1992) 
(requiring charges of bribery to be proven by clear and convincing evidence). 
 215. E.g., Elf Aquitaine Iran v. Nat’l Iranian Oil Co., 11 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 97 (Ad Hoc Arb. 
1986) (asserting the arbitrator’s competence to resolve a dispute over Iran’s nullification of an 
oil contract); Kuwait v. Am. Indep. Oil Co., 21 I.L.M. 976 (Ad Hoc Arb. Trib. 1982) (resolving 
claims arising from Kuwait’s termination of a 1948 oil concession); Texaco Overseas Petrol. Co. 
v. Libyan Arab Republic, 17 I.L.M. 1, 19 (Ad Hoc Arb. 1977) (addressing Libya’s 
nationalization of foreign oil concessions).  
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and securities legislation.216 More fundamentally, the availability of 
international arbitration as an effective means of resolving business 
disputes, particularly disputes involving states and state entities, is 
essential to the structure and success of contemporary international 
trade, finance, and investment. Without a neutral, enforceable means 
of dispute resolution in which private parties can directly participate, 
neither businesses nor many states or state entities would be prepared 
to conduct international commerce in its current form. 
In terms of compliance, states that have concluded international 
commercial-arbitration agreements virtually always participate in 
arbitral proceedings and frequently voluntarily satisfy awards that are 
made against them.217 In the rare cases in which awards are not 
voluntarily complied with, enforcement proceedings have been 
instituted and frequently have succeeded.218 Progressively developing 
from a multitude of pragmatic business dealings and given effect by 
the decentralized, but effective, international enforcement regime 
established by the New York Convention, international commercial 
arbitration now indisputably plays an active and highly important role 
in contemporary international trade and finance. 
3. International Arbitration Under ICSID, BITs, NAFTA, and 
Other Investment Regimes.  Another example of second-generation 
adjudication is investment arbitration, which has also progressively 
developed over the past four decades. Starting in the late 1950s, states 
began to conclude a network of bilateral and multilateral investment 
treaties; over time, these treaties have come to provide for arbitration 
of numerous kinds of significant investment disputes and have 
assumed many of the characteristics of other second-generation forms 
of international adjudication. 
Central to the international investment-arbitration regime is the 
ICSID Convention. Signed in 1965, the Convention now has 146 
 
 216. See Robert Wai, Transnational Private Law and Private Ordering in a Contested Global 
Society, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 471, 474 (2005) (“[P]rivate international law involves policy choices 
with regulatory impact.”). See generally 1 BORN, supra note 197, at 766–841 (discussing the 
nonarbitrability doctrine). 
 217. See 2 BORN, supra note 197, at 2327 (“[E]mpirical studies and anecdotal evidence 
indicate[] that the percentage of voluntary compliance with arbitral awards exceeds 90% of 
international cases.”); Michael Kerr, Concord and Conflict in International Arbitration, 13 ARB. 
INT’L 121, 129 n.24 (1997) (“It has been estimated that about 98 per cent of awards . . . are 
honoured . . . .”).  
 218. See supra text accompanying notes 204–08. 
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contracting states.219 The Convention established a basic legal 
framework for the arbitration of a specific category of disputes—
namely, “investment disputes”220—arising between a contracting state 
and foreign investors who are nationals of another contracting state.221 
Arbitration under the ICSID Convention is only available when a 
contracting state and foreign investor have agreed to submit to ICSID 
arbitration, typically pursuant to either an investment agreement or, 
as discussed next, a BIT.222 
At the same time that the ICSID Convention was being 
negotiated, states began to enter into BITs, beginning with a 1959 
treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and Pakistan.223 
BITs became increasingly common during the 1980s and 1990s and 
were widely regarded as encouraging investment in developing 
markets.224 More recently, states from all regions of the world and in 
 
 219. See List of Contracting States and Other Signatories of the Convention, INT’L CTR. FOR 
SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES (2011), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?request
Type=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ShowDocument&language=English (listing contracting states 
and signatories as of May 5, 2011). As of May 5, 2011, a total of 157 states had signed the 
convention, while only 147 had deposited their instruments of ratification. Id. at 1. Several 
states, including Bolivia, Venezuela, and Ecuador, have renounced, or have indicated intentions 
to renounce, the ICSID Convention. E.g., Press Release, Int’l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. 
Disputes, Bolivia Submits a Notice Under Article 71 of the ICSID Convention (May 16, 2007), 
available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/Announcement3.html; Press Release, 
Int’l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes, Ecuador Submits a Notice Under Article 71 of the 
ICSID Convention (July 9, 2009), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/
Announcement20.html. 
 220. ICSID Convention, supra note 46, arts. 1(2), 25(1), 17 U.S.T. at 1273, 1280, 575 
U.N.T.S. at 162, 175; see also CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER WITH LORETTA MALINTOPPI, AUGUST 
REINISCH & ANTHONY SINCLAIR, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 550 (2d ed. 
2009) (“The Convention does not provide substantive rules for the relationship between host 
States and foreign investors. It is merely designed to establish a procedural framework for the 
settlement of investment disputes.”). 
 221. See SCHREUER ET AL., supra note 220, at 458 (“The request for arbitration may come 
from either the host State or the investor.”).  
 222. ICSID Convention, supra note 46, art. 25(1), 17 U.S.T. at 1280, 575 U.N.T.S. at 175; see 
also SCHREUER ET AL., supra note 220, at 190 (“Consent by both or all parties is an 
indispensable condition for the jurisdiction of the [ICSID].”). Investment agreements frequently 
contain arbitration clauses providing that future disputes relating to the agreement will be 
resolved by arbitration. 
 223. Treaty for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Pak.-Ger., Nov. 25, 1959, 457 
U.N.T.S. 24. 
 224. See U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES IN 
THE MID-1990S, at 122, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/7, U.N. Sales No. E.98.II.D.8 (1998) 
(“[S]ome two-thirds of BITs have been concluded in the 1990s . . . .”); RUDOLPH DOLZER & 
MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 12 (1995) (“BITs have served to 
establish the rules according to which [investments in developing markets] could be 
safeguarded.”); Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Economics of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 41 
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all stages of development have entered into BITs. In 1999, there were 
some 1800 BITs in force,225 and, although the rate at which states are 
concluding BITs has declined in the past decade, by 2010, the figure 
exceeded 2600.226 
Most BITs provide significant protections for investments made 
by foreign investors, including guarantees against both expropriation 
and denials of fair and equitable or national treatment.227 Since the 
early 1980s, BITs have also ordinarily contained dispute-resolution 
provisions that permit foreign investors to require arbitration of 
specified categories of investment disputes with the host state—
sometimes inaccurately referred to as “arbitration without privity” 
because of the absence of a traditional arbitration agreement.228 
Both developing and developed states have pursued a 
multilateral investment-protection convention at various points 
during the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. These 
efforts foundered following disagreements between capital-exporting 
and capital-importing states, because they had differing views about 
the appropriate levels of investor protection.229 Rather than adopting 
a multilateral solution, states instead adopted a network of numerous 
individual bilateral investment-protection relationships—enabling 
methods of dispute resolution and levels of investment protection to 
 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 469, 470 (2000) (“The explosion in BIT negotiations is particularly remarkable 
since these agreements are based on principles to which developing states historically have 
objected.”). 
 225. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 1959–
1999, at iii, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2 (2000) (reporting that the number of BITs 
increased from “385 at the end of the 1980s to 1,857 at the end of the 1990s”). 
 226. Persephone Economou, John H. Dunning & Karl P. Sauvant, Trends and Issues in 
International Investment, 2008–2009 Y.B. ON INT’L INVESTMENT L. & POL’Y 3, 17 (2009). 
 227. See MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 202, ¶¶ 1.24–.30, 2.20 (discussing the substantive 
rights of investors under investment treaties); NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 195, §§ 4.8, 
6.13–.15, 7.6–.7 (describing “fair and equitable treatment” clauses and provisions that define and 
restrict expropriation as being nearly universal in BITs). 
 228. See Jan Paulsson, Arbitration Without Privity, 10 ICSID REV. 232, 232 (1995) (“This 
new world of arbitration is one where the claimant need not have a contractual relationship with 
the defendant and where the tables could not be turned . . . .”). 
 229. See NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 195, § 1.40 (“[S]tates have been unable [to] 
agree on investment issues at a multilateral level.”); Rainer Geiger, Towards a Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment, 31 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 467, 472 (1998) (“Some critics argue that the 
[Multilateral Agreement on Investment] gives foreign investors a right to challenge government 
measures through dispute settlement, putting foreign investors in a better position than 
domestic enterprises.”). 
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be tailored to particular bilateral relationships in a more pragmatic 
and nuanced manner.230 
A number of other multilateral treaties provide for the 
arbitration of international investment disputes in particular regions 
or industrial sectors. These include Chapter 11 of NAFTA,231 the 
Energy Charter Treaty,232 and the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) Comprehensive Investment Agreement.233 
Chapter 19 of NAFTA provides a similar mechanism for specified 
trade disputes.234 In various forms, each of these agreements permits 
foreign investors to arbitrate investment disputes with host states, 
typically even without a preexisting contractual arbitration 
agreement. 
Virtually all forms of investment arbitration are conducted 
pursuant to procedures that parallel international commercial-
arbitration procedures. The arbitration provisions of the ICSID 
Convention and the associated ICSID Arbitration Rules are modeled 
closely on international commercial-arbitration rules.235 Most BITs 
 
 230. Giorgio Sacerdoti, Bilateral Treaties and Multilateral Instruments on Investment 
Protection, 269 RECUEIL DES COURS 251, 292–97 (1997) (discussing negotiations for a 
multilateral agreement on investment); Jeswald W. Salacuse, BIT by BIT: The Growth of 
Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Impact on Foreign Investment in Developing Countries, 
24 INT’L LAW. 655, 656 (1990) (“[T]he general effect of the BIT movement has been to establish 
an increasingly dense network of treaty relationships between capital-exporting states and 
developing countries . . . .”). 
 231. NAFTA, supra note 45, art. 1135, 32 I.L.M. at 646; see also MEG N. KINNEAR, 
ANDREA K. BJORKLUND & JOHN F.G. HANNAFORD, INVESTMENT DISPUTES UNDER NAFTA: 
AN ANNOTATED GUIDE TO NAFTA CHAPTER 11, at 1115-1 to -12 (2009) (discussing the 
negotiating text of Chapter 11). Awards under NAFTA are limited to monetary damages or 
restitution; in the latter case, the respondent state has the option of paying monetary damages 
and interest. NAFTA, supra note 45, art. 1135(1), 32 I.L.M. at 646. 
 232. Energy Charter Treaty art. 26, Dec. 17, 1994, 2080 U.N.T.S. 95. See generally Kaj 
Hobér, Investment Arbitration and the Energy Charter Treaty, 1 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 153 
(2010) (giving an “overview of the investment protection regime of the Energy Charter 
treaty . . . and of the arbitration mechanism therein”); Thomas W. Wälde, Investment 
Arbitration Under the Energy Charter Treaty: From Dispute Settlement to Treaty 
Implementation, 12 ARB. INT’L 429 (1996) (discussing the relationship between the Energy 
Charter Treaty’s investment-arbitration provisions and its broader structure and objectives). 
 233. ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement, Feb. 26, 2009, http://www.asean.org/
22244.htm.  
 234. NAFTA, supra note 45, arts. 1901–05, 32 I.L.M. at 682–85. 
 235. See SCHREUER ET AL., supra note 220, at 6–8 (“The ICSID Convention . . . offers a 
system for dispute settlement that contains not only standard clauses and rules of procedure but 
also institutional support for the conduct of proceedings. It assures the non-frustration of 
proceedings and provides for an award’s recognition and enforcement.” (citations omitted)). 
The procedures in Chapter 11 arbitrations under NAFTA are similar. See KINNEAR ET AL., 
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provide for arbitration either pursuant to the ICSID Rules, the 
UNCITRAL Rules, or the rules of a commercial arbitral institution.236 
In practice, the procedures used in international commercial 
arbitration are the model for investment arbitration, including the 
number and selection of arbitrators, the presentation of evidence, the 
conduct of hearings, and the awards—in part because of overlaps in 
the individuals and law firms that serve as arbitrators and counsel in 
both sets of proceedings.237 
Voluntary compliance with investment-arbitration awards has 
generally been relatively good, particularly when compared with 
compliance under traditional first-generation tribunals.238 In any 
 
supra note 231, at 24–27 (explaining that Chapter 11 of NAFTA grew out of the already-existing 
BIT rules governing arbitration in international trade disputes).  
 236. DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 224, at 129–30 (“In fact, most modern treaties allow 
for the possibility of a choice between different arbitral regimes.”); see also Thomas L. Brewer, 
International Investment Dispute Settlement Procedures: The Evolving Regime for Foreign Direct 
Investment, 26 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 633, 655–56 (1995) (“One reason ICSID is important is 
because most bilateral investment treaties designate it as the prospective arbitration center for 
disputes, refer to it as an appointing authority, or indicate that its rules would be applicable in 
ad hoc arbitrations.”). 
 237. A sui generis aspect of ICSID arbitration is its annulment procedure, which provides 
for the review—on very narrow grounds—of ICSID awards by an annulment committee. See 
SCHREUER ET AL., supra note 220, at 1035–36 (“The Convention’s text itself indicates that an ad 
hoc committee is not under an obligation to annul but is merely authorized to do so.”). Unlike 
ICSID arbitral tribunals, annulment committees are not selected by the parties but by ICSID. 
See id. at 1027 (“A suggestion to give the parties the right to appoint ad hoc committees was 
rejected . . . . The right to appoint persons to ad hoc committees is with the Chairman of the 
Administrative Council.”). A separate annulment committee is formed for each case in which 
annulment of an award is sought. ICSID Convention, supra note 46, art. 52, 17 U.S.T. at 1290, 
575 U.N.T.S. at 102; see also SCHREUER ET AL., supra note 220, at 899 (“[A]nnulment is always 
put into the hands of a different body, called the ad hoc committees.”). 
 238. Although there is no systematic data, anecdotal evidence indicates that states have 
virtually always satisfied ICSID and BIT awards against them, though in some instances they 
have negotiated the amount and terms of payment. See Alan S Alexandroff & Ian A Laird, 
Compliance and Enforcement, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
LAW 1171, 1185 (Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino & Christoph Schreuer eds., 2008) 
(“[A]necdotal evidence would suggest that state respondents . . . have . . . abid[ed] by final 
awards.”); Andrea Bjorklund, Sovereign Immunity as a Barrier to the Enforcement of Investor-
State Arbitral Awards: The Re-Politicization of International Investment Disputes, 21 AM. REV. 
INT’L ARB. 211, 231 (2010) (“The instances in which states have refused to pay are still rare.”); 
Richard Happ, Enforcement of Investment Treaty Awards Against States, in PROTECTION OF 
FOREIGN INVESTMENT THROUGH MODERN TREATY ARBITRATION: DIVERSITY AND 
HARMONISATION 217, 230 (Anne K. Hoffmann ed., 2010) (“The majority of States comply 
voluntarily with an award. Where that is not the case, ICSID awards are easier to enforce than 
non-ICSID awards.”); August Reinisch, Enforcement of Investment Awards, in ARBITRATION 
UNDER INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: A GUIDE TO THE KEY ISSUES 671, 697 
(Katia Yannaca-Small ed., 2010) (“In the majority of that fraction of cases in which host States 
were found to have incurred liability, the awards seem to have been voluntarily complied with. 
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event, in each of these investment regimes, commitments to arbitrate 
are binding—and can be pursued even against defaulting foreign 
states—and awards are enforceable against states and state-related 
entities. Thus, the ICSID Convention and the ICSID Rules provide 
specifically for the possibility of default proceedings, in which an 
arbitration continues notwithstanding the nonparticipation of a state 
respondent.239 Similarly, the Convention provides that ICSID awards 
are final and binding on the parties to the arbitration.240 
In addition, like the New York Convention, the ICSID 
Convention establishes a decentralized, but effective, mechanism for 
enforcing ICSID awards. The Convention contains provisions 
obligating the courts in all contracting states to enforce the pecuniary 
obligations imposed by such awards.241 These latter obligations have 
been implemented by legislation in many jurisdictions,242 and national 
courts have made clear that they will enforce ICSID awards against 
states and their commercial property.243 
 
Enforcement in national courts appears to be a rare phenomenon.”). If there were significant 
instances of noncompliance, one would see reported enforcement actions in national courts.  
 239. ICSID Convention, supra note 46, art. 45(2), 17 U.S.T. at 1287, 575 U.N.T.S. at 188; 
ICSID ARB. R. 42, available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR_
English-final.pdf. 
 240. ICSID Convention, supra note 46, art. 53(1), 17 U.S.T. at 1291, 575 U.N.T.S. at 194 
(“The award shall be binding on the parties and shall not be subject to any appeal or to any 
other remedy except those provided for in this Convention.”); see also SCHREUER ET AL., supra 
note 220, at 1099–1101 (“The binding nature of the award is inherent in the concept of 
arbitration. . . . The principle of the binding force of arbitral awards is expressed in most 
instruments governing arbitration . . . and is frequently restated in arbitration agreements.”). 
 241. ICSID Convention, supra note 46, art. 54(1), 17 U.S.T. at 1291, 575 U.N.T.S. at 194 
(“Each Contracting State shall recognize an award rendered pursuant to this Convention as 
binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award within its territories as if it 
were a final judgment of a court of that State.”); see also SCHREUER ET AL., supra note 220, at 
1125–30, 1134–39 (“Art[icle] 54 is one of the most important provisions of the Convention. It 
provides for recognition and enforcement of ICSID awards by the courts of all States parties to 
the Convention.”). 
 242. See, e.g., Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Act of 1966, Pub. L. 
No. 89-532, § 3, 80 Stat. 344, 344 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 1650a (2006)) (“An award of an 
arbitral tribunal . . . shall create a right arising under a treaty of the United States. The 
pecuniary obligations imposed by such an award shall be enforced and shall be given the same 
full faith and credit as if the award were a final judgment of a court of general jurisdiction of one 
of the several States.”); cf. SCHREUER ET AL., supra note 220, at 1144 (“It is doubtful whether 
the Convention’s authorization to federal States to treat awards like judgments of constituent 
states and to have them enforced through their federal courts implies that the review 
mechanisms for judgments of constituent states that may exist in these States can be applied to 
ICSID awards.”).  
 243. See Liberian E. Timber Corp. v. Republic of Liberia, 650 F. Supp. 73, 77 (S.D.N.Y. 
1986) (“The fact that [the plaintiff] is a French entity and Liberia a foreign sovereign does not 
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Likewise, most BITs provide that awards are subject to 
recognition and enforcement, including coercive enforcement against 
state property. BIT awards rendered pursuant to the ICSID 
Convention are subject to ICSID’s enforcement provisions,244 whereas 
non-ICSID BIT awards are generally governed by both the New 
York Convention and national implementing legislation.245 In both 
 
deprive the Court of subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, this Court had jurisdiction to direct the 
entry for judgment against Liberia to enforce the pecuniary obligation of the arbitration award 
in favour of [the plaintiff].”), aff’d, 854 F.2d 1314 (2d Cir. 1987); Liberian E. Timber Corp. v. 
Republic of Liberia, 2 ICSID Rev. 187, 187 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (“[I]t is ORDERED that 
the . . . [ICSID] arbitration award . . . be docketed and filed by the Clerk of this Court in the 
same manner and with the same force and effect as if it were a final judgment of this 
Court . . . .”); Liberian E. Timber Corp. v. Republic of Liberia, 659 F. Supp. 606, 611 (D.D.C. 
1986) (attaching Liberia’s assets in the United States but holding that “the bank accounts of the 
Liberian Embassy are immune from attachment . . . because they enjoy diplomatic immunity”); 
Republic of Ecuador v. Occidental Exploration & Prod. Co., [2006] EWHC (Comm) 345, (2006) 
8 Int’l Trade L. Rep. 948, aff’d, [2007] EWCA (Civ) 656, [2007] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 352 (Eng.); Cass. 
1e civ., June 11, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1169, 1169 (Fr.) (“Whereas, however, a foreign State which has 
submitted to arbitration has thereby agreed that the award may be granted recognition 
(exequatur) which, as such, does not constitute a measure of execution that might raise issues 
pertaining to the immunity from execution of the State concerned . . . .”); Cour d’appel [CA] 
[regional court of appeal] Paris, 1e ch., June 26, 1981, 20 I.L.M. 878 (1982) (Fr.) (reversing a 
lower court decision that property situated in France could not be taken to satisfy a judgment 
rendered against the People’s Republic of the Congo, thereby making the judgment fully 
enforceable against Congolese property in France). 
 The enforcement of awards against recalcitrant foreign states can face material 
obstacles, particularly if commercial assets cannot be located. See Andrea Bjorklund, State 
Immunity and the Enforcement of Investor-State Arbitral Awards, in INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CHRISTOPH SCHREUER 
302, 321 (Christina Binder et al. eds., 2009) (“[A] successful claimant must still locate 
commercial assets and defeat any arguments about their status that a State may raise.”); cf. 
KINNEAR ET AL., supra note 231, at 1115-1 (discussing the establishment of “a mechanism for 
the settlement of investment disputes that assures both equal treatment among investors of the 
Parties in accordance with the principle of international reciprocity and due process before an 
impartial tribunal” (quoting NAFTA, supra note 45, art. 1115, 32 I.L.M. at 642)). Those 
obstacles are not fundamentally different from those that exist in the enforcement of judgments 
in private litigation and can often be overcome in practice. 
 244. See MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 202, ¶¶ 3.34, 7.73 (“[T]he rules of law pursuant to 
which the arbitration is conducted are supplied by the [ICSID] Convention as interpreted under 
principles of public international law. The laws of the physical place of arbitration have no 
bearing whatsoever on the arbitration procedure.”); SCHREUER ET AL., supra note 220, at 1123 
(“The obligation to recognize and enforce awards applies to all States parties to the ICSID 
Convention.”). 
 245. See, e.g., Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investment, U.S.-Ecuador, art. VI(5), Aug. 27, 1993, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-15, at 12 (“Any 
arbitration under [certain parts of the treaty] . . . shall be held in a state that is a party to the 
New York Convention.”); Attorney Gen. v. S.D. Myers, Inc., [2004] 3 F.C.R. 368, para. 41 
(Can.) (“In the case at bar, [Canada’s implementing legislation] spells out the limited 
jurisdiction of the Court to set aside an arbitration award.”); see also Piero Bernardini, ICSID 
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cases, effective enforcement is available in national courts. Similarly, 
NAFTA provides that monetary awards under Chapter 11 have 
“binding force” on the parties to an arbitration and that NAFTA 
states will enforce such awards in their courts.246 
In addition to producing enforceable awards, investment 
arbitration regimes are effectively mandatory for many states. 
Although states are formally free to conclude or not to conclude BITs 
or individual investment agreements, most states face substantial 
pressure to enter into such agreements to attract foreign investment.247 
Some states can resist that pressure,248 but the existence of nearly 
three thousand BITs indicates that they rarely do so. 
Investment arbitration has played at best a minor role in most 
contemporary discussions of international adjudication, receiving 
only passing reference or less.249 Nevertheless, the various forms of 
investment arbitration discussed previously constitute a significant 
new category of international adjudication, encompassing disputes 
that historically have been resolved through force, diplomatic 
negotiations, or other political means. 
Like other second-generation adjudicatory mechanisms, 
investment arbitration has seen robust growth. Over the past decade, 
 
Versus Non-ICSID Investment Treaty Arbitration, in LIBER AMICORUM BERNARDO 
CREMADES 159, 161–63 (M.Á. Fernández-Ballesteros & David Arias eds., 2010) (explaining the 
differences between ICSID and non-ICSID BITs and noting that ICSID awards leave “no room 
for the application of the New York Convention,” whereas enforcement of non-ICSID awards 
“is in principle governed by the New York Convention”).  
 246. NAFTA, supra note 45, art. 1136(4), 32 I.L.M. at 646 (“Each Party shall provide for the 
enforcement of an award in its territory.”); see also id. art. 1136(6), 32 I.L.M. at 646 (“A 
disputing investor may seek enforcement of an arbitration award under the ICSID Convention, 
the New York Convention or the Inter-American Convention . . . .”); KINNEAR ET AL., supra 
note 231, at 1136-36b (“Once an award is given the imprimatur of a national authority . . . the 
arbitral award is enforceable in the same way that a court decision of that jurisdiction is 
enforceable.”). 
 247. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 195, § 1.48 (“[T]here remains strong competitive 
pressure for developing states to enter into [international investment agreements] and thereby 
signal to foreign investors that an enabling environment for foreign investment exists.”); 
Zachary Elkins, Andrew Guzman & Beth A. Simmons, Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of 
Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960–2000, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 265, 266 (“Our theory is that the 
proliferation of BITs—and the liberal property rights regime they embody—is propelled in 
good part by the competition among potential host countries for credible property rights 
protections required by direct investors.”). 
 248. There are categories of states that have either not entered into BITs with one another, 
such as the United States with many European states; have not concluded BITs, such as Brazil; 
or have denounced BITs that they have concluded, such as Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia. 
See infra note 272 and accompanying text. 
 249. See supra note 9; infra notes 327, 329. 
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roughly twenty-three new ICSID arbitrations have been filed each 
year, reflecting an increase from the 1990s, when approximately four 
new arbitrations were filed annually, and the 1980s, when two cases 
were filed annually.250 At the end of 2011, 140 ICSID arbitrations 
were pending, and a total of 368 ICSID arbitrations had been filed 
since 1972.251 ICSID arbitrations also concern matters of substantial 
public import. ICSID proceedings frequently involve very large 
monetary claims,252 matters of broad international importance—
including, for example, the consequences of Argentina’s financial 
difficulties253 and the lawfulness of Australia’s and Uruguay’s tobacco 
 
 250. Compare INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, THE ICSID CASELOAD—
STATISTICS 7 (2011), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=
ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ShowDocument&CaseLoadStatistics=True&language=English21 
(showing that 262 cases were filed under the ICSID Convention from 2000 to 2010, whereas 43 
cases were filed from 1990 to 1999 and 17 cases were filed from 1980 to 1989), with U.N. 
CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT, at 2, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IA/2010/3 (2010) (showing that 225 
ICSID cases and 357 known investor-state treaty-based cases had been filed through the end of 
2009). 
 251. See List of ICSID Cases, INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, http://icsid.
worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=ListCases (last updated 
Dec. 12, 2011) (listing 140 pending ICSID arbitrations and 228 concluded arbitrations, for a 
total of 368 total arbitrations). This increase was due in part to arbitrations brought pursuant to 
BITs. A nontrivial part of the increase was also attributable to proceedings against Argentina, 
initiated in connection with the country’s economic crisis at the turn of the twenty-first century. 
See William Burke-White, The Argentine Financial Crisis: State Liability Under BITs and the 
Legitimacy of the ICSID System, 3 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 199, 200 (2008) 
(“More than forty of the cases presently pending before ICSID have been brought against the 
Republic of Argentina . . . .”). 
 252. See U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., DEVELOPMENTS IN INVESTOR-STATE 
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, at 9–10, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IA/2009/6/Rev1 (2009) 
(referencing a number of awards in excess of $100,000,000); Desert Line Projects LLC v. 
Republic of Yemen, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/17, Award, 69 (Feb. 6, 2008), http://icsid.world
bank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC791_
En&caseId=C62 (awarding $1 million); CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Annulment Proceeding, ¶¶ 36–40, 163 (Sept. 25, 2007), http://icsid.
worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=
DC687_En&caseId=C4 (upholding a $133,200,000 award); ADC Affiliate Ltd. v. Republic of 
Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/16, Award, ¶ 519 (Oct. 2, 2006), http://icsid.worldbank.org/
ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC648_En&case
Id=C231 (granting a $76,200,000 award); Ceskoslovenskí Obchodní Banka A.S. v. Slovak 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4, Award, ¶ 374 (Dec. 29, 2004) (granting an $800,000,000 
award), http://italaw.com/documents/Cesk-Slovakia-AwardDec2004.pdf.  
 253. See Burke-White, supra note 251, at 200–01 (“More than forty of the cases currently 
pending before ICSID have been brought against the Republic of Argentina . . . . These cases 
are of extraordinary importance, not just because of the immense financial liability to which 
they expose Argentina, but also because, in response, Argentina has invoked a broad set of legal 
arguments about the rights of states to craft policy responses to extraordinary situations such as 
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regulations254—or important issues of international law or national 
regulatory competence.255 
With respect to NAFTA, forty-two investor-state arbitrations 
have been filed under Chapter 11 since 1994—approximately 2.5 
cases per year.256 NAFTA cases have generally involved both 
substantial monetary claims and significant questions regarding 
international-law limitations on national regulatory authority.257 In the 
case of the Energy Charter, twenty-three arbitrations, again involving 
 
a massive financial collapse. . . . These arbitrations thus test both the limits of state freedom of 
action and investor protections under the BIT regime in exceptional circumstances.”). 
 254. See Andrew Mitchell & Tania Voon, Regulating Tobacco Flavors: Implications of WTO 
Law, 29 B.U. INT’L L.J. 383, 385 (2011) (“[I]n March 2010, Philip Morris launched arbitral 
proceedings against Uruguay—often identified as a champion of tobacco control—pursuant to a 
bilateral investment treaty between Uruguay and Switzerland. The proceedings challenge 
Uruguayan regulatory measures . . . .”); Tania Voon & Andrew Mitchell, Time To Quit? 
Assessing International Investment Claims Against Plain Packaging in Australia, 14 J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 515, 517 (2011) (“In their attempts to discredit Australia’s plain packaging scheme at 
an international level, tobacco companies are turning not only to the law of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), but also to international investment law.”); cf. Paul E. Mason & Mauricio 
Fomm Ferreira dos Santos, New Keys to Arbitration in Latin-America, 25 J. INT’L ARB. 31, 53–
55 (2008) (discussing the use of ICSID arbitration to control oil and gas usage and entitlements 
in countries like Venezuela).  
 255. See David Schneiderman, Investment Rules and the New Constitutionalism, 25 LAW & 
SOC. INQUIRY 757, 758 (2000) (“As the arena for international trade and investment expands, 
there increasingly are calls for background legal conditions that will secure ideological gains and 
limit the force of majoritarian politics.”); Gus Van Harten, The Public-Private Distinction in the 
International Arbitration of Individual Claims Against the State, 56 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 371, 372, 
378–80 (2007) (“[I]nvestment treaty arbitration encompasses the full panoply of the State’s 
regulatory relations with foreign investors.”). 
 256. See NAFTA Investor-State Arbitrations, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/s/l/
c3439.htm (last visited Dec. 19, 2011) (listing the cases filed against the United States (sixteen), 
Canada (thirteen), and the United Mexican States (thirteen)). 
 257. See, e.g., Loewen Grp. Inc. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Award, 
¶ 1 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. June 26, 2003), 7 ICSID Rep. 442 (2005) (“This is an important 
and extremely difficult case. Ultimately it turns on a question of jurisdiction arising from (a) the 
NAFTA requirement of diversity of nationality as between a claimant and the respondent 
government, and (b) the assignment by [Claimant] of its NAFTA claims to a Canadian 
corporation owned and controlled by a United States corporation.”); Pope & Talbot Inc. v. 
Canada, Award in Respect of Damages, at 29–30 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. May 31, 2002), 
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/damage_
award.pdf (explaining that BITs have supplanted state law in many cases); Pope & Talbot Inc. v. 
Canada, Award on the Merits of Phase 2, at 15 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. Apr. 10, 2001), 
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/Award_
Merits-e.pdf (“Instead, the Tribunal believes that the language of Article 1102(3) was intended 
simply to make clear that the obligation of a state or province was to provide investments of 
foreign investors with the best treatment it accords any investment of its country, not just the 
best treatment it accords to investments of its investors.”); Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican 
States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. Aug. 30, 2000), 40 
I.L.M. 36, 54 (2001) (awarding $16,685,000). 
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a range of substantial claims, have been filed since the charter came 
into force in 1998; of those cases, eighteen have been filed since 2005, 
a statistic that reflects strong growth in the first decade of the twenty-
first century.258 
It is more difficult to estimate the number of BIT arbitrations 
pursued outside the ICSID system because BITs frequently provide 
for noninstitutional arbitration. Nonetheless, observers estimate that 
more than one hundred noninstitutional BIT arbitrations have been 
filed since 1980.259 And, as with ICSID and NAFTA arbitrations, non-
ICSID BIT cases have involved significant disputes, both with respect 
to the amounts in dispute260 and the disputes’ legal or regulatory 
significance.261 
In sum, the number of investment arbitrations is both 
substantial—roughly four hundred arbitrations since 1990—and 
growing robustly—roughly forty new investment arbitrations being 
filed each year. Investment arbitrations have also frequently involved 
very sizeable financial claims and significant legal and regulatory 
issues, not merely contractual or private-law disputes. More 
generally, just as international commercial arbitration is an essential 
foundation for contemporary trade, investment arbitration is an 
essential foundation for contemporary international investment, by 
virtue of its role in providing a neutral forum in which investment 
disputes can be objectively resolved. At the same time, awards in 
 
 258. Hobér, supra note 232, at 168–74, 190. 
 259. ARIF HYDER ALI & ALEXANDRE DE GRAMONT, THE ARBITRATION REVIEW OF THE 
AMERICAS 2008: ICSID ARBITRATION IN THE AMERICAS 6 (2007) (explaining that more than 
one hundred investor-state cases have been filed in non-ICSID fora). Some 60 percent of 
investment arbitrations are brought under ICSID procedures. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & 
DEV., LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, at 2, U.N. Doc. 
UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/IIA/2008/3 (2008). 
 260. See Republic of Argentina v. BG Group PLC, 715 F. Supp. 2d 108, 114, 126 (D.D.C. 
2007) (declining to reverse an arbitral award of $185,285,485.85), confirmed, 764 F. Supp. 2d 21 
(D.D.C. 2011); Occidental Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Republic of Ecuador, LCIA Case No. 
UN 3467, at 73 (London Ct. Int’l Arb. 2004), http://italaw.com/documents/Oxy-EcuadorFinal
Award_001.pdf (awarding $71,533,649); Yukos Universal Ltd. v. Russian Fed’n, PCA Case No. 
AA 227 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2009), http://italaw.com/documents/YULvRussianFederation-Interim
Award-30Nov2009.pdf (claiming $33,000,000,000 in damages); Goldhaber, Arbitration 
Scorecard 2009, supra note 213, at 31 (listing “59 contract and 33 investment treaty arbitrations 
in which at least $1 billion was at stake”); Goldhaber, Arbitration Scorecard 2007, supra note 
213, at 22–37 (listing sixty-three treaty and contract disputes in which at least $1 billion was at 
stake). 
 261. See Anne van Aaken, Perils of Success? The Case of International Investment 
Protection, 9 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 1, 1 (2008) (explaining that “States commit themselves to 
treaties that restrict their regulatory sovereignty in ways that are sometimes unpredictable”).  
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investment arbitrations have contributed to the development of an 
increasingly sophisticated body of international investment law that 
provides a vitally important legal regime for contemporary foreign 
investment.262 
Investment arbitration has faced substantial criticism since the 
turn of the twenty-first century.263 Some of these complaints have 
been directed broadly at foreign investment and the basic premise of 
international investment protection, typically claiming that 
investment arbitration is skewed in favor of foreign investors.264 Other 
 
 262. MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 202, ¶¶ 1.34, 1.48–.57, 3.83–.103; NEWCOMBE & 
PARADELL, supra note 195, §§ 1.46, 2.22–.23; Friedl Weiss, Trade and Investment, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 238, at 182, 183–87 
(“The ongoing proliferation of intergovernmental arrangements on foreign investments . . . has 
led to an increasingly dense and diverse web of overlapping instruments, including bilateral 
(BITs), regional, sectoral, and multilateral instruments, and non-binding initiatives which differ 
considerably in legal characteristics . . . .”); see also Benedict Kingsbury & Stephan Schill, 
Investor-State Arbitration as Governance: Fair and Equitable Treatment, Proportionality and the 
Emerging Global Administrative Law, in 50 YEARS OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION 5, 5 
(Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 2009) (“Investor-State arbitration, and in particular arbitration 
based on international investment treaties, is not simply dispute resolution. It is also a structure 
of global governance.”). 
 263. See Jason Abbott, The Political Economy of NAFTA Chapter Eleven: Equality Before 
the Law and the Boundaries of North American Integration, 23 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. 
REV. 303, 306–09 (2000) (discussing the various critiques based on environmental concerns and 
injustice-related concerns that have been lodged against the dispute-settlement mechanism in 
NAFTA Chapter 11); Charles H. Brower, II, Structure, Legitimacy, and NAFTA’s Investment 
Chapter, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 37, 38 (2003) (“Debates about the investment chapter—
Chapter 11—of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) have become common 
fare.” (footnote omitted)); Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty 
Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1521, 1523 (2005) (“Rather than creating certainty for foreign investors and Sovereigns, 
the process of resolving investment disputes through arbitration is creating uncertainty about 
the meaning of those rights and public international law.”); Gus Van Harten, Investment Treaty 
Arbitration, Procedural Fairness, and the Rule of Law, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 
AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW 627, 627 (Stephan W. Schill ed., 2010) (“Investment treaty 
arbitration is often promoted as a fair, rules-based system . . . . This claim is undermined, 
however, by procedural and institutional aspects of the system that suggest it will tend to favour 
claimants and, more specifically, those states and other actors that wield power over appointing 
authorities or the system as a whole.”); Public Statement, Gus Van Harten et al., Public 
Statement on the International Investment Regime 1 (Aug. 31, 2010), available at http://www.
bilaterals.org/IMG/pdf_Public_Statement.pdf (expressing concern that investment arbitration 
has harmed the public welfare, particularly by “hampering . . . the ability of governments to act 
for their people in response to the concerns of human development and environmental 
sustainability”). Similar, if less pointed, critiques have been made of international commercial 
arbitration. See supra note 202. 
 264. See, e.g., PUB. CITIZEN’S GLOBAL TRADE WATCH, NAFTA’S THREAT TO 
SOVEREIGNTY AND DEMOCRACY: THE RECORD OF NAFTA CHAPTER 11 INVESTOR-STATE 
CASES 1994–2005, at vii (2005) (“NAFTA rules grant foreign investors greater rights when 
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criticisms have focused on specific features of investment arbitration, 
including its lack of transparency,265 its insufficiently determinate legal 
standards,266 its lack of opportunities for amicus curiae participation,267 
and its lack of appellate review.268 
Notably, almost all of these criticisms have rested on the premise 
that investment arbitration plays a highly significant role in 
 
operating within the United States than those available to U.S. residents or businesses . . . . Our 
findings demonstrate that NAFTA’s model of extensive foreign investor privileges and their 
private enforcement outside of the domestic court system should not be replicated in future 
agreements.”); Jason Yackee, Bilateral Investment Treaties, Credible Commitment, and the Rule 
of (International) Law: Do BITs Promote Foreign Direct Investment?, 42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
805, 827–28 (2008) (claiming that no clear link between treaty protections and investment 
exists); Susan Rose-Ackerman & Jennifer Tobin, Foreign Direct Investment and the Business 
Environment in Developing Countries: The Impact of Bilateral Investment Treaties 31 (Yale Law 
Sch. Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Pub. Policy, Research Paper No. 293, 2005), available at http://ssrn
.com/abstract=557121 (rejecting the claim that BITs encourage foreign direct investment in low- 
and middle-income countries). 
 265. See, e.g., Barnali Choudhury, Recapturing Public Power: Is Investment Arbitration’s 
Engagement of the Public Interest Contributing to the Democratic Deficit?, 41 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 775, 786 (2008) (“Investment arbitration embodies the confidential and 
secretive nature of the international commercial arbitration process. . . . As a result, the public is 
often unaware of pending or ongoing arbitrations.”); cf. Dora Marta Gruner, Accounting for the 
Public Interest in International Arbitration: The Need for Procedural and Structural Reform, 41 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 923, 924 (2003) (“[A]rbitration is primarily a private dispute 
resolution mechanism. Thus, the government’s involvement in the dispute settlement process is 
merely ancillary. . . . [But] contractual disputes between parties of different nationalities can, 
and often do, have significant repercussions for the public at large.”). 
 266. See, e.g., Brower, supra note 263, at 78–79 (discussing the “promulgation of 
interpretations that lack textual determinacy” by the Free Trade Commission); van Aaken, 
supra note 261, at 8 (“Many of the indeterminate and vague legal terms found in BITs have only 
recently been clarified . . . .”); Todd Weiler, NAFTA Investment Arbitration and the Growth of 
International Economic Law, 36 CAN. BUS. L.J. 405, 425–28 (2002) (discussing attempts by the 
Free Trade Commission to correct “mistakes” being made by NAFTA tribunals). 
 267. See Christina Knahr, Transparency, Third Party Participation and Access to Documents 
in International Investment Arbitration, 23 ARB. INT’L 327, 328 (2007) (explaining the lack of a 
codified process for amicus curiae participation in NAFTA tribunals under UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules); Loukas A. Mistelis, Confidentiality and Third Party Participation, 21 ARB. 
INT’L 211, 221–23 (2005) (explaining that amicus curiae briefs are not always allowed in 
international arbitration). 
 268. See, e.g., HOWARD MANN & KONRAD VON MOLTKE, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE 
DEV., NAFTA’S CHAPTER 11 AND THE ENVIRONMENT: ADDRESSING THE IMPACTS OF THE 
INVESTOR-STATE PROCESS ON THE ENVIRONMENT 6 (1999), available at http://www.iisd.org/
pdf/nafta.pdf (“[Chapter 11] allows foreign investors to sidestep [many typical] processes and 
the safeguards they provide to all litigants, in favour of a non-transparent, secretive and non-
appealable system of arbitration.”); Andrew J. Shapren, NAFTA Chapter 11: A Step Forward in 
International Trade Law or a Step Backward for Democracy?, 17 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 323, 
329 (2003) (“The arbitration process is a closed and unaccountable one. . . . [T]here is no 
provision for amicus participation by outside interested parties, and no standard appeals 
process.”).  
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international affairs and in the development of contemporary 
international law. It is precisely because of the significance of 
investment arbitration that critics have attached particular 
importance to improving or abolishing it.269 If investment arbitration 
were unimportant or peripheral, it would attract little or no interest, 
rather than being the subject of a relatively substantial body of 
concern and criticism. 
States have taken a number of steps in response to these 
critiques, including negotiating new BIT terms; issuing interpretive 
statements; and revising institutional rules to provide more precise 
legal standards, greater transparency, and more opportunities for 
amicus participation.270 Despite continuing criticism, however, 
investment arbitration remains successful and robust: BITs continue 
to be ratified, including BIT provisions for investor-state 
arbitration;271 only a few states have renounced existing BITs;272 and 
investment-arbitration caseloads continue to increase. 
4. Contemporary Claims Tribunals.  Claims tribunals have been a 
feature of international adjudication since at least the eighteenth 
 
 269. E.g., MANN & VON MOLTKE, supra note 268, at 2 (explaining how Chapter 11 of 
NAFTA has been used to shape international environmental law); van Aaken, supra note 261, 
at 2–3 (discussing the surge of BITs in recent years and the subsequent effects on international 
law). 
 270. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2004 MODEL BIT art. 28, available at http://www.state
.gov/documents/organization/117601.pdf (“The tribunal shall have the authority to accept and 
consider amicus curiae submissions from a person or entity that is not a disputing party.”); see 
also Antonio R. Parra, The Development of the Regulations and Rules of the International Centre 
for Settlement of Investment Disputes, 41 INT’L LAW. 47, 56 (2007) (explaining a controversial 
amendment to ICSID Arbitration Rule 32 that “provided that third-party attendance at or 
observations of hearings might be authorized by a tribunal only if there were no objections from 
a disputing party”); Suzanne A. Spears, The Quest for Policy Space in a New Generation of 
International Investment Agreements, 13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 1037, 1043–45 (2010) (discussing “a 
new generation of [international investment agreements] that possess one or a combination of 
several new features intended to allow host states greater policy space and thereby prevent 
regulatory chill” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 271. See, e.g., Agreement on the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, 
Ger.-Pak., art. 10, Dec. 1, 2009, http://www.pakemb.de/index.php?id=198&L=0 (including a 
provision for “Settlement of Disputes Between a Contracting State and an Investor of the Other 
Contracting State”). Since 2000, the rate at which new BITs are being concluded has fallen from 
that of the 1990s. See U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF 
BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES (BITS), at 3 tbl.1, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/IIA/
2006/9 (2006) (showing the numeric decline in the rate of BITs being concluded since 2000). 
 272. See supra note 219. 
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century.273 Historically, claims by nationals of one state against a 
foreign state for violations of international-law rights were not 
pursued by the individuals who had suffered injury, but were instead 
espoused by the claimant’s home state—sometimes in diplomatic 
negotiations and sometimes before claims tribunals established by 
treaty.274 During the past forty years, new mechanisms have been 
developed on an ad hoc basis to deal with particular types of claims. 
Two significant examples of international claims tribunals are the 
Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal and the UN Compensation Commission 
(UNCC). Both of these mechanisms authorized private parties to 
pursue claims in proceedings that were modeled on international 
commercial arbitrations and that produced enforceable awards;275 at 
the same time, both mechanisms successfully and effectively resolved 
the large numbers of disputes that were put to them. 
a. Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal.  The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal was 
established in 1981 by the Algiers Accords as a mechanism for 
resolving various commercial claims between the United States, Iran, 
and their respective nationals.276 The Accords provided for a nine-
 
 273. See 1 RICHARD B. LILLICH & BURNS H. WESTON, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: THEIR 
SETTLEMENT BY LUMP SUM AGREEMENTS 26 (1975) (noting 249 instances of adjudication of 
claims between 1794 and 1939); David J. Bederman, The Glorious Past and Uncertain Future of 
International Claims Tribunals, in INTERNATIONAL COURTS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY, supra note 51, at 161, 161 (“The first international claims tribunals were 
established . . . between the United States and Great Britain on November 19, 1794 . . . .”). 
 274. See Bederman, supra note 273, at 176–79 (explaining that, historically, disputes 
between international businesspeople and government administrators were brought by the state 
on behalf of the individual claimants and, that in doing so, the state “assert[ed] its own right, the 
right to ensure in the person of its nationals respect for the rule of international law”). Private 
parties were not permitted to participate directly in the proceedings, and the state espousing a 
claim was free to decline to assert or to settle that claim. Id.; see also BORCHARD, supra note 
168, § 144, at 366 (“[A] necessary corollary of the government’s discretion in the presentation of 
claims is an unlimited control over them in the conduct of diplomatic negotiations. The 
government is the sole judge of what claims it will enforce . . . . It may refuse to present a claim 
at all. . . . The government’s power to settle the claim of its citizen against a foreign country is 
practically unrestricted.”). 
 275. See David J. Bederman, The United Nations Compensation Commission and the 
Tradition of International Claims Settlement, 27 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 24–34 (1994) 
(discussing the UNCC and the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal as forms of international commercial 
arbitrations); infra text accompanying notes 280–84, 294–98.  
 276. See Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of 
Algeria (General Declaration), 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 3, 3 (1981) (establishing the 
government of Algeria “as an intermediary . . . in relations arising out of the detention of the 52 
United States nationals in Iran”); David D. Caron & John R. Crook, Getting Started, in THE 
IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL AND THE PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS 
RESOLUTION: A STUDY BY THE PANEL ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE AMERICAN 
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person tribunal, seated in the Hague, with jurisdiction to hear claims 
brought by U.S. or Iranian nationals arising out of U.S.-Iran 
hostilities.277 The tribunal’s competence included, as its principal 
focus, claims asserted by private parties; those claims could be 
pursued directly by companies or individuals and did not need to be 
espoused by the claimant’s home state.278 
Three tribunal members were appointed by Iran, three by the 
United States, and three by other states.279 Unlike most international 
arbitral proceedings, the tribunal was permanent, in the sense that a 
standing body of decisionmakers heard all of the cases falling within 
the tribunal’s mandate. The tribunal conducted arbitral proceedings 
before three-person panels, pursuant to the UNCITRAL Rules, and 
its procedures closely resembled those employed in commercial 
arbitrations.280 
The disputes submitted to the tribunal were principally 
contractual disputes—arising under commercial agreements between 
U.S. companies and Iranian state entities—and claims for 
 
SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 11, 12 (David D. Caron & John R. Crook eds., 2000) 
(explaining that the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal “could hear official claims by either government 
against the other” in commercial contract disputes). 
 277. The Algiers Accords provided: “An International Arbitral Tribunal (the Iran-United 
States Claims Tribunal) is hereby established for the purpose of deciding claims of nationals of 
the United States against Iran and claims of nationals of Iran against the United States . . . .” 
Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning 
the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Claims Settlement Declaration) art. II(1), 1 Iran-
U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 9, 9 (1981) [hereinafter Claims Settlement Declaration]. 
 278. Id. art. III(3), 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 10; Case No. A/18, 5 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 
251, 261 (1984) (“[M]ost disputes . . . involve a private party on one side and a Government or 
Government-controlled entity on the other . . . .”); see also Brice M. Clagett, The Perspective of 
the Claimant Community, in THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL AND THE PROCESS 
OF INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS RESOLUTION, supra note 276, at 59, 59–63 (explaining that, 
notwithstanding other concerns, private claimants were partially relieved “that an international 
forum had been created” by the Algiers Accords). 
 279. Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 277, art. III, 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 10; 
see also George H. Aldrich, The Selection of Arbitrators, in THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS 
TRIBUNAL AND THE PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS RESOLUTION, supra note 276, at 65, 
65–69 (discussing the selection process that was followed by the three American arbitrators and 
the three Iranian arbitrators in choosing the three third-country nationals who would complete 
the nine-member tribunal).  
 280. See JACOMIJN J. VAN HOF, COMMENTARY ON THE UNCITRAL ARBITRATION 
RULES: THE APPLICATION BY THE IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 5 (1991) (noting that the 
provisions governing the tribunal, as set out by the Claims Settlement Declaration, require the 
tribunal to “conduct all of its business in a manner consistent with the UNCITRAL Rules”). 
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expropriation.281 The tribunal disposed of a large number of claims, 
ultimately hearing more than 3900 cases in roughly twenty years.282 
Compliance with the tribunal’s awards was almost perfect, thanks to 
financial-security arrangements in the Algiers Accords; all of the 
tribunal’s awards were satisfied, either from funds escrowed by Iran 
or otherwise.283 Additionally, the tribunal’s awards were published 
and provide frequently cited authority on a range of international-law 
issues, including expropriation, nationality, remedies, and 
procedure.284 From almost any perspective, the tribunal fulfilled its 
mandate effectively and played a significant role in resolving the 
original—if not later—Iran-U.S. antagonisms. 
 
 281. See Charles N. Brower, Current Developments in the Law of Expropriation and 
Compensation: A Preliminary Survey of Awards of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 21 
INT’L LAW. 639, 639–40 (1987) (discussing the tribunal’s early expropriation decisions). See 
generally CHARLES N. BROWER & JASON D. BRUESCHKE, THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS 
TRIBUNAL 26–122 (1998) (discussing the tribunal’s jurisdiction). The Algiers Accords contained 
a choice-of-law provision, requiring the tribunal to make its decisions on the basis of “respect 
for law,” trade usages, and relevant contract provisions. Claims Settlement Declaration, supra 
note 277, art. V, 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 11.  
 282. David D. Caron & John R. Crook, The Tribunal at Work, in THE IRAN-UNITED 
STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL AND THE PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS RESOLUTION, 
supra note 276, at 133, 137. The tribunal issued some five hundred awards, a number dealing 
with multiple cases. Id. at 135. The tribunal remains in existence, albeit with a very limited 
docket. See Ronald J. Bettauer, The Task Remaining: The Government Cases, in THE IRAN-
UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL AND THE PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS 
RESOLUTION, supra note 276, at 355–60 (discussing the few government cases remaining before 
the tribunal in 2000). 
 283. See Sean D. Murphy, Securing Payment of the Award, in THE IRAN-UNITED STATES 
CLAIMS TRIBUNAL AND THE PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS RESOLUTION, supra note 
276, at 299–311 (discussing the various methods of securing payment of tribunal awards and the 
success of those methods). Awards made by the tribunal were subject to enforcement under the 
New York Convention. See, e.g., Iran Aircraft Indus. v. Avco Corp., 980 F.2d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 
1992) (“[W]e have held that even a ‘final’ and ‘binding’ arbitral award is subject to the defenses 
to enforcement provided for in the New York Convention.” (quoting Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copal 
Co., 517 F.2d 512, 517–19 (2d Cir. 1975))); Ministry of Def. of Iran v. Gould, Inc., 969 F.2d 764, 
770 (9th Cir. 1992) (“The award of the Claims Tribunal here has been held to fall under the 
New York Convention.”). 
 284. See, e.g., JOHN A. WESTBERG, INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS AND CLAIMS 
INVOLVING GOVERNMENT PARTIES: CASE LAW OF THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS 
TRIBUNAL 113–47 (1991) (discussing the tribunal’s findings regarding liability for 
expropriation); Caron & Crook, supra note 282, at 140–42 (discussing methods used by the 
tribunal for handling claims of dual nationals). See generally BROWER & BRUESCHKE, supra 
note 281 (discussing the tribunal’s methods of handling issues with respect to nationality, 
procedure, expropriation, and remedies, as well as the overall contribution of the tribunal to 
international law). 
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b. UN Compensation Commission.  The UNCC was established 
by the Security Council in 1991 and was granted the authority to 
award compensation for losses resulting from Iraq’s invasion of 
Kuwait. Security Council Resolutions 686285 and 687286 provided that 
Iraq “[was] liable under international law for any direct loss, 
damage—including environmental damages and the depletion of 
natural resources—or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and 
corporations as a result of [Iraq’s] unlawful invasion and occupation 
of Kuwait,”287 and they granted the UNCC jurisdiction to resolve 
claims against Iraq by foreign nationals.288 Resolution 687 also created 
a fund from Iraqi oil revenues to pay the amounts awarded by the 
UNCC.289 
As with the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, the UNCC heard claims 
by private parties, rather than simply hearing claims espoused by 
states.290 The claims asserted in the UNCC included the personal-
injury and wrongful-death claims of individuals forced to flee Kuwait; 
claims involving business, property, or related losses by individuals 
and corporations; and claims by states, including claims for 
compensation for environmental loss and resettlement costs.291 
Additionally, the UNCC heard claims by foreign states and 
international organizations against Iraq.292 
 
 285. S.C. Res. 686, U.N. Doc. S/RES/686 (Mar. 2, 1991). 
 286. S.C. Res. 687, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (Apr. 3, 1991). 
 287. Id. ¶ 16. 
 288. Id.; see also Bederman, supra note 275, at 1 (“[T]he United Nations Compensation 
Commission . . . was established to manage the staggering effort of providing billions of dollars 
of compensation to millions of claimants from over one hundred countries around the world.”); 
Veijo Heiskanen, The United Nations Compensation Commission, 296 RECUEIL DES COURS 
259, 267 (2002) (“In paragraph 18 of [Resolution 687] the Security Council decided ‘to create a 
fund to pay compensation for claims that fall within paragraph 16 . . . and to establish a 
Commission that will administer the fund.’” (quoting S.C. Res. 687, supra note 286, ¶ 18)); 
Francis E. McGovern, Dispute System Design: The United Nations Compensation Commission, 
14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 171, 171 (2009) (“[The UNCC] was designed to process and pay 
claims arising from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990.”). 
 289. S.C. Res. 687, supra note 286, ¶ 18; see also S.C. Res. 692, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/692 
(May 20, 1991) (establishing the fund). 
 290. In some cases, such as one concerning the claims of some 800,000 Egyptian workers in 
Iraq, a state espoused claims on behalf of a large number of similarly situated individuals. See 
McGovern, supra note 288, at 185 (“Included within these claims was a consolidated claim filed 
by the Central Bank of Egypt on behalf of over 800,000 Egyptian workers who had not received 
full compensation for their employment prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.”). 
 291. Heiskanen, supra note 288, at 278–87; McGovern, supra note 288, at 185.  
 292. Heiskanen, supra note 288, at 285; McGovern, supra note 288, at 180.  
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The UNCC consisted of a Governing Council, composed of 
representatives of Security Council members, and fifty-nine 
commissioners, selected by the Governing Council, who sat in panels 
of three members to assess individual claims.293 The panels of 
commissioners were charged with making recommendations to the 
Governing Council, which was empowered to render binding 
decisions on claims.294 The commissioners proceeded in a relatively 
summary fashion, generally issuing recommendations of 
compensation based on written submissions and without oral 
hearings.295 Proceedings before the Governing Council were even 
more summary in character, again taking place without oral hearings 
or the presentation of evidence.296 
In total, the UNCC received some 2.6 million claims, for 
compensation in excess of $350 billion.297 The commission completed 
its work expeditiously, concluding the claims-review process in June 
2005, only four years after the UNCC was established.298 In total, the 
UNCC awarded compensation totaling more than $52 billion on 
approximately 1.5 million claims.299 The amounts awarded were either 
paid from Iraqi oil revenues or waived. Despite some complaints 
about “rough justice,”300 the UNCC resolved a formidable number of 
claims involving very large sums efficiently and effectively—
notwithstanding its politically charged setting. 
 
 293. McGovern, supra note 288, at 180. 
 294. Id. at 181; Hans Wassgren, The UN Compensation Commission: Lessons of Legitimacy, 
State Responsibility, and War Reparations, 11 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 473, 477 (1998) (“[The 
Commissioners] carry out the validation and assessment of the claims and the executive body, 
the Governing Council, [makes] the final determination.”).  
 295. See Carlos Alzamora, Reflections on the UN Compensation Commission, 9 ARB. INT’L 
349, 355 (1993) (stating that “a simple, rapid and, in some cases, almost automatic procedure has 
been put in place” to handle claims); McGovern, supra note 288, at 181 (“[The Commissioners’] 
role was to sit in panels of three to review and evaluate claims and submit to the Governing 
Council their recommendations for payment.”).  
 296. McGovern, supra note 288, at 181 (“In practice . . . the Governing Council delegated 
most decisions and the application of their policies to the Commissioners.”). 
 297. McGovern, supra note 288, at 172. 
 298. Id.; see also Carlos Alzamora, The UN Compensation Commission: An Overview, in 
THE UNITED NATIONS COMPENSATION COMMISSION 3, 12 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1995) 
(discussing the speed with which the tribunal dealt with early claims). 
 299. Status of Processing and Payment of Claims, UNITED NATIONS COMPENSATION 
COMM’N (Oct. 27, 2011), http://www.uncc.ch/status.htm. 
 300. McGovern, supra note 288, at 189; see also Heiskanen, supra note 288, at 315–16 
(discussing the criticism that the UNCC’s resolution of claims “on a wholesale basis rather than 
through case-by-case adjudication” effectively amounts to a denial of Iraq’s right to due 
process).  
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5. World Trade Organization.  The WTO includes several 
important dispute-resolution bodies, most notably WTO panels and 
the WTO Appellate Body.301 The adjudicatory mechanisms 
established under the WTO’s 1994 Understanding on Rules and 
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) have 
evolved incrementally from the much less formal, nonbinding 
mechanisms of dispute resolution that were used previously under the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) regime.302 Many, 
but not all, of the aspects of the DSU’s current adjudicatory 
mechanisms differ significantly from those of traditional first-
generation tribunals and now bear a much closer resemblance to 
second-generation mechanisms. 
WTO panels and the Appellate Body are empowered to decide 
disputes arising under specifically identified WTO agreements;303 in 
principle, neither body is authorized to decide disputes under, or to 
apply, other international-law instruments.304 WTO panels are 
constituted in a manner similar to that used to select tribunals in 
 
 301. The WTO’s dispute-resolution mechanism is established by the WTO Understanding 
on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter 
DSU]; see also ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, THE GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
SYSTEM 182–91 (1997) (discussing the role of the DSU in the further legalization of panel 
procedures and the development of new appellate-review procedures). 
 302. See PETERSMANN, supra note 301, at 71 (“The Understanding . . . refers to 
the . . . GATT dispute settlement rules and procedures and replaces them by a new WTO 
dispute settlement system, which builds on the previous GATT dispute settlement system.” 
(citation omitted)); Michael K. Young, Dispute Resolution in the Uruguay Round: Lawyers 
Triumph over Diplomats, 29 INT’L LAW. 389, 405 (1995) (“The Understanding decisively moves 
the GATT dispute-resolution process towards a unified, coherent adjudicatory system.”). 
 303. DSU art. 3(2); see also Panel Report, United States—Continued Existence and 
Application of Zeroing Methodology, ¶ 7.179, WT/DS350/R (Oct. 1, 2008) (discussing the 
purpose of Article 3(2)—providing “security and predictability to the multilateral trading 
system”). 
 304. See Joel P. Trachtman, The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution, 40 HARV. INT’L L.J. 
333, 338 (1999) (“The WTO dispute resolution system is clearly not a court of general 
jurisdiction, competent to apply all applicable international law.”). Under the DSU, WTO 
panels and the Appellate Body are required to apply customary-international-law rules of 
interpretation in construing WTO agreements and are not authorized to “add to or diminish the 
rights and obligations provided in the covered [WTO] agreements.” DSU art. 3(2); see also 
MITSUO MATSUSHITA, THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM & PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, THE WORLD 
TRADE ORGANIZATION: LAW, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 109–11 (2d ed. 2006) (discussing the 
scope of the application of WTO agreements in the decisionmaking procedures of the WTO 
panels and the Appellate Body); John H. Jackson, The Great 1994 Sovereignty Debate: United 
States Acceptance and Implementation of the Uruguay Round Results, 36 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 157, 173 (1997) (“[D]ecision-making procedures of the WTO have been 
significantly circumscribed by negotiated treaty text.”).  
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international investment and commercial arbitration. Parties to a 
dispute are generally free to agree upon the identities of the members 
of the panel, which typically consists of three persons; if the parties do 
not reach an agreement, the WTO’s director general selects the 
panel.305 
The DSU prescribes a basic procedural framework, with an 
emphasis on efficiency, but individual panels have some flexibility to 
alter it in consultation with the parties.306 As with commercial and 
investment arbitrations, default decisions may be issued in WTO 
proceedings,307 making default virtually unthinkable. Although only 
states may formally participate in proceedings before WTO panels,308 
in practice, private parties play a substantial behind-the-scenes role in 
case development and presentation.309 
Absent either a negative consensus among all of the WTO 
members—including the party that prevailed—against the adoption 
of a report or an appeal against the report, panel reports are adopted 
promptly after they are issued.310 This approach altered the pre-1994 
approach under the GATT, according to which a positive consensus 
of all members—including the party that lost—was required to adopt 
a decision, making it virtually impossible for decisions to become 
binding.311 In contrast to many commercial arbitral regimes, WTO 
 
 305. DSU art. 8. Members of WTO panels are required to be independent. Id. art. 8(9). 
WTO panel members are selected from a list maintained by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body 
(DSB), which consists of experts in international-trade law. Id. art. 8(4). WTO member states 
may suggest names for inclusion on the list, and those names are then added following the 
approval of the DSB. Id.  
 306. Id. arts. 7, 12; id. app. 3. 
 307. See id. art. 6(1) (requiring a negative consensus to block the formation of a WTO 
panel). 
 308. Id. art. 1(1); Thomas J. Schoenbaum, WTO Dispute Settlement: Praise and Suggestions 
for Reform, 47 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 647, 653 (1998). 
 309. See GREGORY C. SHAFFER, DEFENDING INTERESTS: PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 
IN WTO LITIGATION 3–7, 15–17, 31–50, 66–101 (2003) (“Private parties—particularly well-
connected, wealthier, and better-organized ones—attempt to use the WTO legal system to 
advance their commercial ambitions.”). In some jurisdictions, legislation provides private 
parties with formal mechanisms for requesting states to initiate WTO proceedings. See Junrong 
Song, A Comparative Study on the Trade Barriers Regulation and the Foreign Trade Barriers 
Investigation Rules, 41 J. WORLD TRADE 799, 799–800 (2007) (“By establishing a legal 
procedure for the private sector to petition their government to challenge foreign trade barriers, 
the Trade Barriers Regulation . . . in the European Union and the Foreign Trade Barriers 
Investigation Rules in China are aimed to forge such partnership.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 310. DSU art. 16. 
 311. See Young, supra note 302, at 392 (“It would appear that the general GATT practice of 
requiring that all decisions of the contracting parties be unanimous has been a bit of a barrier to 
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panel reports may be appealed to the Appellate Body—a standing 
body of seven members serving fixed terms.312 The Appellate Body 
sits in three-person tribunals, with members selected largely by 
rotation, to hear appeals “limited to issues of law covered in the panel 
report and legal interpretations developed by the panel.”313 Appellate 
Body decisions are automatically adopted, again unless blocked by a 
negative consensus of all WTO members including the prevailing 
party.314 
In contrast to adjudication before traditional international 
tribunals, the WTO’s dispute-resolution mechanisms are compulsory: 
membership in the WTO requires acceptance of the DSU and the 
compulsory jurisdiction of WTO panels and the Appellate Body.315 
Decisions by WTO panels or the Appellate Body may also be 
enforced with reasonable efficacy, albeit not in the same manner as 
many other second-generation adjudicatory decisions. WTO decisions 
are not directly enforceable in national courts.316 Nonetheless, the 
 
authorizing the withdrawal of concessions.”). See generally PETERSMANN, supra note 301, at 66–
131 (discussing the GATT dispute-settlement system as well as the clarification and 
development of GATT/WTO law).  
 312. DSU art. 17(1)–(2); see also MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 304, at 117 (“Any party to 
a dispute . . . may appeal a panel report to a seven-member standing Appellate Body established 
for this purpose.”). Members of the Appellate Body are selected by the DSB. DSU art. 17; 
Steve Charnovitz, Judicial Independence in the World Trade Organization, in INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: TRENDS AND PROSPECTS 219, 
229 (Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Cesare P.R. Romano & Ruth Mackenzie eds., 2002). As 
a practical matter, WTO member states, particularly larger states, have a substantial role in 
suggesting and approving the members included on the Appellate Body. See Charnovitz, supra, 
at 228–29 (discussing the procedures used for nominating and approving members of the 
Appellate Body).  
 313. DSU art. 17(6); see also MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 304, at 108 (“The DSU creates 
an Appellate Body to review panel rulings.”).  
 314. DSU art. 17(14); see also id. art. 22(6) (requiring the DSB, under certain circumstances, 
to authorize a party to suspend concessions upon request “unless the DSB decides by consensus 
to reject the request”). 
 315. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization art. XII(1), Apr. 15, 
1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement]. In contrast to the fact that 
accession to the U.N. Charter and UNCLOS does not subject a state to the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the ICJ or ITLOS, see supra Part II.A.3–4, accession to the WTO subjects a state 
to the DSU and the jurisdiction of WTO panels and the Appellate Body, Marrakesh Agreement 
art. II(2). 
 316. See, e.g., Marco C.E.J. Bronckers, More Power to the WTO?, 4 J. INT’L ECON. L. 41, 
59–63 (2001) [hereinafter Bronckers, More Power to the WTO?] (proposing possible remedies 
for instances in which WTO members are unable or unwilling to comply with WTO decisions); 
Piet Eeckhout, The Domestic Legal Status of the WTO Agreement: Interconnecting Legal 
Systems, 34 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 11, 57–58 (1997) (discussing arguments for and against 
giving WTO Agreements “direct effect” in domestic courts). Indeed, some national 
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WTO DSU provides a specific mechanism enabling a complainant 
state to impose otherwise-impermissible trade sanctions against a 
state that has been held to have violated WTO rules and that has 
failed to comply with the decision—but only up to a specified amount 
equal to the harm to the complainant state caused by the violation.317 
Although sometimes criticized,318 the WTO enforcement mechanism 
has been frequently used and is reasonably effective in securing 
compliance with Appellate Body and panel decisions.319 In particular, 
sanctions have been permitted in sectors unrelated to those in which 
WTO decisions have found violations of WTO rules, effectively 
allowing complainant states to obtain monetary redress for favorable 
decisions against any of a respondent state’s trade.320 
 
implementing legislation provides that WTO decisions are not domestically enforceable. See, 
e.g., Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 102, 108 Stat. 4809, 4815 (1994) 
(codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3512 (2006)) (“No provision of any of the Uruguay Round Agreements, 
nor the application of any such provision to any person or circumstance, that is inconsistent with 
any law of the United States shall have effect.”). But cf. Marco C.E.J. Bronckers, From ‘Direct 
Effect’ to ‘Muted Dialogue’: Recent Developments in the European Courts’ Case Law on the 
WTO and Beyond, 11 J. INT’L ECON. L. 885, 886 (2008) (pointing out that WTO substantive 
rules may, in some instances, be incorporated into EU law and made enforceable in EU courts). 
 317. DSU art. 22(3). Disputes over sanctions imposed by a complainant state are resolved 
through a further dispute-resolution mechanism. Id. art. 22(6)–(7).  
 318. See, e.g., Bronckers, More Power to the WTO?, supra note 316, at 61 (“[I]t is . . . ill-
advised that WTO members are free either to play along with a WTO ruling or pay 
compensation.”); Petros C. Mavroidis, Remedies in the WTO Legal System: Between a Rock and 
a Hard Place, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 763, 811 (2000) (“WTO countermeasures, the ultima ratio of 
the system, fail[] on both effectiveness and impartiality grounds. Sometimes they can and 
sometimes they simply are not a structure that will induce compliance.”). Some commentators 
have suggested authorizing the imposition of monetary sanctions by WTO panels (paralleling 
investment- and commercial-arbitration remedies). See, e.g., Bronckers, More Power to the 
WTO?, supra note 316, at 62 (“[I]f compliance really is the ultimate goal of the WTO dispute 
settlement understanding, then monetary damages are apt to be more of an incentive for the 
non-complying government, given ever present budgetary constraints.”). But cf. Joel P. 
Trachtman & Philip M. Moremen, Costs and Benefits of Private Participation in WTO Dispute 
Settlement: Whose Right Is It Anyway?, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 221, 235–37 (2003) (discussing the 
possibility of allowing private-party litigation of WTO resolutions as an alternative mechanism 
for enforcement).  
 319. See Steve Charnovitz, The Enforcement of WTO Judgments, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 558, 
562 (2009) (“[T]he WTO dispute system has been effective because there is an expectation that 
decisions will ultimately be complied with.”); Gary Horlick & Judith Coleman, A Comment on 
Compliance with WTO Dispute Settlement Decisions, in THE WTO: GOVERNANCE, DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT & DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 771, 773 (Merit E. Janow, Victoria Donaldson & 
Alan Yanovich eds., 2008) (finding rates of 67 percent for full compliance, 24 percent for partial 
compliance, and 9 percent for noncompliance). 
 320. Charnovitz, supra note 319, at 562. Professors Scott and Stephan contend that the 
WTO lacks the authority “to impose self-executing sanctions on wrongdoers.” SCOTT & 
STEPHAN, supra note 9, at 113. Their critique is misplaced: virtually no international 
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Some four hundred cases have been filed under the WTO DSU 
since 1995, for an average of roughly twenty-seven cases filed per 
year.321 Annual filings at the WTO have varied, from highs of fifty in 
1997 and forty-one in 1998, to lows of eleven in 2005, thirteen in 2007, 
and fourteen in 2009.322 Rulings have addressed a wide range of trade 
issues that affect important areas of domestic and international 
regulation, including biotechnology, civil aviation, environmental 
regulation, tax, and antidumping.323 These decisions have not only 
resolved individual trade disputes that have substantial commercial, 
political, and regulatory consequences but have also contributed to 
the development of an extensive body of international-trade law that 
 
adjudicatory decisions are “self-executing”; they instead require enforcement by the 
complainant, such as through the enforcement of a judgment or award in a separate 
enforcement action. See, e.g., Anibal Sabater, National Courts, Supranational Courts and 
Arbitral Tribunals in International Litigation, CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE L.J., Summer 2005, at 3, 
9–11 (“[E]nforcement does not always automatically follow a rendered award. . . . In [some] 
countries, such as the U.S., awards are enforceable only after judgment has been entered upon 
them.”). The essential point is that when a WTO decision is not complied with, specific, 
enforceable sanctions are available and are reasonably effective, see supra note 319; that state of 
affairs is similar to the enforceability of arbitral awards and national court judgments and is 
dissimilar to the (un)enforceability of ICJ, ITLOS, and similar decisions, see supra note 315. 
Professors Scott and Stephan also suggest that the principal users of the WTO—the EU and the 
United States—in practice use WTO dispute resolution only for symbolic disputes, employing 
diplomacy for matters of national significance. SCOTT & STEPHAN, supra note 9, at 123–27. In 
fact, the EU and the United States have frequently submitted commercially significant disputes 
to WTO dispute resolution, including civil aviation, information technology, biotechnology 
(GMO and beef-hormone regulation), and foreign taxation disputes. See, e.g., WORLD TRADE 
ORG., ANNUAL REPORT 2010, at 82–101 (2010), available at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/
booksp_e/anrep_e/anrep10_e.pdf [hereinafter WORLD TRADE ORG., ANNUAL REPORT 2010] 
(listing all trade disputes presented to the WTO by the United States and the European 
Community in 2010); WORLD TRADE ORG., ANNUAL REPORT 2009, at 74–88 (2009), available 
at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/anrep09_e.pdf (listing all of the trade 
disputes presented to the WTO by the United States and the European Community in 2009).  
 321. WORLD TRADE ORG., ANNUAL REPORT 2010, supra note 320, at 82.  
 322. Id. at 84. 
 323. See, e.g., Claude E. Barfield, Free Trade, Sovereignty, Democracy: The Future of the 
World Trade Organization, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 403, 406 (2001) (“Rules for service industries—
banks, insurance companies, telecommunications and internet regulation, energy services, 
transportation, et cetera— . . . deal with complex issues that go deep into the economic and 
social structures of its member states . . . .”); Giorgio Sacerdoti, The Dispute Settlement System 
of the WTO in Action: A Perspective on the First Ten Years, in THE WTO AT TEN: THE 
CONTRIBUTION OF THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 35, 54 (Giorgio Sacerdoti, Alan 
Yanovich & Jan Bohanes eds., 2006) (“Disputes concern specific, mostly bilateral issues—such 
as antidumping, safeguards, and countervailing duties (trade remedies)—but involve also issues 
of interpretation and implementation with a wider impact and involving several states . . . .”).  
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serves a vitally important function in the world trading system.324 
Despite criticism, few would disagree that the WTO’s dispute-
resolution mechanisms now play a central and highly effective role in 
the regulation of international trade—just as international 
commercial and investment arbitration play vital roles in 
contemporary international commerce, finance, and investment. 
*          *          * 
As discussed, academic commentary evaluating contemporary 
international adjudication has focused almost entirely on first-
generation tribunals—the PCA, PCIJ, ICJ, and ITLOS—and selected 
European regional courts.325 Regardless of its perspective, this 
 
 324. See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: CONSTITUTION AND 
JURISPRUDENCE 59–100 (1998) (“The United States (as well as many other nations) has often 
expressed the view that the GATT and now WTO treaty texts are vitally important to 
improving a ‘rule-oriented’ international economic system, which should enhance the 
predictability and stability of the circumstances of international commerce . . . .”); Deborah 
Cass, The ‘Constitutionalization’ of International Trade Law: Judicial Norm-Generation as the 
Engine of Constitutional Development in International Trade, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 39, 43 (2001) 
(“[T]he [WTO appellate-review tribunal] is beginning to create, wittingly or not, a constitutional 
structure for international trade law.”); Joost Pauwelyn, The Role of Public International Law in 
the WTO: How Far Can We Go?, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 535, 540 (2001) (“[T]he WTO forms a 
general and increasingly universal framework for all (or almost all) of the trade relations 
between states.”); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Time for a United Nations ‘Global Compact’ for 
Integrating Human Rights into the Law of Worldwide Organizations: Lessons from European 
Integration, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 621, 644 (2002) (“[T]he WTO rules—even if formulated in terms 
of rights and obligations of governments—serve ‘constitutional functions’ for rendering human 
rights and the corresponding obligations of governments more effective in the trade policy 
area.”); Sacerdoti, supra note 323, at 35–60 (“Dispute resolution at the WTO stands out as a 
new chapter in the evolution of international justice.”); Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial 
Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and Political Constraints, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 
247, 251 (2004) (“WTO judicial decisions have created an expansive body of new law.”). 
 325. See, e.g., Alvarez, supra note 9, at 411–12 (noting the existence of arbitration between 
“MNCs and states,” but not discussing it); Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 6, at 284–97 
(examining the role of the ICJ and two European regional courts); Helfer & Slaughter, supra 
note 16, at 910–15 (analyzing regional courts on a five-point scale); Posner & Yoo, supra note 7, 
at 8–11 (discussing the PCA, PCIJ, ICJ, ITLOS, and regional courts). The same commentary 
also considers some international civil litigation in national courts, particularly litigation 
involving human-rights claims by private parties under the Alien Tort Statute in the United 
States. See POSNER, supra note 9, at 207–25 (describing Alien Tort Statute litigation as a “form 
of foreign litigation in domestic courts”); Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 6, at 290–97 
(“Approximately half of the signatories to the Convention have incorporated the treaty into 
domestic law, thereby allowing individuals to invoke the treaty and the ECHR’s judgments in 
national judicial proceedings.”); Koh, supra note 9, at 2365 (“[F]ederal courts became 
increasingly obliged to adjudicate commercial suits brought by individuals and private entities 
against foreign governments.”); Koh, supra note 9, at 2371 (“Transnational litigation . . . has 
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commentary seldom mentions, much less discusses in any detail, 
either the many forms of second-generation tribunals—including 
international commercial and investment arbitral tribunals and 
claims-settlement mechanisms—or the capacity of this new 
generation of international tribunals to render enforceable decisions. 
As a consequence, the conventional wisdom shared by virtually 
all commentary is that international tribunals lack both compulsory 
jurisdiction and the power to make enforceable decisions. As one 
author concludes, 
In the Westphalian system . . . adjudicative bodies, whether of a 
permanent character like the World Court or of an ad hoc character 
like arbitral tribunals, are instruments in the hands of the entities 
which make up this system without them being subjected to an 
authority which can compel them to make use of these instruments 
and which can, if need be, enforce their decisions.326 
This view is shared by commentators from every academic 
perspective. Reflecting deep skepticism about international 
adjudication, Professor Posner writes that “[s]tates may voluntarily 
comply with judgments, and they sometimes do. But they need not.”327 
Instead, according to these critics, states use international tribunals to 
“provide information” to the parties to a dispute.328 At the same time, 
but from a very different perspective, proponents of international 
adjudication, such as Professors Slaughter, Helfer, and Guzman, 
agree that contemporary international tribunals cannot render 
enforceable decisions: international tribunals “lack a direct coercion 
mechanism to compel . . . compliance”329 and “are simply tools to 
produce a particular kind of information.”330 
 
now migrated into the realm of public human rights suits against the United States and foreign 
governments and officials.”).  
 326. Kooijmans, supra note 21, at 408; see also supra text accompanying notes 13–30. 
 327. POSNER, supra note 9, at 34; see also Posner & Yoo, supra note 7, at 13–14 (“[O]ne 
should be skeptical of the claim that states would submit disputes to judges over whom they 
have no influence.”). 
 328. See POSNER, supra note 9, at 129 (“The courts help resolve bargaining failures between 
states by providing (within limits) information in (within limits) an impartial fashion.”); supra 
text accompanying notes 18–30. 
 329. Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 6, at 285–86; see also Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 16, 
at 903 (“Why would states ever agree to bind themselves to tribunals that they cannot control 
and that can hand down decisions that appear contrary to their national interests?”); supra text 
accompanying notes 10–21.  
 330. Guzman, supra note 1, at 235. 
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As discussed, this conventional wisdom is mistaken. Although 
these accounts may accurately describe traditional forms of 
international dispute resolution, such as the ICJ and ITLOS, they 
ignore the most successful instances of contemporary international 
adjudication: the second-generation tribunals that have developed 
over the past forty years. Contrary to conventional accounts, 
commercial and investment arbitral tribunals, new types of claims-
settlement tribunals, WTO panels, and national courts considering 
litigation against foreign states all have the authority to issue 
enforceable decisions and, in varying degrees, also possess effectively 
mandatory jurisdiction. 
The decisions of second-generation tribunals are not enforceable 
by a centralized enforcement agency, as is typically the case in 
domestic legal systems. Rather, their decisions are enforceable by 
virtue of a highly decentralized process, in which effectively all states 
have the power—and, under universally applicable conventions such 
as the New York Convention and the ICSID Convention, the 
obligation—to enforce international decisions against the assets of 
foreign states. Although different in design, this decentralized 
mechanism of enforcement is no less capable of overcoming 
Westphalian theories of national sovereignty and giving effect to rules 
of international law than a centralized enforcement mechanism. 
Indeed, this enforcement mechanism is achievable and effective 
precisely because it does not have a centralized enforcement 
authority. Diffused responsibility for enforcement obviates the need 
for a centralized and politically controversial enforcement authority, 
while maximizing the enforceability of decisions. At the same time, 
the intrusion on an individual state’s sovereignty is minimized 
because, in practice, only assets outside a state’s borders will be 
subject to execution to satisfy monetary awards. The frequent and 
relatively successful use of second-generation adjudicatory 
mechanisms, combined with their power to render enforceable 
decisions, squarely contradicts the conventional wisdom about the 
characteristics of international adjudication. 
It is of course true that not all arbitral awards or WTO decisions 
are immediately enforced because states may, for example, conceal 
their assets or use political and economic measures to resist 
enforcement. This possibility is no different, however, from the reality 
surrounding judgments of national courts against private parties, 
which face similar barriers to enforcement. Even in developed legal 
systems, substantial numbers of judicial decisions that are not 
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voluntarily complied with are not capable of being fully enforced;331 
compliance rates in less efficient legal systems are correspondingly 
worse.332 Indeed, given the very limited grounds available for the 
review of commercial and investor-state awards,333 these decisions are 
in fact materially more enforceable than domestic court judgments in 
most countries; the same is true of WTO and claims-settlement-
tribunal decisions.334 
III.  THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SECOND-GENERATION  
INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 
Commentary on contemporary international adjudication has 
focused almost entirely on traditional first-generation tribunals and 
has thereby significantly distorted its descriptions of the field. In 
addition, the omission of second-generation tribunals from the 
academic debate has distorted the analysis of contemporary 
international adjudication. In particular, the development and success 
of second-generation tribunals has important implications both for 
analysis of whether international adjudication is successful and for 
prescriptions for future international tribunals. 
First, the development of second-generation tribunals contradicts 
the claims of skeptics about international adjudication and 
international law more generally. Contrary to these claims, 
international adjudication before second-generation tribunals is 
 
 331. See, e.g., COLLIER & LOWE, supra note 7, at 5 (“It is said that something like 80 per 
cent of English court judgments are neither complied with voluntarily, nor enforced in their 
entirety.”); Hans Smit, Enforcement of Judgments in the United States of America, 34 AM. J. 
COMP. L. (SUPPLEMENT) 225, 230 (1986) (“The problems judgment creditors encounter in 
enforcing their judgments have been extensively documented.”).  
 332. Of course, judicial systems in most states qualify as less efficient; in reality, many are 
corrupt, arbitrary, and ineffective. See, e.g., Transparency Int’l, Executive Summary: Key Judicial 
Corruption Problems, in GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2007: CORRUPTION IN JUDICIAL 
SYSTEMS, at xxi, xxi–xxii (Diana Rodriguez & Linda Ehrichs eds., 2007), available at http://www.
transparency.org/content/download/19093/263155 (“[A] corrupt judiciary . . . diminishes trade, 
economic growth and human development . . . . [I]n one third of [sixty-two] countries more than 
10 per cent of [poll] respondents who had interacted with the judicial system claimed that they 
or a member of their household had paid a bribe to obtain a ‘fair’ outcome in a judicial case.”).  
 333. See 2 BORN, supra note 197, at 2553–2660 (“[T]he predominant tendency of 
contemporary arbitration legislation . . . is to limit the grounds on which an award can be 
annulled . . . .”); Klaus Peter Berger, The Modern Trend Towards Exclusion of Recourse Against 
Transnational Arbitral Awards: A European Perspective, 12 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 605, 617 
(1989) (“[G]rounds for this recourse are limited to procedural deficiencies or violations of 
public policy.”). 
 334. See supra text accompanying notes 204–07, 238–44, 283, 300, 315–20. 
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widely used and highly successful. Over the past forty years, these 
tribunals have developed large and growing caseloads that 
substantially exceed those of most other forms of international 
adjudication, including, in particular, traditional first-generation 
tribunals. At the same time, second-generation tribunals play vitally 
important roles in contemporary international affairs, particularly 
international trade and investment. Their decisions provide a striking 
contemporary example of international law’s being successfully 
applied to constrain and alter the conduct of states and to redress 
violations of international law. 
Second, in considering what forms of adjudication are successful 
and how to design future international adjudicatory mechanisms, it is 
essential that the structure of second-generation tribunals be 
considered. Prescriptions for international tribunals have frequently 
called for the use of independent courts, modeled closely on domestic 
appellate courts, with standing panels of tenured judges exercising 
broad jurisdictional competence and applying uniform procedural 
rules. Conversely, other prescriptions have argued for highly 
dependent, ad hoc international tribunals, authorized to order only 
weak and ineffective remedies. 
The design of second-generation tribunals is materially different 
from either of these prescriptions. Second-generation tribunals are 
modeled in large part on international commercial arbitral 
tribunals—with relatively dependent decisionmakers selected by the 
parties for specific cases, limited jurisdictional mandates, and tailored 
procedural rules. At the same time, second-generation tribunals are 
authorized to make enforceable decisions—a uniquely effective and 
powerful remedy by the standards of international adjudication. As 
discussed in Part II.B, tribunals with this structure have been the most 
popular, effective, and successful forms of international adjudication 
in recent decades. Prescriptions for future international adjudicatory 
mechanisms cannot continue to ignore either the success or the 
structure of second-generation tribunals. 
A. Second-Generation Tribunals: The Success of International 
Adjudication 
An analysis of the new generation of international tribunals that 
has developed over the past forty years is critical to an accurate 
understanding of contemporary international adjudication. Not only 
do second-generation tribunals render enforceable decisions, but they 
also represent a large, vibrant, and successful category of 
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international dispute resolution; indeed, by all appearances, they are 
more frequently used and more successful than traditional first-
generation tribunals. 
1. Caseloads of Second-Generation Tribunals.  States have used 
second-generation tribunals to resolve large numbers of international 
disputes. These disputes have thus far been limited to specifically 
defined subjects—in particular, trade, investment, and related 
matters—but they have nonetheless resulted in very substantial 
caseloads for many second-generation tribunals.  
As discussed, approximately three hundred international 
commercial arbitrations involving states or state entities are filed 
annually, whereas approximately forty new investment arbitrations 
are filed each year.335 Foreign-sovereign-immunity litigation in 
national courts has been almost as frequent, with roughly 250 suits 
filed against foreign states per year.336 Taken together, these figures 
alone exceed the total number of PCA, ICJ, and ITLOS cases filed 
each year by approximately sixty-fold.337 If the WTO’s twenty-seven 
cases per year, the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal’s 3900 total cases, and 
the UNCC’s 2.6 million claims are added to the balance, the volume 
of disputes in second-generation adjudication is even more 
significant, and the quantitative difference between first- and second-
generation adjudication is even more marked.338 All told, and 
recognizing the rough nature of statistics in the field, second-
generation tribunals currently hear substantially more than one 
hundred times as many cases per year as first-generation tribunals. 
Moreover, second-generation tribunals include the most vibrant 
types of contemporary international adjudication. The total number 
of PCA, ICJ, and ITLOS cases has remained largely stagnant since 
the late twentieth century.339 In contrast, the number of international 
investment and commercial arbitrations and litigations involving state 
entities has increased materially, both since 1990 and in more recent 
 
 335. See supra text accompanying notes 210–12, 250–62.  
 336. See supra text accompanying notes 186–87. 
 337. See supra text accompanying notes 65–70, 103–06, 124–25, 186–87, 210–12, 250–62. The 
figures are not altered by inclusion of regional courts and tribunals, such as the CACJ and 
ACJHR. See supra text accompanying notes 134–42. 
 338. See supra text accompanying notes 281–83, 297, 321–22. 
 339. See supra text accompanying notes 65–70, 103–05, 124–25. 
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years.340 Put simply, usage of second-generation adjudicatory bodies is 
high and robustly increasing, whereas usage of the ICJ, ITLOS, and 
PCA is relatively low and stagnant. 
2. Dispute-Resolution Provisions Selecting Second-Generation 
Tribunals: Contemporary Treatymaking Practice.  It is also useful to 
consider state practice over the past several decades with respect to 
including dispute-resolution provisions in treaties. These provisions 
evidence both existing state preferences and likely future caseloads 
because future disputes arise and are dealt with under existing 
treaties and dispute-resolution provisions. As with the existing 
caseloads of international tribunals, recent dispute-resolution 
provisions show that states are willing to use second-generation 
tribunals and enforceable forms of adjudication in significant 
numbers of cases and, again, much more frequently than traditional 
first-generation forms of dispute resolution. 
A review of treaties filed with the UN Secretariat for 1990, 1995, 
2000, and 2005 provides a representative sample of state practice with 
regard to dispute-resolution provisions in treaties and other 
international agreements.341 As detailed in the Appendix, the texts of 
roughly 440 treaties are available for each of these years, for a total 
sample of 1755 treaties.342 Of these, approximately 38 percent, or 672 
treaties, include some sort of dispute-resolution provision,343 and 
conversely, roughly 62 percent of all treaties contain no dispute-
resolution provision. 
Of the treaties containing a dispute-resolution provision, roughly 
45 percent, or 305 treaties, include only provisions for negotiations 
not involving any third-party decisionmaker.344 In effect, these treaties 
provide for little more than what general principles of international 
law already mandate: requiring the parties to negotiate in an effort to 
resolve any differences arising from the treaty but imposing no 
further obligations.345 The remaining 367 treaties, roughly 20 percent 
 
 340. See supra text accompanying notes 210–12, 250–61. WTO filings have decreased 
somewhat since 2000. See supra text accompanying notes 321–22.  
 341. See infra Appendix. 
 342. Id. 
 343. Id. 
 344. Id. 
 345. Thirteen treaties contain a specially designed “specific” dispute-resolution mechanism, 
often involving some sort of nonbinding third-party adjudication such as mediation, and another 
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of the 1755 reported treaties, contain some sort of binding dispute-
resolution mechanism. 
Of the treaties with binding dispute-resolution provisions, only 
three contain a provision providing for submission to the ICJ, ITLOS, 
or a similar body, out of a total of 1755 treaties studied.346 In contrast, 
348 treaties, or 94 percent of the treaties containing a binding dispute-
resolution provision, include some sort of arbitration clause.347 Of the 
348 treaties providing for arbitration, 134 treaties are BITs providing 
for enforceable decisions by investment arbitration mechanisms.348 An 
additional sixty-one treaties are bilateral air-transport or air-services 
treaties concluded under the auspices of the International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO),349 many of which also provide for 
enforceable arbitration mechanisms. Approximately a dozen of the 
remaining 146 treaties with arbitration clauses contain other 
provisions for enforceable forms of arbitration,350 whereas the 
 
four treaties provide for submission of disputes to a regional court, such as the ECJ or CACJ. 
Id. 
 346. Id. The three ICJ treaties were a bilateral agreement between the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees and Nicaragua concerning certain matters in Nicaragua, a 
multilateral agreement for controlling locusts in West Africa, and an interim agreement 
between Greece and Macedonia. Four additional treaties contain dispute-resolution provisions 
referring to the ECJ, CACJ, and ACJ. Id. 
 347. Id. Of these, and other than in BITs, only nine include PCA-arbitration provisions. 
 348. Id.; see also Andrew T. Guzman, The Cost of Credibility: Explaining Resistance to 
Interstate Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 303, 304 & n.3 (2002) (“[In 100 
surveys reviewed,] [o]f the 20 treaties with a mandatory dispute resolution clause, 12 were 
bilateral investment treaties.”). 
 349. The ICAO’s dispute-resolution mechanisms typically adopt an enforcement strategy 
like that under the WTO, providing that, if a state fails to comply with an arbitral award, its 
counterparty is free to withhold benefits promised under the treaty to the state and its nationals. 
E.g., Air Transport Agreement, Austria-It., art. 7, Jan. 23, 1956, 393 U.N.T.S. 97, 103–04 (“Each 
Contracting Party reserves the right to withhold an operating permit from an airline designated 
by the other Contracting Party . . . in any case where the airline fails to comply with . . . an 
arbitral award made in accordance with the provisions of article 8 . . . .”); see also Agreement on 
Air Transport, Can.-Neth., art. XXIII(5), Feb. 16, 2005, Trb. 2005, 167, p. 38 (Neth.) 
(“If . . . either Contracting Party fails to comply with any [arbitral] decision given under . . . this 
Article, the other Contracting Party may limit, withhold or revoke any rights or privileges which 
it has granted by virtue of this Agreement to the Contracting Party in default or to the 
designated airline in default.”); Air Services Agreement, Den.-Maced., art. 18(5), Mar. 20, 2000, 
2137 U.N.T.S. 279, 288 (“If . . . either Contracting Party fails to comply with any [arbitral] 
decision under . . . this Article, the other Contracting Party may limit, withhold or revoke any 
rights or privileges which it has granted by virtue of this Agreement to the Contracting Party in 
default or to the designated airline in default.”).  
 350. E.g., Development Credit Agreement (Social Action Fund Project), Tanz.–Int’l Dev. 
Ass’n, § 10.03(k), Aug. 30, 2000, 2138 U.N.T.S. 3, 41 (“If . . . the award shall not be complied 
with by the Association, the Borrower may take any such action for the enforcement of the 
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remainder provide only that awards will be “final,” “binding,” or not 
subject to appeal, without providing for any enforcement mechanism. 
In total, slightly more than 10 percent of the treaties contain express 
provisions for enforceable adjudication by some form of second-
generation tribunal. 
Although states devote substantial attention to designing 
dispute-resolution provisions, in recent decades they have virtually 
never concluded treaties that provide for the resolution of disputes by 
the ICJ, ITLOS, or other classic first-generation tribunals; only five 
times in the 1755 treaties studied did states agree to submit disputes 
to the ICJ or a similar tribunal. Indeed, and ironically, 179 treaties 
providing for interstate arbitration as a dispute-resolution mechanism 
specified the president of the ICJ as the default appointing authority 
for arbitrators.351 Rather than using the ICJ to resolve disputes, states 
are instructed to use the president of the ICJ as a means of ensuring 
the timely appointment of arbitral tribunals, a revealing indicator of 
states’ current attitudes toward effective forms of international 
adjudication. Similarly, and again ironically, the PCA has emerged 
after decades of disuse in recent years—but only after reinventing 
itself as an appointing authority for international investment and 
commercial arbitrations, which have dramatically increased its 
caseload.352 
In contrast, in the vast majority of treaties in which states agree 
to some form of binding third-party adjudication—94 percent, or 
roughly 20 percent of all reported treaties—they select some form of 
arbitration. Moreover, in a substantial number—roughly 10 percent 
of all reported treaties—states agree to arbitration mechanisms 
providing for enforceable awards, as is the case in most BITs and 
many bilateral air-transport treaties. This pattern of state practice 
both confirms the popularity of second-generation tribunals and 
 
award against the Association.”); Loan Agreement (Rural Development Project), Pol.–Int’l 
Bank for Reconstruction & Dev., § 10.04(k), July 25, 2000, 2143 U.N.T.S. 3, 51 (“[A]ny party 
may: (i) enter judgement upon, or institute a proceeding to enforce, the award in any 
court . . . against any other party; (ii) enforce such judgement by execution; or (iii) pursue any 
other appropriate remedy . . . for the enforcement of the award and the provisions of the Loan 
Agreement or the Guarantee Agreement.”). 
 351. An additional seven treaties provide for concurrent appointing authorities between the 
ICJ and another entity, generally either the Secretary General of the UN or the Secretary 
General of the PCA. 
 352. See supra text accompanying notes 69–70. 
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suggests that usage of these tribunals will continue to be significant in 
the future. 
3. Importance of Second-Generation Tribunals to Contemporary 
International Affairs and Law.  Second-generation tribunals are also 
vitally important to contemporary regimes for international trade and 
investment and, more generally, to the development and application 
of international law. As discussed, international commercial and 
investment arbitrations, backed by the possibility of litigation in 
national courts against foreign states, play a central role in 
contemporary international trade and investment by providing a 
neutral, efficient means of resolving disputes.353 The WTO is equally 
central to resolving disputes over contemporary international-trade 
regulation.354 In each of these instances, second-generation tribunals 
are essential to the fabric and success of modern trade and 
investment: without this form of dispute resolution, international 
trade and investment would be materially riskier and more difficult. 
As discussed, second-generation tribunals also deal with 
significant issues of national regulatory authority and the constraints 
imposed on that authority by international law. Investment 
arbitration and WTO decisions determine the compatibility of a wide 
range of domestic regulatory regimes with international standards, 
including the relationship between domestic prohibitions against 
expropriatory or inequitable conduct and WTO requirements 
regarding discriminatory treatment.355 Commercial arbitrations and 
national court litigation involving foreign states also frequently raise 
significant issues of international law, national regulatory policy, and 
government conduct.356 In each case, the decisions of second-
 
 353. See supra text accompanying notes 188–91, 213–16, 260–61. The availability of this 
means of dispute resolution is critical to the willingness of parties to engage in international 
commercial transactions with state entities: if private parties and states do not have confidence 
that future disputes can be resolved fairly and efficiently, then they will not enter into 
international transactions. 
 354. See supra text accompanying notes 323–24.  
 355. See supra text accompanying notes 252–54, 323–24. 
 356. See supra text accompanying notes 188–90, 214–16. National court litigation involving 
foreign states also resolves disputes over international human-rights norms. See, e.g., POSNER, 
supra note 9, at 207–25 (“If a plausible claim can be made that the emission of greenhouse gases 
violates human rights, and that these human rights are embodied in treaty or customary 
international law, then American courts may award damages to victims.”); Koh, supra note 9, at 
2347 (“[E]xamples of this . . . include[] international human rights suits . . . as well as actions by 
foreign governments against individual, American government, and corporate defendants.”). 
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generation tribunals have contributed to the development of 
significant and growing bodies of international law that again are 
essential to contemporary international-trade and investment 
regimes.357 
The vital role played by the decisions of second-generation 
tribunals in international trade and investment compares favorably 
with the role of first-generation tribunals in contemporary 
international affairs. As discussed, states make only limited use of 
traditional first-generation tribunals—both in drafting dispute-
resolution mechanisms for contemporary treaties and in actually 
using adjudicatory mechanisms. Moreover, outside the context of 
boundary disputes, even when states have submitted disputes to 
traditional international tribunals, the resulting decisions have 
frequently had limited practical effect—in part because they often 
have involved largely symbolic matters, have been ignored, or for 
other reasons. Proceedings before the ICJ such as the LaGrand 
Case,358 Legality of Use of Force,359 Oil Platforms,360 Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua,361 and Application of 
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination362 have generated substantial media attention 
 
 357. The significant role of investment arbitration in the development of contemporary 
international law has been noted by both its proponents, e.g., Jan Paulsson, International 
Arbitration and the Generation of Legal Norms: Treaty Arbitration and International Law, 
TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. (Dec. 2006), http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/
article.asp?key=883 (“[T]he field of international investment arbitration[’s] . . . legal status as a 
source of law is in theory equal to that of other types of international courts or tribunals.”), and 
its critics, e.g., GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW 4–
10, 70 (2007) (“[I]nvestment treaty arbitration . . . should . . . be understood as an international 
system that is elaborate and well entrenched, that has wide geographic scope, and that governs 
the bulk of the capital flows into developing and former communist countries.”); William 
Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Private Litigation in a Public Law Sphere: The Standard of 
Review in Investor-State Arbitrations, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 283, 283–96 (2010) (“[M]uch of 
investment treaty arbitration today must be understood as public regulatory or administrative 
law.”); Gus van Harten & Martin Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global 
Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 121, 149 (2006) (“[I]nvestment arbitration would appear 
to be the only case of global administrative law in the world today.”).  
 358. LaGrand Case (Ger. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27). 
 359. E.g., Legality of Use of Force (Serb. & Montenegro v. U.K.), Preliminary Objections, 
2004 I.C.J. 1307 (Dec. 15). 
 360. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161 (Nov. 6). 
 361. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 
I.C.J. 14 (June 27). 
 362. Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (Geor. v. Russ.), Preliminary Objections (Apr. 1, 2011), available at http://www.
icj-cij.org/docket/files/140/16398.pdf. 
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but have had limited impacts on the actual conduct of states. 
Similarly, none of the ITLOS’s decisions have had any effect on the 
actual behavior of states or private parties.363 
Instead, it is in commercial arbitrations, WTO cases, and BIT or 
ICSID proceedings that substantively important disputes have been 
decided: over the financial crises in Latin America and Asia, over the 
treatment of energy sectors in Russia and Venezuela, over civil-
aviation subsidies in Europe and the United States, over 
environmental regulations in the United States, and over the civil-
justice system. Similarly, it is increasingly in WTO, ICSID, and Iran-
U.S. Claims Tribunal decisions—not ICJ, ITLOS, or PCA decisions—
that important contemporary international-law principles dealing 
with issues of trade and investment, including expropriation and state 
responsibility, are found. Indeed, as noted previously, one of the 
primary reasons for the criticisms that have been leveled against some 
second-generation tribunals—notably, against investment arbitration 
and WTO tribunals—is concern about the increasing importance of 
their decisions.364 
Finally, second-generation tribunals provide many of the best 
examples of the successful application of international law over the 
past forty years. International investment-arbitration tribunals have 
been generally successful in adjudicating a wide range of disputes 
involving alleged abuses of state authority during recent decades;365 at 
the same time, the existence of effective adjudicatory mechanisms for 
investment protections has had significant effects on state behavior.366 
 
 363. See supra text accompanying notes 124–26. 
 364. E.g., VAN HARTEN, supra note 357, at 4–11 (“[S]tates have enabled privately 
contracted adjudicators to determine the legality of sovereign acts and to award public funds to 
businesses that sustain loss as a result of government regulation. This undermines basic 
hallmarks of judicial accountability, openness, and independence.”); Burke-White & von 
Staden, supra note 357, at 283–87 (“[I]nternational investment arbitration has become ‘a part of 
the “normal” investment landscape.’” (quoting U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., LATEST 
DEVELOPMENTS IN INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, at 2, U.N. Doc. 
UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IA/2009/6/Rev1 (2009))); see also supra text accompanying note 269. 
 365. See supra text accompanying notes 252–54. Second-generation tribunals have also 
played a vital role in developing a range of international-law topics, including procedural, 
evidentiary, remedial, and other issues. See CHESTER BROWN, A COMMON LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 3–4, 83–224 (2007) (“[I]nternational courts are increasingly 
recognizing that they have the power to issue judgements and awards in mandatory form. This 
appears to be an indispensable complement to the adjudicative function of international 
courts . . . .”). 
 366. See, e.g., Kingsbury & Schill, supra note 262, at 59 (“States, and their legal advisors, 
would be rash not to consider the arbitral jurisprudence on a specific issue in deciding how to 
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Similarly, international commercial-arbitration tribunals have 
successfully resolved countless substantial disputes between states or 
state entities and private parties during the same time period and 
provide an effective mechanism for holding states to their 
commercial—and other—commitments.367 For its part, the WTO has 
adjudicated, again generally successfully, a number of significant 
trade disputes368 and has influenced state behavior in instances in 
which adjudication has not ensued.369 Likewise, the Iran-U.S. Claims 
Tribunal and the UNCC resolved significant disputes in difficult 
political circumstances.370 In all of these cases, second-generation 
tribunals have played vital roles in effectively applying contemporary 
international law and directly affecting state conduct. 
B. Implications of Second-Generation Tribunals for International 
Adjudication 
The success and frequent use of second-generation tribunals 
have significant implications for the analysis of contemporary 
international adjudication. These phenomena bear directly on 
conclusions about the efficacy and importance of international 
adjudication and, hence, about the resources and attention that 
should be devoted to designing and using adjudicatory mechanisms. 
They also are directly relevant to prescriptions for the design of 
future international tribunals. 
1. Efficacy and Importance of International Adjudication.  The 
success of second-generation tribunals directly contradicts central 
claims by skeptics about the efficacy and value of international 
adjudication and, more broadly, international law. It is wrong to 
conclude, as Professors Posner, Yoo, and others do, that 
 
deal with a particular foreign investment. Regard to investment treaty awards is evident also in 
changes in State practice as States come to draft new investment treaties or revise existing 
ones.”); see also U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: INVESTOR-
STATE, at 13, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/30, U.N. Sales No. E.03.II.D.5 (2003) (“[T]he 
willingness to accept internationalized dispute settlement on the part of the host country may 
well be motivated by a desire to show commitment to the creation of a good investment climate. 
This may be of considerable importance where that country has historically followed a 
restrictive policy on foreign investment and wishes to change that policy for the future.”). 
 367. See supra note 217.  
 368. See supra notes 320, 323.  
 369. See, e.g., Guzman, supra note 1, at 225 (“The [WTO Appellate Body] is perceived to be 
quite effective, meaning that it promotes compliance with the underlying legal rules.”). 
 370. See supra Part II.B.4.  
BORN IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 20/12/2011  8:11 AM 
868 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:775 
the proliferation of international courts is a sign of the weakness of 
the international system, not its strength. . . . States set up courts and 
then find they cannot control them. Rather than submitting to their 
jurisdiction, they set up even more courts or more arbitration 
panels—ones that they think they can control.371 
It is also wrong to conclude that “[a]djudication today remains 
marginal to world affairs.”372 
On the contrary, the development of second-generation tribunals 
has entailed states’ devoting substantial effort to creating new forms 
of international adjudication that are more, not less, effective—
including forms of enforceable, effectively compulsory adjudication. 
It has also involved states’ then using, not ignoring, those dispute-
resolution mechanisms in a very substantial number of cases, 
particularly as compared with other forms of international 
adjudication—again, notwithstanding the fact that these mechanisms 
produce enforceable results. Moreover, in many circumstances, such 
as investment and commercial arbitration, foreign-sovereign-
immunity litigation, and claims-settlement tribunals, states have 
created adjudicatory mechanisms that private parties—not just 
states—can use, taking the ability to determine whether or not to use 
these mechanisms out of state control. 
None of these developments conform to the image of ineffective, 
marginal international adjudication ignored by states, an image that is 
central to skeptics’ evaluations of the field. Instead, states have 
created an almost entirely new generation of tribunals, vesting them 
with the power to issue peculiarly effective, enforceable decisions, 
often at the behest of private parties, and have then made frequent 
use of those tribunals. This is exactly the opposite of what Professor 
Posner’s, Professor Yoo’s, and other critics’ analyses claim. The 
frequent use and efficacy of these second-generation tribunals 
provide compelling evidence of the success of international 
adjudication and, more generally, of international law itself.373 
 
 371. Posner & Yoo, supra note 7, at 173–74; see also id. at 167 (“[T]he most plausible reason 
for the proliferation of courts [is that] states become unhappy with an existing international 
court, and they work around it by depriving it of jurisdiction and establishing additional 
courts . . . .”). 
 372. POSNER, supra note 9, at 132. 
 373. Conversely, international investment and commercial arbitration and WTO dispute 
resolution are subject to criticism precisely because of their significance to contemporary 
international affairs and the development of international law. See supra text accompanying 
notes 263–69. 
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2. Models for Future International Tribunals.  The frequent use 
and success of second-generation tribunals also have important 
implications for the design of contemporary international 
adjudicatory bodies. The success indicates that the structure of these 
forms of adjudication deserves at least the same attention as 
traditional first-generation tribunals; indeed, the evidence suggests 
that second-generation tribunals will often provide a more attractive 
and effective model than traditional adjudicatory mechanisms for 
future forms of international adjudication.  
Nevertheless, most commentary has not regarded second-
generation tribunals as helpful models for future international 
adjudicatory bodies. On the one hand, proponents of international 
adjudication argue that there is a “growing global consensus that 
adjudicatory bodies outside the nation state should be 
independent.”374 These commentators contend that international 
adjudicatory bodies should be structured “more like . . . court[s]”375—
particularly, more like independent appellate courts such as the 
ECJ.376 On the other hand, skeptics of international adjudication take 
the opposite tack, arguing that “[i]nternational courts succeed best 
when they are subject to strict limitations—voluntary jurisdiction, 
limited jurisdiction, weak remedies, and so forth.”377 
Neither of these prescriptions can be reconciled with the 
frequent use and success of second-generation tribunals over the past 
three decades. That success weighs strongly against using idealized 
conceptions of either independent courts or purely dependent 
tribunals as the exclusive models for international tribunals. 
As discussed, virtually all first-generation tribunals have enjoyed 
very limited success—apart from the ECJ, which is a regional 
European exception with limited relevance in other international 
settings.378 The record of first-generation tribunals stands in stark 
 
 374. Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 16, at 914; see also supra text accompanying notes 40–
41.  
 375. Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 6, at 365; see also supra text accompanying notes 37–41.  
 376. Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 6, at 276 (“[The ECJ] perche[s] atop national 
governments and national law with no direct relationship to either.”); see also id. at 387 (noting 
the success of the ECJ in making up for its “lack of direct coercive power by convincing 
domestic government institutions to exercise power on [its] behalf”). 
 377. POSNER, supra note 9, at 173. 
 378. See supra text accompanying notes 154–65. Although states have created significant 
numbers of nominally independent tribunals modeled on national appellate courts, such as the 
PCIJ, ICJ, ITLOS, and many regional courts, they have in practice made limited use of these 
tribunals. See supra text accompanying notes 65–68, 90–92, 103–06, 124–25. 
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contrast to the experience with second-generation tribunals, which 
have witnessed substantial and continuing usage and notable 
success—both in resolving individual disputes and in playing essential 
systemic roles in contemporary international affairs.379 Although the 
model of traditional first-generation adjudication may have useful 
applications in some circumstances, such as within some regional 
integration efforts, the structure and design of second-generation 
tribunals offer at least an equally—and often materially more—
promising prospect as a model for most future international 
adjudicatory bodies. 
Conversely, the success of second-generation tribunals also 
argues against prescriptions for entirely dependent adjudicatory 
mechanisms that are wholly subject to the state parties’ control and 
that lack any enforcement authority. As discussed, second-generation 
tribunals have flourished, notwithstanding their power to render 
enforceable decisions, including decisions at the behest of private 
parties. Indeed, the success and frequent use of second-generation 
tribunals are partially attributable precisely to the enforceable 
character of their decisions, which enables states to make highly 
credible commitments and allows both states and private parties 
effectively to enforce those commitments. 
Moreover, although the structures and procedures of second-
generation tribunals have numerous elements of dependence, they 
also have important aspects of independence. In particular, second-
generation tribunals share a number of institutional characteristics 
that differ from both “independent” first-generation tribunals and 
purely “dependent” tribunals. Thus, second-generation tribunals 
have: (a) been granted limited jurisdictional and remedial 
competence, ordinarily only the power to award monetary relief; 
(b) been utilized in individual cases, with substantial involvement of 
the parties; and (c) applied adjudicatory procedures that are aimed at 
efficient, effective factfinding, that are tailored to particular parties 
and cases, and that are frequently combined with some form of 
limited appellate review. These characteristics are most apparent with 
international commercial- and investment-arbitration tribunals and 
claims-settlement bodies, but can also be observed, less consistently, 
in WTO proceedings and foreign-sovereign-immunity litigation in 
national courts. 
 
 379. See supra Part III.A. 
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First, as discussed, the jurisdiction of international commercial- 
and investment-arbitration tribunals is defined narrowly and with 
considerable specificity by the arbitration provisions of either a 
commercial agreement, a bilateral treaty, or another document.380 
Claims-settlement tribunals exercise comparably limited, determinate 
jurisdiction.381 The WTO is similar, with the panel’s and the Appellate 
Body’s competence limited to interpretation of specified WTO 
agreements382 and their interpretive discretion constrained by both the 
detailed character of the agreements and the formal prohibitions in 
the WTO DSU.383 These aspects of second-generation adjudication 
contrast markedly with the sweeping aspirations and broad 
compulsory jurisdiction of traditional first-generation tribunals, 
features that are also characteristic of independent national courts.384 
A related aspect of the limited jurisdiction of second-generation 
tribunals is the remedies they may grant. The ICSID Convention 
limits the obligation of contracting states to enforce awards to the 
pecuniary aspects of such awards.385 Similarly, the enforcement of 
 
 380. See supra text accompanying notes 218–37. In the case of commercial-arbitration 
agreements, these provisions are typically included in commercial contracts and provide for 
arbitration of a defined category of future disputes—typically those “relating to” a particular 
contract. See 1 BORN, supra note 197, at 1090 (listing the “limited number of fairly standard 
formulae used in arbitration agreements to describe the scope of such provisions”). In the case 
of investment arbitrations, many proceedings are conducted pursuant to traditional arbitration 
clauses covering future disputes in investment agreements. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra 
note 195, §§ 1.31–.33 (“The traditional form of consent to arbitration between a foreign investor 
and a host state was through an arbitration clause in a contract . . . .”); SCHREUER ET AL., supra 
note 220, at 356–62 (discussing the form and validity of concurrent arbitration clauses). 
Alternatively, the jurisdiction of tribunals is defined by the terms of a BIT, sometimes in 
conjunction with a further expression of state consent—in investment legislation or otherwise. 
See supra text accompanying notes 222–28. 
 381. See supra text accompanying notes 277, 281.  
 382. See DSU art. 3(2) (noting that the WTO’s dispute-settlement system “serves to 
preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the 
existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of 
public international law”); MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1036 (6th ed. 2008) 
(explaining that the WTO has jurisdiction when “a member state considers that a measure 
adopted by another member state has deprived it of a benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly 
under the GATT or other covered agreements”); Trachtman, supra note 304, at 338, 342–43 
(“The WTO dispute resolution system is clearly not a court of general jurisdiction, competent to 
apply all applicable international law.”); supra text accompanying notes 304, 313. 
 383. See DSU art. 3(2) (“Recommendations and rulings of the [DSB] cannot add to or 
diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements.”); supra notes 303–04 
and accompanying text. 
 384. See supra text accompanying notes 51–52, 81, 97–99.  
 385. See supra text accompanying notes 241–42.  
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awards under BITs, NAFTA, and the New York Convention is either 
formally or effectively limited to monetary enforcement against a 
foreign state’s assets.386 Enforcement of WTO decisions is also 
effectively monetary in character, taking place through the imposition 
of trade sanctions within specified financial limits.387 Again, this 
contrasts with the putatively broad remedial jurisdiction of the ICJ, 
the ITLOS, and other first-generation tribunals.388 
The limited jurisdictional and remedial competence of second-
generation tribunals contrasts with the calls for independent 
international tribunals modeled on either the ICJ or domestic 
appellate courts and exercising broad competence. Indeed, the 
success of second-generation adjudicatory mechanisms with limited, 
specifically defined jurisdictional mandates recommends exactly the 
opposite approach toward tribunals’ competence. At the same time, 
the success of second-generation tribunals that have been authorized 
to issue enforceable decisions at the behest of private parties also 
contrasts with competing prescriptions that international tribunals 
should be weak, ineffective, and subject to state control. 
A second and related structural characteristic of second-
generation tribunals concerns the selection of decisionmakers. 
Enforceable adjudicatory mechanisms have generally been accepted 
only when tribunals are selected for specific cases, with substantial 
involvement of the parties. This has typically resulted in tribunals that 
are, in the terminology of most commentators, relatively dependent 
on the parties to a dispute.389 
Thus, in commercial arbitrations, there is no standing 
decisionmaking body; parties to disputes instead choose tribunals on 
 
 386. See supra text accompanying notes 204–07.  
 387. See supra text accompanying notes 317–20.  
 388. A related feature of second-generation tribunals is that they typically apply 
comparatively specific legal rules, rather than indeterminate standards. See Gary Born, 
Designing Effective International Tribunals 1 (Sept. 27, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with the Duke Law Journal) (“States have generally rejected the ICJ’s optional clause 
jurisdiction . . . and have similarly declined to accept the ITLOS’s general jurisdiction.”); supra 
text accompanying notes 229–37, 301–09.  
 389. See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 16, at 942–54 (“[S]tates . . . fine-tune their influence 
over the tribunal and its jurisprudential output using a diverse array of structural, political, and 
discursive controls.”); Posner & Yoo, supra note 7, at 7 (“[S]tates will be reluctant to use 
international tribunals unless they have control over the judges.”); cf. Helfer & Slaughter, supra 
note 6, at 300–01, 303–04, 312–14 (suggesting strategies for choosing jurists to attract claimants, 
stressing the importance of independent-factfinding capacity to a tribunal’s authority, and 
emphasizing “the link between a supranational tribunal’s authority and its neutrality” with 
respect to political interests). 
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an ad hoc basis, and jurisdiction is limited to particular cases. In 
practice, parties ordinarily agree upon the identities of the members 
of three-person tribunals, often with each party nominating a co-
arbitrator and the two co-arbitrators selecting the presiding 
arbitrator—failing which, an appointing authority will do so.390 
Similarly, in investment arbitrations, tribunals are selected on an ad 
hoc, case-by-case basis, through appointment procedures identical to 
those in commercial arbitrations.391 WTO panels are selected on a 
broadly similar, case-by-case basis, with the parties free to agree upon 
the composition of the panels in particular cases, and the Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB) selecting panels in the absence of party 
agreement.392 All of these procedures differ materially from the ideal 
of independent standing judiciaries prescribed for international 
tribunals by many contemporary commentators.393 
At the same time, however, various forms of second-generation 
adjudication also provide for limited forms of appellate review of 
first-instance decisions, often by tribunals with a measure of 
independence from the parties. This type of review exists in ICSID 
investment arbitrations,394 WTO proceedings,395 and NAFTA Chapter 
19 proceedings.396 These mechanisms combine first-instance tribunals 
that are highly dependent in most respects with a review tribunal that 
exercises very limited jurisdiction and whose members enjoy a 
higher—but still limited—degree of independence. Again, this 
structure contrasts with both blanket calls for independent 
 
 390. See 1 BORN, supra note 197, at 17, 1399 (“[I]n most jurisdictions, a party’s failure to 
appoint an arbitrator in accordance with an ad hoc arbitration agreement permits its counter-
party to apply for judicial appointment of the defaulting party’s co-arbitrator.”). 
 391. See supra text accompanying notes 235–37. 
 392. See supra note 305.  
 393. See supra text accompanying notes 374–76. 
 394. ICSID arbitral awards—but not non-ICSID, BIT, or NAFTA awards—are subject to 
annulment on very limited grounds by annulment committees, selected by ICSID—not the 
parties—from a standing list of potential committee members. See supra note 237.  
 395. Broadly paralleling the ICSID structure, WTO panel reports are subject to limited 
appellate review by the WTO Appellate Body—a standing body from which the members of 
appellate tribunals in particular cases are selected. Although less dependent than arbitral 
tribunals, the WTO Appellate Body is more dependent than most first-generation tribunals, 
including the ICJ and the ITLOS; among other things, WTO Appellate Body members are 
chosen for relatively short four-year terms and are eligible for reappointment, which is coveted. 
See supra note 312 and accompanying text.  
 396. An appellate mechanism is provided by NAFTA’s Extraordinary Challenge 
Committee, which can hear a limited range of challenges to NAFTA awards under Chapter 19. 
NAFTA, supra note 45, art. 1904(13), 32 I.L.M. at 688. 
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international tribunals and similar prescriptions for entirely 
dependent tribunals. 
A third structural aspect of second-generation tribunals concerns 
the procedures they apply, particularly for factfinding. The 
procedural and factfinding regimes in international commercial and 
investment arbitrations have been designed to satisfy users’ 
expectations—including those of state parties—and, at the same time, 
to provide mechanisms for addressing dissatisfaction, both 
systemically and in specific cases.397 Thus, most international 
arbitrations are conducted pursuant to institutional rules that provide 
a comparatively skeletal procedural framework,398 allowing the parties 
substantial freedom to participate in the design of procedures tailored 
to particular parties and disputes.399 
The procedures in most second-generation tribunals have been 
designed to facilitate the effective presentation and evaluation of 
factual evidence. Both commercial and investment arbitrations 
typically involve substantial factfinding, including the examination of 
witnesses in direct and cross-examination, mandatory disclosure of 
documents, and evaluation of expert evidence.400 The same is true of 
the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal and WTO panels, which involve 
 
 397. See supra text accompanying notes 203, 235–37, 264–68. Similar procedures are used in 
the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal and WTO panel proceedings. See supra text accompanying notes 
280, 305–06. 
 398. Examples include the UNCITRAL Rules and the rules of leading arbitral institutions. 
See 1 BORN, supra note 197, at 150–69 (outlining the rules of UNCITRAL and describing 
sixteen leading international-arbitration institutions). 
 399. See Kenneth S. Carlston, Procedural Problems in International Arbitration, 39 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 426, 448 (1945) (“Procedure is no unalterable course of conduct to which all tribunals 
must adhere. It should always be adapted to facilitate the course of the particular arbitration 
and to enable the economical accomplishment of its task within the time fixed.”); Laurent Lévy 
& Lucy Reed, Managing Fact Evidence in International Arbitration, 13 ICCA INT’L ARB. 
CONGRESS 633, 644 (2007) (“Adopting formal guidelines . . . is unnecessary and 
counterproductive. . . . [E]xtensive harmonization of procedural rules for witness testimony 
would not serve the interests of parties wishing to resort to international commercial 
arbitration . . . .”). 
 400. See John R. Crook, Fact-Finding in the Fog: Determining the Facts of Upheaval and 
Wars in Inter-State Disputes, in THE FUTURE OF INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 313, 315–20 
(Catherine A. Rogers & Roger P. Alford eds., 2009) (discussing the process of factfinding in 
investor-state arbitration). See generally Richard Mosk, The Role of Facts in International 
Dispute Resolution, 304 RECUEIL DES COURS 11 (2003) (discussing factfinding procedures in 
international adjudication and arbitration). 
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procedures broadly similar to those in commercial and investment 
arbitrations.401 
Again, the procedures in these second-generation settings differ 
materially from the procedures in traditional international 
adjudications, as well as in purely dependent tribunals. The 
procedures used in most first-generation tribunals are a standing set 
of generally applicable rules that are drawn up in a multilateral 
setting in which the need to satisfy a wide range of very different 
procedural expectations produces a lowest-common-denominator 
approach, and that are applied by large tribunals of a dozen or more 
senior jurists modeled on national appellate courts. Not surprisingly, 
these procedures are typically ineffective when used for factfinding. 
For example, “hearings” in the ICJ involve three hours of sitting per 
day, during which counsel read prepared submissions to a fifteen-
person tribunal that virtually never asks questions.402 Moreover, 
compelled disclosure from counterparties is essentially unknown,403 
and witness testimony and examination is equally rare.404 Other first-
 
 401. On the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, see STEWART ABERCROMBIE BAKER & MARK 
DAVID DAVIS, THE UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES IN PRACTICE: THE EXPERIENCE OF 
THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 1–3 (1992); and Jamison M. Selby & David P. 
Stewart, Practical Aspects of Arbitrating Claims Before the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 
18 INT’L LAW. 211 (1984). On the WTO, see Bashar H. Malkawi, Arbitration and the World 
Trade Organization, 24 J. INT’L ARB. 173, 176–78 (2007). 
 402. Cecily Rose, Questioning the Silence of the Bench: Reflections on Oral Proceedings at 
the International Court of Justice, 18 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 47, 49 (2008) (“During the [ICJ] 
hearings, the Registrar and the fifteen judges of the ICJ . . . sit in almost total silence in black 
robes behind a long bench. . . . [R]epresentatives . . . address the bench virtually uninterrupted 
for several hours, usually by reading, verbatim, a prepared text distributed in advance to the 
judges.”); see also Alain Pellet, Remarks on Proceedings Before the International Court of 
Justice, 5 LAW & PRAC. INT’L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 163, 181 (2006) (“‘Procedurally speaking,’ the 
[ICJ] is not aging well.” (footnote omitted)). But see 3 SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE LAW AND 
PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT, 1920–2005, at 1297, 1304 (4th ed. 2006) (“Although 
the Court does not usually interfere in the manner in which a case is pleaded, the faculty to put 
questions . . . is regularly used.”). See generally ANNA RIDDELL & BRENDAN PLANT, EVIDENCE 
BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 308–11 (2009) (providing reasons for the 
lack of testimonial evidence in the ICJ). 
 403. THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 336 
(2002) (“[T]he ICJ has no procedures by which one party can compel the disclosure of evidence 
by the other, because compelled disclosure is inconsistent with the nature of sovereignty.”); 
Crook, supra note 400, at 326 (“Tribunals in inter-state cases rarely encourage or require states 
to disclose documents or evidence to the other party . . . .”). 
 404. See Crook, supra note 400, at 327 (“There have been few cases in which the [ICJ] has 
heard oral testimony . . . .”); Phillip C. Jessup, Foreword to DURWARD V. SANDIFER, 
EVIDENCE BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS, at vii, x (rev. ed. 1975) (“Most of the 
evidence received by the [ICJ] is documentary . . . .”); cf. 3 ROSENNE, supra note 402, at 1312–13 
(summarizing the process of obtaining witness testimony in several cases); Rosalyn Higgins, The 
BORN IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 20/12/2011  8:11 AM 
876 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:775 
generation tribunals also provide minimal opportunities for effective 
factfinding.405 
In all of these respects, second-generation tribunals share a 
number of vital institutional characteristics and procedures that differ 
substantially from both their independent first-generation 
counterparts and from prescriptions for purely dependent tribunals. 
Given the striking success of second-generation tribunals, it is both 
appropriate and necessary to consider whether these characteristics 
provide attractive, effective models for future forms of international 
adjudication. 
Addressing this question raises issues that are beyond the scope 
of this Article and that are the subjects of a forthcoming companion 
piece.406 Among other things, the subject requires more detailed 
consideration of the structures and procedures that states have used 
for existing second-generation tribunals; the particular settings in 
which such tribunals have successfully been used; and the questions 
whether second-generation structures could be used in new settings, 
and, if so, which ones. As discussed, second-generation tribunals have 
been used only in relatively specific contexts, principally concerning 
trade and investment, and have been subject to significant structural 
conditions. It may be that second-generation structures are ill suited 
for other settings or, conversely, that they can be applied much more 
 
Desirability of Third-Party Adjudication: Conventional Wisdom or Continuing Truth?, in 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: LAW IN MOVEMENT 37, 42–46 (J.E.S. Fawcett & Rosalyn 
Higgins eds., 1974) (“The evidence seems to be that, so far as fact-finding is essential to the 
weighing of any legal claims, fact-finding commissions are likely to be more effective than a 
judicial body.”).  
 405. Traditional interstate arbitrations were historically conducted pursuant to procedures 
that closely resembled PCIJ and ICJ proceedings, albeit with less unwieldy tribunals that 
provided little room for the development of factual matters. See James Crawford, Advocacy 
Before the International Court of Justice and Other International Tribunals in State-to-State 
Cases, in THE ART OF ADVOCACY IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 11, 12–13 (R. Doak 
Bishop ed., 2004) (“Since new evidence . . . is generally inadmissible after the close of written 
pleadings, the notion of ‘development’ generally takes the form of recapitulation, emphasis and 
argument in the alternative.”). The ITLOS’s procedural rules and the composition of the 
tribunal, which consists of twenty-one members, closely parallel those of the ICJ and, if the 
tribunal is ever used to any appreciable extent, would likely produce comparable procedures. 
See UNCLOS, supra note 116, annex VI, art. 2, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 561 (“The Tribunal shall be 
composed of a body of 21 independent members . . . .”); id. annex VI, art. 13, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 
564 (“[A] quorum of 11 elected members shall be required to constitute the Tribunal.”); supra 
text accompanying notes 116–26. Similarly, regional courts, such as the ACJHR and CACJ, are 
also relatively large tribunals, again structured like appellate courts, which offer few 
opportunities for effective factfinding. See supra text accompanying notes 129–47.  
 406. Born, supra note 388.  
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widely. It may also be that different tribunals, with different 
institutional designs, are appropriate in different settings. 
The essential point for present purposes, however, is that the 
consideration of models for international adjudication cannot 
properly be limited to traditional first-generation tribunals, based on 
independent national appellate courts, or limited to prescriptions for 
purely dependent tribunals. Instead, models for future international 
tribunals should also look to the carefully designed, distinctive 
structures and procedures of second-generation tribunals. It is these 
tribunals that have achieved the most frequent usage and the most 
successful application of international law in the late twentieth and 
early twenty-first centuries, and it makes no sense for their model to 
continue to be ignored in discussions of contemporary international 
adjudication. 
CONCLUSION 
The past forty years have seen the development of a new 
generation of international tribunals, best represented by 
international commercial- and investment-arbitration tribunals. 
Unlike traditional public-international-law tribunals, these second-
generation tribunals issue enforceable decisions and exercise what is 
effectively compulsory jurisdiction. They have also been the most 
frequently used and, in many respects, most successful form of 
international adjudication in recent decades. Among other things, 
second-generation tribunals have played vital roles in international 
trade, finance, and investment; have contributed to the development 
of important fields of international law; and have provided leading 
contemporary examples of international law working in practice. 
The success and frequent usage of second-generation tribunals 
have important implications for analysis of international adjudication. 
They contradict claims that international adjudication is marginal and 
unimportant in contemporary international affairs and that states do 
not use international tribunals, particularly tribunals that are 
effective. In fact, second-generation tribunals have been widely and 
successfully used, in part precisely because they issue effective and 
enforceable decisions. 
At the same time, the widespread usage and success of second-
generation tribunals also contradict prescriptions that future 
international tribunals be modeled on independent first-generation 
tribunals, national courts, or, alternatively, on entirely dependent 
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tribunals. Instead, successful second-generation tribunals exhibit a 
blend of structural characteristics that contradict blanket 
prescriptions for independence and that instead counsel in favor of 
more tailored, nuanced institutional designs of future international 
tribunals than existing prescriptions contemplate. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Dispute-Resolution Provisions in Treaties and International Agreements 
(1990, 1995, 2000, 2005) 
  1990 1995 2000 2005 Total Avg. 
a) 
Total Number of 
Registered Treaties  
with Text Available 
(“Available Treaties”)  
564 647 324 220 1755 439 
b) 
Number of Treaties with 
a Dispute-Resolution 
Provision (DRP) 
151 241 175 105 672 168 
c) 
As a Percentage of 
Available Treaties  
(b/a × 100) 
27% 37% 54% 48% 38%  
d) 
“Negotiation” DRP: 
Number of Treaties 56 88 98 63 305 76 
e) 
As a Percentage of 
DRP Treaties  
(d/b × 100) 
37% 37% 56% 60% 45%  
f) 
“Specific Mechanism” 
DRP: Number  
of Treaties 
5 5 2 1 13 3 
g) 
“ICJ Jurisdiction” DRP: 
Number of Treaties 1 1 1 0 3 1 
h) 
“Arbitration” DRP: 
Number of Treaties 89 144 73 42 348 87 
i) 
Number of  
BITs with an 
Arbitration DRP 
33 64 24 13 134 34 
j) 
Number of ICAO 
Treaties with an  
Arbitration DRP 
19 24 15 3 61 15 
k) 
Number of Other 
Treaties with an  
Arbitration DRP 
37 56 34 26 153 38 
l) Regional Court DRP 
(ECJ, CACJ, etc.): 
Number of Treaties 
0 3 1 0 4 1 
